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ABSTRACT
The subject of this study is the construction of the German
High Seas Fleet at the turn of the century from 1897 to 1912.
Specifically, it focuses on the efforts of the Imperial Naval Office
(RMA) under the direction of Admiral Tirpitz as State Secretary to
coordinate and control fleet construction and the many firms caught
up in that program.

From the Admiral's appointment to the RMA in

1897 until the Reichstag's budget priorities shifted back to the army
in 1912, the fleet was one of the outstanding sources of debate in
Germany and among the western powers.

Previous historical research

has concentrated on political and social ramifications, but has ignored
the naval-industrial relationship that was fundamental to the
development of the fleet.
My research has shown that in spite of a powerful and well
established conmunity of armaments firms, the RMA usually enforced its
will on industry through a complex system of checks and restraints.
Even in its relationship with the navy's strongest suppliers, among
them the Krupp-Dillinger annor plate monopoly, the RMA was able to
make headway in quality and price controls to the Gennan navy's
long-term advantage.
The dissertation also assesses Admiral Tirpitz's influence on
the creation and use of the fleet.

His considerable political talent

was essential for the passage of the Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900 as
well as the supplemental laws of 1906, 1908 and 1912.

iv

Yet his

V

devotion to battleship strategy both played into the strength of his
main adversary, Great Britain, and restricted his appreciation of new
weapons systems like the U-boat.

As the director of the RMA,

Tirpitz's strategic dogma resulted in a fleet ill-suited for an
actual confrontation with Britain.

Thus he was, simultaneously the

political architect of the navy's success in the Reichstag, as well
as a major reason for its failure in World War One.
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INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the Twentieth Century it was a sign of national
greatness and power to possess a navy.

The strengthening of a nation's

naval forces was virtually required to compete for economic and
political influence around the world.

In the l89O's, Gennany, under

the direction of Kaiser Wilhelm II, sought to enter this international
contest by developing a navy on par with that of Great Britain or
France.

This study focuses on the creation of the new Gennan navy

from the perspective of the naval-industrial relationship between the
Imperial Naval Office (RMA) and the various shipyards and industrial
concerns actually responsible for fleet construction from 1897 to 1912.
During these years Admiral Alfred Tirpitz conceived and
directed an ambitious naval expansion program from his position as
State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office.

The program grew

rapidly as a result of his success in the Reichstag and reached its
zenith with the Supplementary Naval Law of 1912.
The major questions posed here are related exclusively to the
purchase of naval weaponry according to Tirpitz s design.
1

The

Imperial Naval Office or Reichsmarineamt (RMA) was the organization
through which Tirpitz directed his program.

How was it organized and

which people within this structure were most influential in the navy's
relations with the arms industry? On these individuals and their
professional resourcefulness depended the leverage the RMA might exert
upon scores of diverse business interests.
1

How did the navy propose to

2

cope with the diverse industrial groups needed to fulfill its con
struction goals?

New business arrangements with hundreds of companies

were sought by an RMA inexperienced in this sort of quick, massive
expansion.

Quality, price, prompt delivery, all of these and more

depended on the RMA's ability to turn potential confusion into
advantage.
In many instances industrial competition for the navy's favors
was fierce.

However, this was not always the case.

Other situations

brought Tirpitz and his associates face to face with cartels and
monopolies nearly impossible to break.

In which cases was the RMA

successful in its efforts to encourage competition to its advantage?
Was this utterly impossible in other situations? The awesome inter
national power of some German firms and the ambition of minor
businesses to profit from the fleet forced the RMA to exhibit consider
able flexibility and agility in its various relationships with
industry.

Contrasting its successes and failures in this area reveals

the many facets of the naval-industrial complex.
Naval-industrial relations also expressed themselves in a series
of rituals, formalities and procedures.

For example, how did a firm

qualify as a naval supplier? There were tenns, requirements, tests
and specifications imposed on every company contracting with the RMA.
Where did these standards come from and how did they evolve? What were
the procedures for contracting, sub-contracting, delivery and accept
ance of a product by the navy?

Indeed, procedures themselves are

often used to the advantage of official organizations.

Was this true

of the German Navy between 1897 and 1912? A major consideration here
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must also be the role given to the Imperial Naval Yards.

What part did

they play, for example, in establishing construction standards or
lowering prices? The Imperial Yards were important as a possible tool
for creating standards for and forcing lower prices from private
industry.
Lastly, how did the introduction of new weapons and technologi
cal innovation affect the relationships between the navy and its
industry? The most obvious case here is the advent of the U-boat.
Where did German U-boat technology originate, with the navy or in the
private sector? The response of the RMA to U-boat development
revealed early its policy regarding research and development and the
restrictions placed upon this activity by Tirpitz himself.

This

policy detennined whether the navy purchased innovations like the
U-boat, turbine or wireless telegraphy, at a very high price from a
small group of highly developed private firms or possessed viable,
cheaper alternatives.
The answers to these questions are valuable in understanding
the growth of a navy at the turn of the century.
industry made the High Seas Fleet possible.

The power of German

Tirpitz's parliamentary

ability and ambition made it a force that disrupted international
relations in western Europe and abroad.

The fleet definitely

contributed to the mounting tensions that later allowed an assassina
tion to blossom into world war.
Yet there is still a great mystery lurking in the background.
If one reads the printed minutes of the Reichstag sessions there is
repeated one theme.

The politicians could be convinced of the
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neces sity of building anns, and they could discuss these matters in
terms of large sums and percentages of the annual budget.

Very rarely,

however, did any of these men truly understand the particulars of how
and why the money was spent.

They did not understand the mechanism

that turned appropriations into naval hardware.

This lack of under

standing is not unique to the leaders of Germany earlier in this
century.

What has come to be called the military-industrial complex

confused world leaders at the turn of the century and is very much a
problem for present governing institutions.

Thus a comparison between

the case examined here and, for example, the modern American military
industrial complex, would not be entirely without its advantages.

At

the very least, the present study should provide the reader with a
greater insight into the modern military-industrial complex in its
infancy, eighty years ago.
This investigation also provides a profile of previously
ignored historical characters and a new perspective on one of the most
controversial figures in modern German history.

Here the frequently

discussed figure of Alfred Tirpitz appears in his role as director of
an expanding naval construction program.

His actions in this capacity

were determined by the Risk Theory, an interesting strategic concept
defensive in appearance, but offensive in reality.

Tirpitz built the

High Seas Fleet to give Germany enough seapower to discourage an
attack by any potential adversary.
11

The latter would be taking a

risk 11 not worth the cost in men and machinery.

At the same time,

however, the plans Tirpitz had for the future of the fleet seemed to
go far beyond the goal of creating this

11

risk. 11

Thus the suspicion

5

that Tirpitz actually intended to catch and surpass the primary naval
power of his time arose in the minds of British leaders over eighty
years ago as it does with modern historians today.
His dogged attachment to this theory takes on an interesting
new dimension when one correctly perceives the Admiral s position.
1

Tirpitz never had tactical command of the fleet he built between 1897
and World War One.

Indeed, he came close to this opportunity only once

and even then his candidacy displeased too many to be taken seriously.
Thus, he became an administrator and shipbuilder following a concept
which those in command of the fleet did not unequivocally accept.

To

what extent could this basic strategic antagonism weaken Germany as a
naval power?

Can one argue that this was one of the fatal flaws in

German naval development, viz. the discrepancy between strategy and
the choice of weaponry? These questions are central to this study.
Another part of this study is an attempt to reevaluate
Tirpitz s puzzling and prolonged adherence to the Risk Theory.
1

The

appraisal of this issue is to a large extent a test of an analytical
framework provided by Carl-Axel Gemzell in his study of the links
between strategy fonnation and career ambitions in the German armed
forces (Organization, Conflict and Innovation:
Naval Strategic Planning, 1888-1940).

A Study of German

While acknowledging his debt to

sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf's work, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society, Gemzell asserts that conflict over the selection of
strategic theories frequently established an adversary relationship
between officers leading to group formation.

In turn, the antagonism

between these groups was resolved by strategic innovation.

The
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innovation was sometimes a synthesis of both points of view or a
victory for one strategy or another.

Gemzell also insists that this

model can work in reverse, from innovation to group formation, leading
to conflict.
The question here is whether Tirpitz 1 s devotion to the Risk
Theory and the battleship was a result of a successfully fought
conflict of this sort with his colleagues.

Was he subsequently so

identified with these points of view that he dared not deny them lest
he damage his career and popular image? Another question along these
same lines pertains to Tirpitz 1 s position on the U-boat.

Did this

innovation produce antagonistic groups within the navy resulting in
severe internal conflict?
thesis is affirmed.

If this was indeed the case, then Gemzell's

The Risk Theory and Tirpitz's devotion to the

battleship are essential themes to the topic of this work.

These

elements determined the number and type of ships that the RMA, under
the direction of Admiral Tirpitz, built during the 1897-1912 period.
Other naval figures appear either for the first time or in a
new light.

Captain Persius and Admiral Galster loom large as two of

Tirpitz's strongest public critics.

The obvious direction here is to

test the extent to which their criticisms were true.

Another prime

figure in these matters was Admiral Capelle, Tirpitz's successor in
1916, an administrator of the highest calibre, and far more adaptable
in his strategic ideas than his superior.

His first experience with

the RMA came as head of the Administrative Department during the early
years of Tirpitz's naval expansion.
other RMA departments as well.

There are key characters among

Both Admiral van Eickstedt and his
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successor Admiral Rollmann were vital to the progress of the building
program, directing the Construction Department of the RMA from 1899 to
1914.

In addition, Admiral Dahnhardt's role in determining the

feasibility of many projects and in naval relations with the Reichstag
were crucial to fleet development.

As Director of the RMA Budget

Department, his views on the constantly rising price of armor plate on
the domestic and international market were particularly valuable to
the navy.
Although the creation of the High Seas Fleet often seems the
product of Tirpitz s energy and imagination alone, these '~inor''
1

characters hold the key to actually understanding relations between
the navy and industry.

Tirpitz set the policy, but these men turned

the fleet into reality and tried, on a daily basis, to exert RMA
control over naval-industrial relations.
Previous literature on the German Navy during this period
focuses on the navy's role in domestic politics and international
relations. 1 Walther Hubatsch has spent many years studying the navy,
particularly its conmand structure.

He is the present champion of

traditional German naval historiography.

His evaluation of Tirpitz is

1w. Hubatsch, Die- Ara Tir itz: Studien zur deutschen Marine
politik 1890-1918 (Berlin, 1955 ; W. Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab und die
obersten Marinebehorden in Deutschland 1848-1945 (Frankfurt a.M.,
1958); E. Kehr, Schlachtflottenbau und Partei olitik, 1894-1901
(Berlin, 1930); J. Steinberg, Yesterdays Deterrent New York, 1965);
H. Herwig, The German Naval Officer Cor s, A Political and Social
History (Oxford, 1973 ; V. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan: Genesis und
Verfall einer innen olitischen Krisenstrate ie unter Wilhelm II
Dussel orf, 971 .
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very supportive and he accepts the Admiral s contention that the fleet
1

was built for defensive purposes.
1

Eckart Kehr s Battleship Building and Party Politics 1894-1901
pioneered new perspectives in Gennan historical literature.

Kehr 1 s

work integrated interest group politics, domestic economic issues and
the international implications of fleet construction.

He challenged

the German historical preoccupation with foreign policy and focused on
the primacy of domestic issues in German history.

Kehr's evaluation of

the naval issue in Germany concluded that internal financial and
political interests spawned the fleet, not the necessity of responding
to foreign pressures.
In the last twenty years historians have rediscovered the
social, political and economic themes stressed by Kehr.
is but one illustration.

Paul Kennedy

His recently published Rise of Anglo-German

Antagonism, 1860-1914 has superceded earlier efforts by including many
more social and economic factors in his analysis.

Kennedy shows how

Germany's unification and subsequent emergence as a world-rank military
and economic power created the conflict with Great Britain that later
contributed to the outbreak of World War One.

In this study the naval

issue is placed in the wider national context of political, social and
economic elements.
Other historians have followed Kehr in a similar way.

Jonathan

Steinberg restated Kehr's thesis in his work Yesterday's Deterrent
which focused on the passage of the 1898 and 1900 Naval Laws through
the Reichstag.

Holger Herwig has broadened German naval historiography

by studying the social background of the officer corps.
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More important for the issues essential to this work is Volker
Berghahn s Der Tirpitz Plan.
1

Berghahn devotes more time to an evalua

tion of Admiral Tirpitz, his aggressive motives and the importance of
the Risk Theory.

His thesis shows that the Admiral was building the

fleet for the expressed purpose of challenging Britain for mastery of
the seas.

However, Berghahn does not dwell on the links between

Tirpitz and the Risk Theory on the one hand and the types of ships
built for the fleet on the other.
The works of Walther Hubatsch offered adept exposition and
analysis of the naval command.

Kehr, Kennedy, Steinberg and Herwig

contributed their evaluation of the navy 1 s position in the politics,
society and economy in Germany at the turn of the century.

Yet all of

this literature on the German Navy ignores one vital element--the
difficulties involved in actually building ships, i.e., the RMA s
1

attempt to cope with the puzzle presented by daily business with
civilian contractors.

This work not only fills this void, but also

adds to our knowledge of the nature and potential of German industry
at the turn of the century.
Other valuable sources used in this work include the memoirs of
various naval figures and politicians.

The most important of these

works describe the careers of Tirpitz, Hohenlohe, von BUlow and
Riezler.

The nature of memoirs, however, makes it important for a

historian to use them with care.
In the case of the Tirpitz memoirs, the Admiral's obvious
purpose was to defend his political policies and naval construction
program.

The success of the U-boat and the unfulfilled expectations
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regarding the fleet during the First World War forced him out of the
RMA in 1916 under a barrage of criticism.

Thus, his statements,

published ten years later, must be carefully evaluated.

In too many

instances he admits few errors and always defends his position
uncritically as the logical and correct one.
the U-boat are a case in point.

His decisions regarding

Tirpitz 1 s evaluation of his own

actions was widely criticized by his contemporaries and later by
historians.

Similar works present the same difficulties, but the role

of Tirpitz in this study makes his memoirs at once very important, but
equally suspect.
Most of the primary sources used in this work came from the
naval holdings of the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in Freiburg, West
Germany.

Of these the majority of the documents used can be found in

the files classified RM3, the signature for the RMA or Imperial Naval
Office.

These documents include material from all departments of the

RMA, including correspondence from all the private firms employed by
the navy in ship construction.

Other sources made available in

Freiburg covered the old Imperial Admiralty (RMl), the Naval High
Corrmand (RM4), the Admiral Staff (RM5) and the Naval Cabinet (RM2).
Also valuable were the personal papers of the Admirals Tirpitz,
Capelle, von Senden-Bibran and Behncke.
It was fortunate that the bulk of the military documentation
was preserved at various locations throughout the Second World War.
Most of the archives of the pertinent private firms and shipyards
were destroyed between 1940 and 1945.

This includes the university

libraries and private records centers in cities like Hamburg, Bremen,

11

Kiel, and Wilhelmshaven.

For example, all that remains of the pre-

1945 company records at the Howaldtswerke shipyard in Kiel, a single
contract for the battleship S.M.S. Bayern, was sent to the author in
response to a written inquiry for available source material.
There are very few major firms in Germany that still possess
records covering the activities of their company earlier this
century.

Among the few naval related finns that do are Krupp,

Mannesmann and Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-NUremburg (M.A.N.).

Unfor

tunately, neither Mannesmann nor M.A.N. 1 s archive was open to me
during my working visit to Gennany in 1981.

However, the most

important of the three, Krupp, allowed more than enough time to do the
research required for this work, especially in the area of armor
production and Li-boat development.

Therefore, in spite of war damage

and archive scheduling problems, the Militararchiv and the Archives
of the Krupp Firm at the Villa HUgel in Essen supplied abundant source
material.

This evidence was more than adequate for a thorough

investigation of both the naval and industrial perspectives on the
problems of naval expansion.
Some of the primary and secondary sources used here might imply
a wider scope for this study than is intended.

Although the German

Navy was a contributing factor to the First World War, this is not an
issue for discussion here.

Neither are the banks which were an

important facet of the German industrial system.

The activities of

the Reichstag and political parties are treated only as they relate
directly to the naval building program, the Naval Laws and their
supplements.

The author has relied on secondary sources merely to set

l2

the proper political background, thereafter dwelling exclusively on the
relationship between the navy and the industry that supplied it.

The

central focus of the dissertation is supported almost entirely by
unpublished primary sources.
Each chapter of this work represents a chronological slice of
the 1897-1912 period.

Within the chapters five themes are frequently

repeated alongside material pertaining to the political influences
affecting the construction program.

These five themes are:

annor

plate and the Krupp-Dillinger monopoly; the iron and steel industry;
electrical firms; cost and weight problems; research and development.
The first two chapters (1897-1898; 1899-1901) revolve around the
problem of getting the construction program underway, initial contacts
with industry and the passage of the 1898 and 1900 Naval Laws.

The

third chapter (1902-1904) deals with the acceleration of the naval
program within the accepted boundaries of a system established by the
RMA.

The last two chapters (1905-1908; 1909-1912) concentrate on the

passage of the Supplementary Naval Bills of 1906 and 1908 as well as
the change of naval fortunes in 1912.

These last chapters also

highlight the efforts of the RMA to place controls on the formidable
armor monopoly.

BACKGROUND TO 1897
Germany was not an established naval power when Tirpitz arrived
at the RMA in 1897.
expansion.

The fledgling shipbuilding industry needed naval

Many shipyards were forced to do alternative work to

remain solvent during dry spells between contracts.

The organization

of the labor force in the shipbuilding industry was also rudimentary.
The numbers of skilled workers increased during the period in question
here, but employers still controlled wages, hours and working
conditions.
The key theme in this background chapter is the embryonic state
of the navy, the shipbuilding industry and the organization of the
workers hired by shipyards and firms.

It was uncertain in 1897 how

these vital factors would adapt and adjust when they were called upon
to expand Germany ' s naval power.
The Navy:

Structure and Responsibility

Shortly after the young Kaiser Wilhelm II ascended the thrones
of Prussia and the Empire in 1888, he requested that a commission
review suggestions for reorganizing the naval hierarchy.

This

commission proposed a new structure which the Reichstag and then the
Kaiser himself approved in 1889.

The Admiralty split into three

parts (Fig. 1), the Supreme Corrmand (Oberkorrmando der Marine), the
Naval Cabinet (Marinekabinette), and the Imperial Naval Office

13
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1871-1889:

Kaiser

1

Admiralty
1889-1899

Kaiser

Supreme Command
of the Navy 1.·"/
(Oberkorrrnando
der Marine)

/

RtA

~ Naval

(closely akin to the anny's structure:
and Military Cabinet)
1899-1918:

Cabinet

General Staff, War Ministry

__ Kaiser. ~

--·~------ . I l £~' \~~

RMA~

Naval Cabinet

;.1·\\
Admiralty Staff

Cruiser Squadron

~

\irst Ba tle Squadron*

/

\ Naval Station, Baltic

i

Independent Ship Corrmanders
in Foreign Waters _;~
,1

j

\
\ .

-~Naval Station,
North Sea

Training Inspectorate
--all had direct access to the
Kaiser
*Later becomes Fleet Command, when the Second Battle Squadron is
added in 1903. Chief of the High Seas Fleet was the commanding
officer.

Source:

Figure 1. Organization of the German Naval Hierarchy.
Gemze 11, Organ i za ti on and Conflict • . . , p. 39.

15
(Reichsmarineamt or RMA). 1 The Supreme Command detennined strategy
and was the branch through which the Kaiser carried out his function
as commander-in-chief.
Goltz.

Its first leader was Vice-Admiral von der

The Naval Cabinet followed the pattern established by the

Army s Military Cabinet and was responsible for matters of personnel
1

and all of the secretarial aspects of the Kaiser 1 s command role.
Under its first head, Rear Admiral Heusner, the RMA received
ministerial responsibilities with all of the obligations involved in
presenting naval matters before the Reichstag.2
The Supreme Command determined ship types and advanced design,
but the RMA was responsible for projecting naval needs into the
future in terms of budget allocations.

Yet in 1889 the RMA did not

even have a full time chief of naval construction, and it was easily
the least important of the three naval branches with direct access to
the Kaiser.
Under Heusner (1889-91) and then Hollmann (1891-97) the policy
of the RMA lacked direction (Table l).

Previously the navy had

perfonned only a coastal defense function.

Now Heusner and Hollmann,

particularly the latter, found themselves caught in a period of re
definition.

Wilhelm was clearly bent on a program of naval expansion.

Furthermore, within the navy a diversity of strategic theories

lv. Berghahn, Tirpitz Plan, 23 24. See also W. Hubatsch, Der
Admiralstab und die obersten Marinebeh15rden in Deutschland, 1848-1945
(Frankfurt am M., 1958 ).
2J. Steinberg,
(#7, 1970), 1968.

11

Germany a.nd the Russo-Japanese War, 11 AHR, 75
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TABLE l
NAVAL OFFICIALS IN CHARGE OF
CONSTRUCTION MATTERS

RMA Construction Chiefs
Dietrich 1881-1898
Construction Office/Division
von Eickstedt 1899-1907
Construction Division/Dept.
Rollmann 1907-1914
Construction Dept.

State Secretaries, Imperial
Naval Office (RMA)
Heusner 1889-1891
Hollmann 1891-1897
Tirpitz 1897-1916
(Tirpitz was knighted in 1901 and
thereafter carried the 11 von 11
before his name.)
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clouded the nature of this expansion while in the political arena the
growing strength of the Reichstag complicated the budgetary process.
To evolve a logical expansion plan, formulate a proper budget, and
defend it successfully before the Reichstag would take considerable
political talent.

Heusner and Hollmann were not suited for this

position, as both were career officers with little or no political
background. 3
Thus during the 1890 s everything was a bit chaotic.
1

The fleet

was actually a hodgepodge of different types of ships without a
strategic coherence.

In turn the flow of orders to the primitive naval

armaments industry was perpetually erratic, and the industrialists were
never sure that the Reichstag would vote appropriations enough to
justify further capital investment.
The historian Volker Berghahn suggests at this point that
Wilhelm s absolutist tendencies prompted him to envision a supra
1

ministry which would gather together the diverse elements of his
disparate naval policy under his power.

Whether one accepts this

analysis or not, the Kaiser was certainly eager for increased
continuity between his political plans and naval expansion.

The RMA

was conmissioned to fulfill this purpose,4 and Tirpitz was selected to
fulfill the Kaiser's wishes.

3see Appendix:

Heusner, Hollmann.

4The Kaiser was thinking about Tirpitz for this position as
early as 1896. BA/MA Nl60/5 Nachlass von Senden-Bibran, von Senden,
on board the S.M.S. Hohenzollern, to Tirpitz, Berlin, 3.3.1896.
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In 1897, when Tirpitz was in command of the Far East Cruiser
Squadron, the Kaiser's impatience over the Reichstag's hesitation to
accept increased naval appropriations spilled over to include
Hollmann s inability to alter that situation.
1

The State Secretary had

to pilot a 1.56 billion mark naval budget through the Reichstag in the
spring of that same year, even as Tirpitz returned to take his place.
Hollmann was less than eager to assume this task, especially given the
fact that he had to present concrete spending proposals before the
Reichstag.

He rarely made a concerted effort to support his budget

requests with studies or plans showing present and future needs for
increased appropriations.

The parliamentary deputies found his

tendency to base his requests on unclear general principles rather than
calculated plans and considerations too vague. 5 As one wartime
political analysis put it:
. . . one of his (Hollmann's) main difficulties with the
Reichstag was his inability to justify his estimates by
numerical demonstrations. . . . On the other hand,
Admiral von Tirpitz's strength always lay chiefly in
this, that he knew exactly what he wanted and why he
wanted it.6
The concerted opposition of the Center and Progressive Parties
in the Reichstag led by Eugen Richter regarded the Kaiser's proposed

5A. Hurd and H. Castle, German Seapower: Its Rise, Progress and
Economic Basis (New York, 1914), 195. Hollmann did not like Tirpitz
at all and frequently wrote about the new SS/RMA in later letters to
his close friend Fritz Krupp. See: HA Krupp, FAH III C233 Hollmann to
Krupp (on Capri) Berlin, 4.18.1899 and 4.26.1899. See also: Richard
Owen, 11 Military Industrial Relation: Krupp and the Imperial Naval
Office, 11 Societ and Politics in Wilhelmine German , ed. by R. J.
Evans (London, 1978.
6Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 195.

19
1897 naval budget as

11

limitless. 11

This left wing liberal tried to

challenge the position of Hollmann as a minister of the crown, stress
ing his responsibility to the Reichstag as a Cabinet minister.

The

Kaiser denied that Hollmann was ultimately responsible to the Reich
stag, which was technically true.

But when Hollmann resurrected an

1873 memorandum on fleet composition and strategy as the basis of his
Reichstag budget defense, the deputies cut 12 million marks off the
naval appropriations for that year.7
In 1897 both the Supreme Command and the RMA received new
directors in the persons of Admiral von Knorr and Rear Admiral
Tirpitz.

Knorr became one of Tirpitz's strongest opponents, not

because he opposed an increase in naval spending, but because Tirpitz
was from the outset clearly intent on making the RMA the preeminent
branch of the Imperial Navy.

Under van Knorr the Supreme Command could

not preserve its influence in matters of construction and fleet
composition because Wilhelm clearly supported Tirpitz.

With his All

Highest Cabinet Order of February 1898 the Kaiser gave the RMA chief a
free hand in these matters. 8 Tirpitz s enviable position in 1897
1

rested on his ability to guarantee a continuous flow of credits from
the Reichstag in order to build Germany a first-rate navy.

7BA/MA RM3/2487 Reichstagsverhandlung, 9. Legislatur Per~ode,
IV Session 1895/97 Kommission fUr den Reichshaushalts Etat 27. S1tzung
3.8.1897. For the 1873 Plan; BA/MA Library, Denkschrift betreffend
die AusfUhrung des FlottengrUndungsplans von 1873 11 (Berlin, 1873).
11

BJ. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent (New York, 1965),
136-140.
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Tirpitz:

The Driving Force

Alfred Tirpitz must dominate any discussion of the growth of
the German navy during these years.

The State Secretary is one of the

most popular figures of modern German naval history.

Evaluations of

his ability and his effect on Germany's navy, domestic policy, and
foreign affairs have received exhaustive study.

On the one hand, the

conservatives Walther Hubatsch and Gerhard Ritter have portrayed him
as a man whose policy was essentially defensive, protecting Germany s
1

security and vulnerable international trade.9

On the other hand, to

Volker Berghahn, John Rohl and many of the new social-economic
historians influenced by Kehr, Tirpitz was the advocate of a High Seas
Fleet designed to challenge Britain and neutralize the Reichstag s
1

control over naval expenditure by means of a longterm shipbuilding
commitment. 10 His naval laws severely curbed the financial authority
of the Reichstag regarding further military spending by legally
requiring a pre-determined budget minimum for each year.

Afterwards,

a series of supplements ensured that the minimum figure kept growing.
It is essential here to review the development of Tirpitz s career and
1

of his theories on the purpose and future composition of the fleet.
The consistency of these views, and Tirpitz 1 s persistence in following
9w. Hubatsch, Kaiserliche Marine (Augsburg, 1975);
Staatskunst und Kriegsnanswerk, Vol. 2 (Munich, 1965).

G. Ritter,

lOv. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan (DUsseldorf, 1971); J. Rohl,
Deutschland ohne Bismarck (Tubingen, 1969); 11 Admiral v. MUller and the
Approach of War, 1911 bis 1914, 11 ~ ' 12 (No. 4, 1969), 651-673.
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them, detennined the types of ships added to the German navy in the
years between 1898 and 1912, thus limiting the strategic options of
the Supreme Command in case of ~ar.
Alfred Tirpitz was born in 1849, entered the navy as a cadet
sixteen years later and passed through the naval academy between 1874
and 1876.

He was trained as a torpedo specialist and thus his first

commands were Chief of the Torpedo Inspectorate and then Chief of the
Torpedo Flottillas.

He also served as Chief of Staff, first to the

Commander of the Baltic Naval Station and then to the Supreme
Command. 11
It was in 1894, when he held the latter position, that Captain
Tirpitz first circulated the essentials of his strategy for the future
of the fleet in his Service Memo IX.

It proposed a direct challenge to

Great Britain and a vast increase in German naval power emphasizing
the battleship.

The core of Tirpitz's ideas lay with the Risk Theory.

It suggested that the seemingly absurd challenge to Great Britain was
indeed possible if Germany possessed a large naval force capable of
inflicting severe damage on its enemies.

Then any naval power would

shrink from engaging in a surface battle because a victory would be too
costly to contemplate.

As far as Tirpitz was concerned, increased

offensive potential was the key to securing Germany's international
ambitions without war.

llHurd & Castle, 110. See also Kaiserliche Marine Rangliste,
1890-1895. (Hereafter cited as Rangliste.)
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The vogue in naval strategy during these years was the Jeune
Ecole.

This strategy was based on the commercial war theories of the

French Admiral Theophile Aube. 12 Here, British naval supremacy, which
was the one obvious 11 given 11 in all naval theories of the period, was
countered by a naval force composed of quick, powerful cruisers aimed
directly at her shipping lanes.

This force would avoid the decisive

battle, or Entscheidungsschlacht, with the Grand Fleet and attempt to
strangle British supply lines.

The interdependence of nations created

by large scale industry, food scarcity and rising populations lay at
the foundation of this strategy.

It was popular in Germany and

appeared in the writings of Freiherr von Maltzahn and Vice-Admiral
Galster.13

The Kaiser toyed with it for a short time.

formed the basis of many critiques of Tirpitz.

Later, it also

The antithesis to the

Jeune Ecol~ would advocate the challenge to Britain and the possibility
of the Entscheidungsschlacht.

This was the central idea of Tirpitz's

Service Memo IX (Dienstschrift IX).
Tirpitz embraced this idea in order to appear the German foil
to the French Jeune Ecole.

In this he reflected sentiments within

12E. Bohm, LJberseehandel und Flottenbau: Hanseatische
Kaufmannschaft und deutsche Seerustung 1879-1902 (Hamburg, 1972),
87-88. For further information on the Jeune Ecole see: V. Bueb,
Die "Junge Schule 11 der franzasischen Marine: Strate ie und Politik,
Wehrwissenschaftliche Forschungen. Militargeschicht iche Studien 12
(Boppard a. Rh., 1971).

1

13See Appendix:

Galste~ van Maltzan.
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naval circles more eloquently stated by Alfred T. Mahan. 14 The
appearance of a dynamic German naval leader with an appealing strategy
also proved a welcome change from the aimlessness of Heusner and
Hollmann. 15 Their ideas had perpetuated the navy's coastal defense
role, a position which seemed outworn as German Weltpolitik developed
during the reign of Wilhelm II.

These factors worked to Tirpitz's

career advantage when he returned to Berlin in 1897 as State Secretary
of the RMA after a year abroad commanding the Far East Cruiser
Squadron.

To choose Tirpitz as State Secretary was to install Service

Memo IX as the bible of the new navy.

Tirpitz's energetic drive to

publicize, argue, organize, and otherwise impress his High Seas Fleet
concept on Germany's leaders enabled the passage of his naval con
struction bills of 1898 and 190G. 16 His reputation and credibility
rested on his theory, and the entire construction program from 1898 to
the war was based on his thought.
in these ideas deepened.

As the program succeeded his faith

Industrial and public support gave naval

expansion a momentum that constantly reenforced his attachment to the
Risk Theory in spite of significant changes on the international scene.
For Tirpitz, the 1897-1898 period was a part of the strategic
"danger zone," in which Britain might launch a preventive attack

14Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History
(Boston, 1890). The original title of Dienstschrift IX: 11 Allgemeine
Erflihrung aus den Manovern der Herbstubungsfl otte. 11
15Rangliste, 1889-1897.
16 The supplements to the 1900 Naval Law came in 1906, 1908 and
1912, but under slightly different conditions. The BUlow Block was
rocked in 1908 by a proposed increase in taxes.
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before Germany's fleet development was complete.1 7 Throughout this
time he closely adhered to his policy, both to see Germany out of the
"danger zone" and to preserve the credibility gained earlier for
himself and his ideas.
Germany was ready.

He did not want a war with Great Britain until

If it came earlier, however, he was fully prepared

to urge the use of Germany's new naval strength to inflict quickly as
much damage upon the British as possible.

He believed that a pro

tracted war would be disastrous.
Tirpitz was a strategist, but his most important role as
Walther Hubatsch reminds us, was that of shipbuilder.

Indeed,

strategy was the province of the Supreme Command, whose job it was to
use the fleet in wartime. 18 While Tirpitz may have consistently
employed Service Memo IX as the bible of the construction program, the
Supreme Command did not adhere to it in matters of strategy.

The two

agencies did not agree on fleet composition, location of the major
naval bases, the use of the fleet, and the definition of exactly what
"favorable conditions" were in a possible battle with the British.
There was no unity of purpose between these two vital branches of the
Imperial Navy.

One finds only constant competition before the Kaiser

for the upper hand, resulting in a confusion and indecision which
greatly contributed to the sterility of the surface fleet during the
war.

Tirpitz never fulfilled his own plans, and, by 1914, a

17K. Riezler, TagebUcher, Aufsatze, Dokumente, K. D. Erdmann,
ed. (Gottingen, 1972), 299.
18 Bernard, FUrst von BUlow, Denkwurdigkeiten, vol. 1 (Berlin,
1930), 413. Berghahn, op. cit., 380-82.
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discontented Admiralty was left with a fleet which was very often
unsuited to the wartime strategic alternatives posed to it.
The Shipbuilding Industry
Before Tirpitz s arrival at the RMA, the German shipbuilding
1

industry was still fairly embryonic as compared to Great Britain, the
world's naval power.

Contracts from the navy were infrequent and

industry was obliged to diversify in order to survive.

The private

shipyards were also faced with the RMA's option to employ the
Imperial Yards rather than awarding certain contracts to private
concerns.

This would keep prices down to a certain extent and perhaps

enable only the larger yards and cartels to compete.

From this

situation, German shipbuilding firms had to weld themselves into an
efficient, productive, mature industry if they hoped to respond to
the urgently needed naval expan~ion.

In 1852 the first seagoing

steamer of German construction came off the slipway at Furchtenicht and
Brock Co., later the Vulcan Firm of Hamburg and Stettin.

It was, of

course, not an ironclad, nor was there a Germany to speak of at the
time.

The only domestic source of ironclad ship construction

technology was a small school at Grabow (Stettin) opened in 1831.

For

the most part, German shipbuilders learned their trade abroad, in
England or at the naval construction school at Copenhagen. 19 After
unification in 1871, most of Germany's ships were still built in Great
Britain.

19Hurd and Castle, op. cit., 307-309.
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The first concerted effort to force the expansion and develop
ment of the German shipbuilding industry came from the head of the
Imperial Admiralty from 1871 to 1882, General Albrecht von Stosch.
He combined in his person the functions which Wilhelm II would later
distribute between the Reichsmarineamt, the Admiralty Staff and the
Naval Cabinet. 20 His post as Chairman of the Conmittee on Naval
Affairs enabled him to exert considerable political power and
industrial influence.21

Stosch was the first to insist that a greater

percentage of German naval construction take place within Germany. 22
He ordered that the purchase of warships be limited exclusively to
domestic shipyards (Table 2). 23 Thus the Admiralty policy under
Stosch encouraged the development of a shipbuilding industry at
home.24
By 1899 Germany had twenty-three private shipyards of various
capacities (Tables 2, 3), eleven firms on the Baltic and twelve on the

20F.B.M. Hollyday, Bismarck's Rival: A Political Bio rah
General and Admiral von Stosch Durham, 1960, 101-102.

of

21F.B.M. Hollyday, op. cit., 112-13.
22Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 311.
23Ibid., 199. Stosch was succeeded by: Caprivi, 1883-88 and
Graf Monts, 1888-89. Afterward a drastic reorganization of the naval
hierarchy took place. See Figure 1, page 14.
24Ibid., passim. During this period Germany's arms industry
experienced increased competition. In 1885 the French Chamber of
Deputies lifted its arms export prohibition against Germany. Richard
Owen, "Military Industrial Relations: Krupp and the Imperial Naval
Office, 11 Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany, op. cit.
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TABLE 2
GERMAN SHIPBUILDING FIRMS, 1899

Baltic Sea

North Sea

Schichau, Elbing

Blohm and Voss, Hamburg

Schichau, Danzig

Reiherstieg, Hamburg

Klawitter, Danzig

Brandenburg, Hamburg

Vulcan, Stettin

Janssen and Schmilinski, Hamburg

Oderwerke, Stettin

Hal tz, Harburg

NUscke, Stettin

Weser, Bremen

Neptun, Restock

Vulcan, Vegesack (Bremen)

Koch, Lubeck

Tecklenborg, GeestemUnde

Howaldtswerke, Kiel

Wencke, Bremerhaven

Gennania, Kiel and Tegel

Seebeck, GeestemUnde

Flensburger Gesellschaft,
Flensburg

Rickmers, Bremerhaven
Meyer, Papenburg

TABLE 3
VITAL STATISTICS ON THE SIX MAJOR PRIVATE SHIPYARDS

Shipyards
Germania (Krupp), Kiel
75,000 sq. meters: 10 docks for construction, workers' bath house,
breakfast hall, beer storage facilities, railroad spurs
145,280 sq. meters: copper, brass and iron foundries, Schultz
System Boiler Factory, electrical workshop (some of this property
was acquired in 1896 to fulfill expansion plans formulated during
acquisition)
Work force: 1890 - 1,409; 1899 - 2,564; 1914 - over 5,000
Howaldtswerke, Kiel
770 meters of waterfront, 155,000 sq. meters total territory
12 docks for construction (50 m. to 230 m. long)
Work force: 1890 - 1,304; 1899 - 2,370
Schichau, Elbing and Danzig
12,450 sq. meters: 18 docks for construction
352,000 sq. meters: factories, mills, workshops
Work force: 1880 (Elbing only) - 1,200; 1899 (Elbing and Danzig) 5,820
A.G. Weser, Bremen
252 meters of waterfront
38,290 sq. meters of territory: shops, factories, storage
14,030 sq. meters of construction docks included above
Work force: 1890 - 1,178; 1900 - 1,350
Blohm und Voss, Hamburg
1,195 meters of waterfront
141,750 sq. meters of territory: Of this, 32,650 sq. meters - 10
construction docks; 82,100 sq. meters - factories, workshops,
storage
Work force: 1880 - 450; 1890 - 2,051; 1899 - 2,598
Extensive living facilities for workers built in the suburb of
Wilhelmsburg, just outside the yard itself.
Vulcan, Stettin-Bredow
182,650 sq. meters of territory in total
518 meters of waterfront at Stettin
71,220 sq. meters - 9 construction docks (100-200 meters long)
Hork force: 1899 - 6,628
A facility in Hamburg was acquired in 1906.
Source: T. Schwarz and E. von Halle, Die Schiffbauindustrie
in Deutschland und im Auslande, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1902).
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29
North Sea and three Imperial Shipyards.25

The six most important

private yards were Krupp Germaniawerft and Howaldtswerke in Kiel,
Schichau in Elbing and Danzig, A.G. Weser in Bremen, Blohm und Voss
in Hamburg and Vulkan in Stettin and Hamburg.
Germania, owned by the Essen firm of Friedrich Krupp, eventually
became the largest shipbuilding company in Germany.

Located at the

south end of the Kiel docks, this concern, established in 1822, was a
foundry for boilers and the manufacture of naval engines until it
acquired the Norddeutsch Werft also in Kiel.

The company, which was

called the Schiff-und Maschinenbau A. G. Germania by 1881, built the
S.M.S. Kaiserin Augusta, the first German warship with triple screws
capable of 22 knots, and the first armored German cruiser, S.M.S.
Furst Bismarck.
1902.

Krupp gradually acquired the company between 1896 and

The process was completed only seven months before Fritz Krupp's

suicide in November, 1902 and supervised by Krupp director Hanns
Jencke, a long standing member of Germania's Board of Governors.26
The yard's income from warship contracts rose from 40.5 million marks
between 1871 and 1896 to 51.5 million between 1897 and 1904.

In the

latter period, only Schichau had greater revenue.27

25see Figure 1, page 14.
26Hurd &Castle, op. cit., 369-371. HA Krupp, WA IV 952. See:
Germania, Berlin/Tegel to Jencke, Essen 12.24.1896. The Krupp Firm was
also busy trying to enter into a close association with Vulcan which
the latter rejected. Then the firm began secretly to purchase large
blocks of Vulcan stock. HA Krupp, FAH III Bl79, passim. See also:
Chapter III on the 1902-04 period.
27E. Bohm, LJberseehandel und Flottenbau. Hanseatische Kaufmann
schaft und Deutsche SeerUstung 1879-1902 (Hamburg, 1971), 147.
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Germania's work in the early l880's for the navy was small
scale:

it built scout ships, a small armored cruiser, and a

torpedo boat prototype.

Under the direction of Krupp, this yard

became an early center of research and development and later took the
lead in German U-boat technology.

It supplemented its domestic naval

work by completing projects for foreign navies and fulfilling six
commercial ship contracts between 1881 and l90o.28
As a member of the Association of Shipyards founded in 1885,
Germania became one of fourteen yards to respond collectively to
Stosch's plan to rely more on both German materials and production in
domestic yards. 29

Yet Stosch's initial efforts to bring shipbuilding

home could not suddenly bring stability to a firm.

Germania

experienced difficulties between 1889 and 1895 that no doubt reflected
the unpredictable frequency of naval contracts and British domination
of the commercial ship market.

The yard's dividends bounced

erratically between 0% and 6-1/2% during this period.

With the

arrival of Krupp capital in 1896 the dividends levelled off at a
steady 4-1/2%. 30 The Essen concern eventually developed the yard from
a 5.5 million mark investment in 1889 into a 200 million mark invest
ment by 1914, with half of the financial interest in the hands of the
family and the rest managed by a limited liability company.31
28T. Schwarz and E. von Halle, eds., Die Schiffbauindustrie in
Deutschland und im Ausland, vol. 2 (Berlin, 1902), 53.
29Jbid. Others among the six leading yards in the Shipbuilding
Association include: Schichau, Blohm und Voss, and Vulcan.
30Ibid., 58-59.
31Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 314.
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In its relations with the RMA Germania and the Krupp Firm in
general, found Tirpitz less than cordial.

Very early in his term as

State Secretary, Tirpitz correctly surmised that the firm would just as
soon profit from Germany's enemies as supply the German navy.

But as

Willi Boelcke has pointed out, Tirpitz and the navy were hopelessly
dependent on the firm.
Although Admiral Tirpitz was truly a strong person of
responsible position in Wilhelmian Germany, a man of unusual
talents, hard and ruthless ambitions, and an initiator of
modern warship construction, he was definitely not a friend
of the house of Krupp. But the Reichsmarineamt could and
would never be without the services of Krupp.32
The other major private shipyard in Kiel was the Howaldtswerke.
Established in 1876 by Georg Howaldt it was one of the smallest of the
six major private yards.

Like Germania, it depended a great deal upon

both military and corrmercial contracts, foreign and domestic, to
remain financially solvent in the years before the military expansion
of the Tirpitz era.

In 1878-1879 it built the twin screw steamers

Socrates and Diogenes for the Peruvian navy, and two corvettes for the
Chinese government in 1883.33

Its size forced it to specialize in the

intermediate versions of the great commercial trans-Atlantic steamers.
Howaldt also effectively diversified with various types of postal and
passenger vessels and ships for colonial service.34

32w. Boelcke, ed., Krupp und die Hohenzollern in Dokumenten.
Krupp Korrespondenz mit Kaisern, Kabinettschefs und Ministern
1850-1918 (Frankfurt, 1970), 236.
33Schwarz and Halle, op. cit., 314.
34Ibid., 22. The smaller 11 tramp 11 steamers were the specialty
of Klawitter, NUscke, Neptun and Henry Koch.
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The Howaldtswerke only managed one corrmercial contract for over
2000 tons in the l880's, but as the firm moved into the nineties this
number grew, reaching ten by 1900. 35
for any firm during this period.

However, work was never steady

Howaldt produced 9,907 tons of

commercial ships and that figure rose to 17,081 in 1899, but then an
almost 2,000 ton decline occurred in 1900.36
The firm's dividends showed a constant slow upward progress in
spite of the irregular nature of the market.

Between 1899 and 1892,

capitalized at 2 million marks, its returns increased a point
annually from 4% to 7%, and then remained a steady 8% in 1893-94.
When Howaldt was turned into a joint stock company in 1895 and
recapitalized at 2.5 million, returns remained at 8%.37
Along the southern rim of the Danzig Bight in the eastern
Baltic, the city of Elbing provided the site for one of Germany's
largest and most diversified private shipyards.

The shipbuilding

work begun there by Ferdinand Schichau in 1852 was based on a
successful machine works established in 1837.

While it was acquiring

a reputation as a first class locomotive and machine company,
Schichau built Germany's first steam dredger (1841) and Prussia's
first propeller driven ship (1855).

By 1902 the firm's own factory was

producing Qetter cast steel forms than some of Germany's best mills. 38

35Ibid., 53.
36Ibid., 50.
37rbid., 58-59.
38Ibid., 11-12; 191.
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Schichau s first contracts for the navy resulted in the produc
1

tion of three cannonboats.

Although the RMA frequently balked at its

high prices, it was the navy 1 s primary supplier of small surface craft
such as torpedo boats.

This type of craft did not, however, represent

the firm s limits.

In 1891 it formally applied to the RMA for consid
eration in capital ship contracts 39 and less than a year later acquired
1

a shipyard in Danzig with sufficient depth to accommodate ships with a
much greater displacement.40 The depth of the Elbing dock facilities
was 2.8 meters normally and 4 meters at high tide.

The new Danzig

facility put Schichau in the battleship business with a depth of 8.5
meters at the construction sites and a minimum depth of 7.3 meters on
the way out to sea.41

Schichau eventually built six battleships for

the RMA before the opening of World War One.
In spite of its potential, Schichau s purely commercial work
1

was modest.

It was one of the three or four German companies capable

of handling the large trans-Atlantic liners, but it received no
contracts between 1881 and 1890 and only six between 1891 and 1900.
In this area the old Hanseatic cities kept the business to themselves.
Between 1881 and 1890 Blohm und Voss and Reiherstiegwerft in Hamburg
accounted for fourteen each out of fifty-five ships.

Vulcan, Stettin

(10) and Flensburger of Schleswig-Holstein (8) were a close third and

39sA/MA RM3/347 Schichau, Elbing to SS/RMA Konstruktions Dept.,
Berlin, 9.9.1891.
40schwarz and Halle, op. cit., 12.
41Ibid., 85.
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fourth.

In the 1890's the same four firms won 121 out of 162 commer

cial contracts over 2,000 tons displacement.42 Breaking into this
market was difficult, even for a firm of Schichau 1 s size.
Schichau remained somewhat unique in the German shipbuilding
industry for the firm's success in its diverse interests.

It was a

family concern that not only involved itself in shipbuilding and
manufacturing but also created its own shipping business as well.

It

provided regularly scheduled freight service, mostly for grain and
wood, between east Prussia and the manufacturing centers of the
west. 43
Of Germany's major shipyards, only Weser was a former wooden
ship company specializing almost exclusively in military vessels.

In

the 1880 s Weser took only two commercial contracts over 2,000 tons
1

and no others until after 1900.44 Founded in 1843 as the Bremer
Watjenschen Werft, it became the A.G. Weser in 1872.

It was the

third German shipyard to form a joint-stock company (Aktiengesellschaft)
after Vulcan (1857) and the Oderwerke (1871).
before any other companies followed suit. 45

Eighteen years passed

In the 1870 s Weser began the transition from wooden ship
1

building to meta1.46 As long as the ships were of a modest size the

42Ibid., 53.
43 Ibid., 82.
44Jbid., 53.
45Ibid., 57.
46Jbid., 12.
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shipyard diversified its military contracts in the l880's and l890's
with torpedo boats, light cruisers and battleships.

As the size and

sophistication of the battleships desired by the RMA increased, Weser
was forced into a pattern of torpedo boat and light cruiser contracts.
Before 1900 the only battleships Weser built were the S.M.S. Beowulf
and Frithjof (1890-93).

It received no other contracts for this type

of vessel until it began S.M.S. Westfalen fourteen years after the
Frithjof was completed.47 Weser's first contracts for the navy in the
1870 s included thirteen armored gunboats and eight torpedo boats.48
1

The firm followed that pattern through 1918, building only six
battleships.

During the same period it produced eighteen light

cruisers and a number of torpedo boats and U-boats.49
Weser was always responsive to new naval construction plans.
It was one of the first firms to begin converting to German materials
for its vessels as a response to the wishes of Stosch.50 However, its
attempt to expand between 1900 and 1907 in order to accorrnnodate RMA
battleship contracts nearly resulted in disaster.

Excessively rapid

growth resulted in management miscalculations, strikes, and near
bankruptcy.

The price of Weser shares dropped during this period from

47Erich Groner, Die deutsche Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945, vol. l
(Munich, 1966), 19-49 passim. Weser did not feel able to fulfill
battleship contracts in 1891.
48schwarz and Halle, 16.
49E. Groner, op. cit., 19-49 passim.
50schwarz and Halle, op. cit~, 26.
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130 to 45 marks and financial ruin was averted only by raising 3.75
million marks among faithful stockholders.51
In the wake of Germany's unification and the incentive given
shipbuilding by Stosch's policies, Blohm und Voss was established in
Hamburg in 1872.

It ilTITiediately won a contract to build a small ocean

going vessel for the Hamburg-American Line in 1873.52 This firm's
primary strength lay in the commercial area throughout the 1890-1914
period.

It built 42,337 tons of ships in 1898 and exceeded that figure

by 6,127 tons in 1898.53 The Hamburg firm raised the number of con
tracts it signed for vessels over 2,000 tons from fourteen between 1881
and 1890 to fifty for the next decade or almost one third of total
German commercial production.
One of the reasons for Blohm und Voss's success was its
willingness to adopt new technology and its ability to expand as the
market demanded.

In the 1890's the firm rebuilt part of its dock

facilities to accommodate not o~ly the increasing need for ocean going
liners and freighters, but also the RMA's demand for battleships. 54
The result was the capability to repair and service the huge,
commercial Vulcan built steamers, Preussen, Bayern, and Sachsen, as
well as construction facilities large enough for the navy's capital ships.
51Hurd & Castle, op. ~it., 316.
52Ibid., 12; 17.

See also Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 366-67.

53Ibid., 50.
54BA/MA RM3/354 Blohm u. Voss, Hamburg an SS/RMA, Berlin
6.4.1892.
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In 1892 Blohm und Voss finished their first military vessel, the
S.M.S. Condor, while the expansion of their construction facilities
was underway and the firm was ready for increased naval orders by
1897. 55
Blohm und Voss built one battleship for the RMA, three light
cruisers, and discovered its real military specialty :

heavy cruisers.

Beginning with the S.M.S. Friedrich Karl in 1903, Blohm und Voss
provided the navy with eleven heavy battle cruisers including the
S.M.S. von der Tann, Seydlitz, Moltke, Goeben and Derfflinger.

In

1916 these ships gave remarkable performances against the British at
Jutland. 56
The last of the six major private shipyards, and, at the turn
of the century, the largest, was the Maschinenbau Aktiengesellschaft
11

Vulcan 11 of Stettin-Bredow.

Like many German shipbuilding finns,

this joint-stock company was strong in the area of engineering and
machine construction.

Vulcan began in 1857 as the firm of Fruchtenicht

and Brock, established in Stettin only six years before.57 The new
finn's capital grew from 3.9 million in 1880 to 10 million marks in
1900, and shareholders received a handsome return of from 6% to 14%
during the 1890's.58

55E. Groner, op. cit., 19-49 passim.
56Schwarz and Halle, op. cit., 21.
57Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 362-364.
58schwarz and Halle, op. cit., 58-59.
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In the commercial market Vulcan produced only 15,249 tons of
ships in 1898, but by 1900 this figure had risen to 55,023 tons.59
Between 1881 and 1890 Vulcan completed ten ships for Germany's merchant
marine, including six large government subsidized steamers for the
North German Lloyd. 60 The following decade brought eighteen more
contracts.
Vulcan's relations with the Imperial Navy began with the
construction, in Stettin, of the first armored German ship ever
produced, the corvette S.M.S. Preussen.

It was laid down in 1869 and

completed well after Bismarck was finished unifying Germany.61

This

was only the beginning of a very profitable association for both
Vulcan and the navy.

The Stettin firm eventually built nine battle

ships for the RMA, more than any other company.

In addition, other

contracts resulted in three heavy cruisers, eleven light cruisers,
numerous torpedo boats and later, U-boats.

Vulcan's work for foreign

navies began in 1881, when it built several torpedo boats for the
Chinese.

In the next ten years this work expanded, with Stosch's

approval, to two battleships, a light cruiser and two heavy armored
cruisers. 62

59Ibid., 50.
60Ibid., 19. The six were the Preussen, Bayern, Sachsen,
Danzig, Stettin and Lubeck.
61Ibid., 15.
62Ibid., 16-17.
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The typical shipyard performed actually a number of independent
functions united by a single project.

It employed painters, skilled

mechanics, boilermakers and metalsmiths of all kinds.

It made

fittings, valves and different qualities of iron and steel.

One yard

engaged in repair work, others manufactured replacement parts, and all
preserved the old carpenter s skills still very much in demand.
1

This

diversification enabled some of the larger firms to produce other
products or do piece work which would keep them financially secure if
contracts were few.

Blohm und Voss 1 s repair capability, Schichau 1 s

locomotive works and Vulcan's machinery are all examples of this
capability.

For the smaller firms the erratic rhythm of commercial

and naval contracts through 1898 proved quite a trial.
The Imperial Yards, although physically similar to the private
yards, served a variety of other functions for the RMA.

Established

in 1869 as centers for Prussian coastal defense in cooperation with
Bismarck 1 s North German Confederation, these yards were located at
Danzig and Kiel on the Baltic, and at Wilhelmshaven on the North
Sea.63

They were as large as some of the private shipyards.

In

Danzig, the smallest of the Imperial Yards, the navy had three slipways,
two stationary docks and a number of floating docks.64

Danzig and the

Germaniawerft were the only shipyards in Germany engaged in U-boat
research and development.

Danzig produced 27 of the 62 boats laid

63Schwarz and Halle, op. cit., 15.
64Ibid., plan l (Appendix).
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down before 1914, leaving twenty-eight to Krupp, six to Weser and
one to an Italian firrn.65
The Wilhelmshaven yard was the second largest among the three.
Wilhelmshaven specialized more in battleship construction than the
other two and possessed extensive repair facilities as it was RMA
policy to execute repairs exclusively at the Imperial Yards.
Wilhelmshaven had three large docks, two smaller ones and a minimum
of the required auxiliary facilities.66
The largest of the three Imperial Yards was at Kiel.

Here

construction capabilities certainly equalled some of the better
independent firms.

The centers in Kiel for testing artillery and

torpedoes were larger and more sophisticated than either of the other
Imperial Yards.

Its plant space included machine shops, materials

testing laboratories and considerable storage facilities.

Besides

nine slips for working on torpedo boats and three small construction
docks, Kiel had six full size docks for battleship and cruiser work.67
In the 1870 1 s the Imperial Yards were used to spearhead
official programs, to perform administrative functions, and to provide

65E. Groner, op. cit., 40-41. The U-42 was awarded to the
Societa Fiat 11 San Giorgio, 11 La Spez1a-Muggiano. But all of these
boats were very primitive. They were either 450 ton petrol driven
models or 800 ton MS-boats. See RM3/ll692, 11 Inbaugabe der U-boote, 11
Berl in 5 . 3 . l 7.
66schwarz and Halle, op. cit., plan 3 (Appendix).
67Ibid., plan 2 (Appendix). At the turn of the century the
KvJs had a modest workforce of 15,781. See: Ibid., 204-05; 244-45.
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the RMA with greater freedom of decision.

For example, Stosch would

only encourage the private shipyards to employ domestic materials and
sub-contractors, but Imperial Yards had to follow these naval
directives as much as possible.

Nearly two decades later, when

Tirpitz's ambitions for the fleet strained the entire industry to its
limits, the Imperial Yards became one of his more effective tools in
dealing with the private sector.
The RMA employed the Imperial Yards to whittle down ship prices.
When Schichau and Germaniawerft proposed what the RMA considered
excessively high bids for the Torpedo boats 90-101, it used the
Imperial Yards to reduce the total contract price.

Schichau bid

930,000 marks and Germania 1,075,000 marks for a project the RMA placed
in the 770,000 marks range.

The RMA gave projects worth 560,000 marks

to the Imperial Yards and awarded the rest to Schichau at the reduced
price of 874,000 marks.68 According to two British journalists
evaluating the Imperial Yards on the eve of World War One, the
Imperial Yards were:
. . . designed on the principle that they shall possess a
sufficient power of output so as to prevent private yards
from being in a position to fix the prices at which warships
should be built, and they have shown themselves equal to the
occasion, and are by no means behind private establishments.69
This role was not their original function, but it certainly became
one of the major duties of the Imperial Yards after 1897.

1900.

11

68BA/MA RM3/3699, 11 Protokoll Uber die Sitzung am 16. Juni
See also BA/MA RM3/3697-98 passim, for similar examples.
69Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 361.
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Before Tirpitz, the Imperial Yards fulfilled a financial and
accounting role that the admiral greatly expanded at the turn of the
century.

The administrative departments of all three Imperial

Shipyards were used to account for the expenditure, not only of their
own funds, 70 but also of those periodically released to the private
yards to fulfill ship contracts.

They were also responsible for funds

allotted for research and testing at all the yards.71

The RMA Budget

Department often authorized the yards to issue vouchers which smaller
contractors could present for payment at the Reichsbank.72

The diverse

skills required of every shipyard were considerably broadened in the
case of the Imperial Yards.
By 1899, German materials still only amounted to 2.7% of any
given ship built at home.

More than half of the materials used and,

in a good many cases, entire ships were still procured abroad, mainly
in Britain.

Only 120,000 tons, or l .9% of total German steel

production, was used in shipbuilding.

By mid-1900 the percentage of

German steel made for ships was only 4.5%.

70BA/MA RM3/6071 KWK an SS/RMA, Berlin 10.2.1896: 11 Beantragung
von Mitteln aus den lfd. No. 11 und 12 des Rechnungssolls von den
einmaligen Ausgaben. 11 BA/MA RM3/7312-13 (1895-1909), passim. (Budget
control.)
71BA/MA RM3/6072, passim (1896-1900).
72BA/MA RM3/6061. Payment of 661 .80 marks made to the Nord
deutschen Gewerbe Ausstellung, Ktlnigsburg 10.16.1895. The American
system was similar. See BA/MA RM3/1073 "Marine der Vereinigten
Staaten, 11 Construction Dept., RMA, Berl in, 1896.
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In 1900 prices for shipbuilding materials were 25 to 30 marks
higher than in Britain or France because of the lack of naval
experience and difficulties within industry.

Germany's coal and iron

ore prices, set largely by the Rhineland industrialists, were among
the highest in Europe.

Long distances between the major shipyards on

the Baltic and North Seas and Germany's mines and inland industries
created huge transport costs.
Elbing was 984 km.

From the Krupp works in Essen to

From Essen to Wilhelmshaven, one of the shortest

distance, was 299 km.

Many small specialized firms could not pay

these prices and still show a profit.

Often their large capital

expenditures were hardly worth the effort.73
Various industries suffered from low product standards, poor
designs, and mismanagement.

In the machine and tool industry, the

U.S. surpassed Germany in mass production methods, and the British
were more original in design.
In the iron and steel industry innovation and combination
presented yet another problem.

The Thomas-Gilchrist and Siemens

Martin processes for high quality steel production were still under
going tests for naval use in the 1890 s, and only a limited number of
1

German firms were capable of producing by these methods.

Armor plate

production techniques changed every five years or so in a regular
rhythm, from the Ellis System developed in Britain in the 1880 1 s,
through the Wilson System which first introduced steel into armor for

73Pollard and Robinson, British Shipbuilding Industry, 18701914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 29.
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resilience.

Finally, by 1890, the Harvey Company of New Jersey

devised a nickel-steel armor which Krupp almost immediately improved.
Krupp had a virtual monopoly on armor in Germany by the early 1890 s
1

and a voracious appetite for consuming competitors like Gruson and
the Bochumer Gussstahlfabrik, or outcompeting others like the
~Order Verein.74
Most of these iron, steel or mineral firms in the Ruhr formed
cartels with which the navy had to deal.

The coal and coke suppliers

of western Germany were united in the Rhine-Westfalian Coal Syndicate
and the Westfalian Coke Syndicate.

Their east German counterparts

later established two cartels centered in Berlin.75 There were iron
pipe, scrap iron and conventional iron syndicates like the Grobble
chverband, which was managed by Krupp's Board of Directors and united
twenty finns producing steel plate from five to forty millimeters
thick.

The powerful iron and steel firms were able to force the

suspension of many provincial tolls, but the savings were hardly
passed on to any consumer, let alone the navy.

They also had close

ties with other cartels such as the Association of Ship Steel
Producers and the Association of Cast Steel Producers.

74G. Leckebusch, 11 Der Beginn des deutschen Eisenschifbaues,
1850-1890, 11 Moderne deutsche Wirtschafts9eschichte, Karl E. Born, ed.
(Cologne, 1966), 191-99. Many finns also watched carefully any
tendency by their workers to lean toward the unions or political
left; e.g., Krupp's Direktorium claimed only 40 left-affiliated
workers in 1896 at the Gussstahlfabrik and only 78 one year later.
HA Krupp FAH III 839 Direktorium to F. A. Krupp, Essen 4.26.1897.
75BA/MA RM3/3681.
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In 1895, according to the naval yearbook Nauticus, there were
1130 ship construction or supply companies in Germany employing about
35,000 workers.

There were only forty-six firms with more than fifty

workers making up 28,600 of the total employed.

This was a modest

increase from a workforce of 23,000 employed by the industry in 1882,
the last full year Stosch spent at the Admiralty.

By 1898, however,

eleven of the largest shipyards were employing 24,220 people out of a
total related workforce of 62,400 at a salary of approximately 67
million marks.76 The expansion of the naval armaments industry to
meet the RMA 1 s demands was already under way.
The Labor Force
The success of individual construction projects and the entire
program of naval expansion largely depended upon the labor situation
at the shipyards.

A primary consideration in any study of naval

expansion must be the sufficiency of skilled labor and the state of
its organization.

The twenty-two private yards and three Imperial

Yards employed 50,451 people by 1900.

The six major private yards

employed 23,381 administrators, technical personnel and workers; the
Imperial Yards 15,781.77 The skilled workers of the industry split
into thirty-one different categories, and worked with metal, wood,
canvas, and paint among other specialties.

The average workday at a

shipyard was ten hours, beginning at six in the morning with a break

76Nauticus, 1899, 282-83.
77schwarz and Halle, vol. 2, op. cit., 124-25.
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for breakfast and a sixty or ninety minute mid-day rest period.78 The
longer overtime days occurred most frequently in the summer, when the
RMA and many private shipping firms brought their vessels in for
standard repairs.

During the winter the days were sometimes shortened

to 7-1/2 hours, but this became more infrequent as the electrical
industry provided night-lighting at the shipyards.79
Most workers were hired independently or in groups according to
trade.

Each person or homogeneous group had its own contract with his

employer stipulating type of work, the pay scale, and schedule.

Many

were paid by the job, not by the hour, day or week, and this type of
employment contract called for the completion of an entire project
before the workers were paid a bulk, prearranged wage.

The multi

plicity of arrangements in this system made it extremely difficult to
control wages easily or estimate accurately future spending.
was only one exception to this rule:

There

the women in the industry.

Since

there were only fifteen of them in 1900, their wages posed no problem
for the time being.BO
The levels of pay given to German shipyard workers depended on
two variables.

The place an individual chose to work was as important

as the skill he possessed.

A riveter, included in the class

11

ship

builder,11 working in Stettin would earn from 26 to 32 pfennig (pf) per
hour.

The same worker in Danzig was paid 25 to 28 pf.

The higher wages

78Ibid., 105.
79Ibid., 105.
80Ibid., 124-25. Thirteen women were employed by Schichau and
two by Neptun (Restock).
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were found at the five Hamburg yards.

A riveter's wage there went

from a low of 26 pf to 39/40 pf per hour.
were average for the industry in this case.

The wages paid by the navy
At the Imperial Yard in

Kiel a riveter earned from 26 to 36 pf.81
In another line of shipyard work, a machine builder earned
wages similar to the various metalsmiths.

The rates ranged from 30

to 40 pf in Danzig to a possible high of 43 pf in Hamburg.

Some of the

older traditional skills were practiced by fewer men and drew the
highest salaries in the business.

A sailmaker and rigger earned 55 pf

per hour, but they were in demand only at the smaller firms in Stettin,
Rostock, Lubeck, Hamburg and Harburg.82
Most firms had a number of apprenticeship programs that
catered to two groups of trainees or Lehrlinge.

These were young men

grouped above and below sixteen years of age engaged in learning ship
building skills.

There were also laborers sixteen and under, but the

industry only employed 596 of these in 1900 and the Imperial Yards had
only 111.

The wages for the 3,252 trainees peaked at 15 pf per hour

in Danzig, LUbeck and Papenburg and sank to 3-1/2 pf in Harburg.

Those

under sixteen were paid from two-thirds the rate for the older ones to
full parity depending on location.

The laborers under sixteen

received about half of the amount given regular full-time skilled
workers.83

81Ibid., 114-115.
82Ibid., 114-115.
83Ibid., 114-115.
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For the workers, one means to better their wages and hours
before 1914 was the pressure applied by unions.

Yet by 1900 the

development of the labor movement among the shipyard workers was still
primitive, if growing.

The earliest of these organizations traced its

roots back to the mid-nineteenth century.

This was the Carpenters

Association formed from the guilds of Hamburg and environs in 1849
because of widespread unemployment and the hiring of foreign workers
by the yards.

By 1873 the German Carpenters Association unified the

regional and city associations in Hamburg, Cuxhaven, Weserplatze,
Apenrade, Kiel and LUbeck.

Of about 6,000 carpenters in the trade in

1875 the Association represented 3,300.84
Not all of the workers associations were so homogeneous in
their origins.

In 1888, the Central Association of Shipyard Workers

was formed from the German Shipbuilders Association founded among the
Baltic workers six years before.

This group was a coalition of wood

and metal tradesmen as opposed to the single trade carpenters
association.

Many carpenters scorned the multi-trade organizations

and chose to cling to the German Carpenters Association or local,
smaller carpenters' groups.

The craft guild traditions were still

strong and not quickly submerged within the newer, more diversified
organizations.
As was the case with the carpenters, the metal workers first
began their associations among single specialized trades.

The

Mechanics' and Machine Builders' Association dated from 1883, the

84Schwarz and Halle, op. cit., vol. l, 170-71.
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Metal Smiths' Association from 1885.

Perhaps because these men and

their skill were products of modern industry, they were less concerned
about losing their technical identity in a large heterogeneous organiza
tion.

The German Metal Workers' Association of 1891, based in Hamburg,

brought many different skills together in a common cause.
By the turn of the century most of the shipyard workers who
were united were loosely committed to either the German Carpenters
Association or the Central Association of German Shipyard Workers.
But these two groups and smaller independents rarely cooperated with
each other.

The Carpenters called strikes in 1888 and 1889 over wages

without the cooperation of the Shipyard Workers.

Both strikes

failed.85
In 1890, the Central Association of German Shipyard Workers
with S.P.D. support attempted their own walkout in which 4,000
participated.

It failed and nearly destroyed the Shipyard Workers

organization, as they lost a great deal of money and many members.
In order to survive, the Association briefly entered into a union with
the dockyard workers until 1892.

In 1896 its combination with the

German Metal Workers' Association restabilized the situation with fresh
money and supporters.86
Out of the more than 50,000 employed by the industry in 1900,
only a few thousand were organized.

The Carpenters and Shipyard

Workers' Associations accounted for merely 4,000 members among fifteen

85Ibid., vol. 2, 127-29.
86Ibid., 128-29.
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affiliated associations.

The only other union making pretensions

toward unifying the shipyard labor was the Hirsch-Dunckerscher
Gewerkverein. 87 At this point the workers were far from being a truly
effective political and economic force.

There were no strikes at the

shipyards between 1890 and 1899.
As the RMA also discovered, both it and the shipyards were
particularly vulnerable to the sheer scarcity of skilled workers.

In

a discussion with the Kaiser at the time of the S.M.S. Kaiser Wilhelm
der Grosse launching, Tirpitz complained about the way some private
yards used skilled labor.

He seemed particularly annoyed by Krupp's

use of skilled workmen on the Russian Cruiser Askold, while some RMA
projects were neglected.BB The possibility of labor shortages,
strikes, and slowdowns were perpetual sources of anxiety for the RMA.
Tirpitz cited the latter two as the reason for up to six months of
delays in finishing some of the battleships of the Kaiser Friedrich III
Class laid down between 1895 and 1898.89 The German navy was not alone
in this sort of problem.

In 1901, Mr. J. T. Bowles, the construction

chief of the U.S. Navy, blamed steel-workers' strikes for delays of
up to two years in the Virginia Class battleships and Pennsylvania
Class armored cruisers.90 No matter the country, the early growing
pains were similar.

87Ibid., 129.
88Ibid., 130.
89BA/MA RM3/2 Tirpitz, Berlin to Wilhelm II 10.17.00.
90BA/MA RM2/163 Press clipping from the Daily Graphic, 10.22.01,
New York City.
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SuITlllary
A number of important points should be distilled from this
survey of conditions in the navy and industry as Tirpitz came upon the
scene.

The naval structure was fairly new, and each of the men in

charge of the three part naval organization was testing the boundaries
of his authority.

Tirpitz proved the most aggressive of all.

In

choosing Tirpitz as State Secretary of the RMA, Kaiser Wilhelm
selected a new set of ideas as well.

Tirpitz religiously followed his

strategic dogma despite the objections of his colleagues.

He was

clearly determined to fulfill Germany's ambitions as well as his own.
In 1897, the shipbuilding industry in Germany was still
relatively primitive but two things offset a good measure of this dis
advantage:

The German economy in general was experiencing a period of

rapid growth; and the prospect of huge naval profits was definitely
attractive.

The firms already involved in naval related fields

increased their efforts, while new companies turned their attention to
the navy's needs.

The labor movement, lacking effective unions, posed

no real threat of slowdowns to the RMA's expansion program.

If

Tirpitz could guarantee continuous government appropriations after
1897, the German shipbuilding industry appeared most capable of
discarding the primitive qualities of the 1880's and 1890's.

CHAPTER I
NEW DIRECTIONS:

1897-1898

Upon assuming the post of State Secretary of the RMA, Tirpitz
immediately began to execute his plans for expansion.

On the politi

cal front he initiated preparations for the debate over the 1898 Naval
Bill in the Reichstag.
RMA.

In the naval sphere he began to reorganize the

The Admiral also set out to construct a system of relations with

industry that would afford him the upper hand in all of his business
dealings.

His efforts resulted in victory in the Reichstag and a

formidable system of controls which Tirpitz imposed on the firms
wishing to produce for the fleet.

They also led to his confrontation

with the armor monopoly, a questionable RMA policy regarding research
and development, and the first encounters with iubstantial cost and
weight overruns.

This stormy two year period witnessed the official

birth of the modern Germany Navy.
Tirpitz and the Naval Law of 1898
In a memorandum of June 1897, Tirpitz laid down his fleet
proposals which called for a program of 408 million marks spread over
the 1898-1905 period.

His goal for the German fleet at home and

abroad was as follows:
19 Battleships (+2 in reserve)
8 armored coastal vessels
12 heavy cruisers (+3 reserves for overseas duty)
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30 light cruisers (+3 reserves for overseas duty)
12 Torpedo Boat divisionsl
Tirpitz's memorandum of June 1897 was a truly revolutionary
document in German naval history.

In a single stroke he gave direction

and consistency to naval policy and in the process managed to lower the
projected construction costs by 15%. Although the goals set were not
as extensive as Wilhelm wished, Tirpitz managed to put together an
acceptable package.

But more iffiportantly, these naval goals were not

proposed as part of the 1898 budget.

The strength of the fleet in

ships and men, the regular replacement of obsolete ships and the
completion date for the program were all proposed as a new law.

The

Reichstag would approve not one year's spending, but rather a long
term corrmitment to naval development.
In support of this effort the RMA News Bureau led by Corvette
Captain August von Heeringen mustered its formidable power in the
propaganda sphere.2 During the Reichstag Christmas recess, beginning
in December 1897, the business community joined the RMA in its
propaganda campaign.

On 13 January 1898, at the Kaiserhof in Berlin,

the Central Association of German Industrialists and Hamburg's leading
fleet proponent, Adolf Woermann, sponsored a meeting of the interested
business corrununity.

Two hundred and fifty-one pro-naval individuals

and groups, including seventy-eight Chamber of Commerce presidents,
1J. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent (New York, 1965).
2von Heeringen:

See Appendix.
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attended and agreed to coordinate their efforts to see the 1898 Naval
Law through the Reichstag.
Particularly important for parliamentary success was Tirpitz's
relationship with the Catholic Center Party and its leader Ernst
Lieber.3 The Naval Law appealed to Lieber because of its potential
for extracting political benefits for the Center.

Lieber looked beyond

the religious and regional character of his party and fancied that the
naval issue could make the Center the national party in Germany.

In

exchange for aiding Tirpitz he hoped to broaden the freedom and
influence of the Catholic Church and establish the Center as the
arbiter in Reichstag disputes.

But Tirpitz, the prototype of the

soldier-politician, successfully sidestepped Lieber's efforts to place
clearly defined limits on naval expenditure over the 1898-1905 period
without losing the essential support of the Center Party leader.
Only the financial figures endangered the Tirpitz-Lieber
agreement on Center Party support for the Naval Law.

Could the

Reichstag afford this law without a new source of revenue?

Proposed

progressive income tax laws, designed to arrest the Reich's declining
revenues, remained a spectra that haunted the Reichstag, and both the
Hohenlohe and von Billow governments. 4
The struggle over the Naval Law reflected the blurred dis
tinction between outward appearance and political reality in a Reich

3see: E. Kehr, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 18941901 (Berlin, 1930); J. Steinberg, Deterrent, passim.
4J. Steinberg, Deterrent, 186.
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bound by Bismarck's constitution.
confronted in the Reichstag it

11

•

In spite of the obstacles he
was precisely because Tirpitz

behaved as if Germany had a parliamentary regime that he was so
successful. 11 5 He took the politicians seriously, talked, negotiated
and argued with them, and thus seemed to become one of them.

This

often seemed true to his naval colleagues as well for, as Samuel
Huntington has pointed out,

11

•••

he was generally viewed by the other

admirals as an essentially political figure. 11 6
The Admiral could adjust his relations with people according to
the demands of the moment.

He was ruthless at eliminating rivals in

the navy. He pushed both van Knorr and Buchsel into the background and
with them relegated the Supreme Command to a secondary position in
naval affairs.

He had Galster censured for advocating quicker

development of the U-boat because Tirpitz felt it would challenge the
primacy of the battleship.? But he handled contacts in the Reichstag
with seasoned grace.

He sent the Reichstag leaders thorough memoranda

to keep them well informed on naval affairs.

He frequently engaged

them in personal conversations or encouraged his associates Dahnhardt
and Capelle to do so.6 The RMA responded to all of their questions
5Ibid., 191.
102.

6s. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York, 1957),

7H. Herwig, The Gennan Naval Officer Cars, A Political and
Social History (Oxford, 1973 , 27.
8Both of these men were frequently at Tirpitz 1 s side during
Reichstag debates: See biographical appendix.
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and even arranged for tours of the Imperial Naval Yards for some
Reichstag deputies.9
If Tirpitz obtained what he wanted from the Reichstag in 1898
it would truly indicate a great deal of political skill.

Costs rose

constantly, and politicians like Lieber sought spending limits and
sharp definitions in every spenGing category.

The S.M.S. Brandenburg

(1890) had cost 9.3 million marks and the S.M.S. Kurfurst Freidrich
Wilhelm (1890) eventually went as high as 11 .23 million marks.10 No
price was stable in the shipbuilding industry, especially now that the
government was contemplating new spending in the billions.

The

possibility of a new tax to cover the conmitments of the Naval Law
seemed to loom larger than ever.11
One of the most understandable fears in the Reichstag concerned
obsolescence.

How could one determine appropriations for materials for

repair and replacement?

The navy was projecting only a twenty-five

year service life for the new ships, and parts for repair work were
constantly spiraling upwards in price.
lamented that:
Firm.

One deputy, Dr. Hanmacher,

"In ordering artillery we can only deal with the Krupp

But we should not have to fear constantly that the prices will

9P. - Kennedy, 11 Fischer and Tirpitz: Political Admirals in the
Age of Imperialism, 11 Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century 1900-1945,
Gerald Jordan, ed. (London, 1977), 52.
lDBA/MA RM3/347 11 Zusammenstellungen von Schiffsneubauten bei
1897/98 und Neubauten Schiffe Sachsen Klasse 11 (quotes figures from 1889
to 1898).
llBA/MA RM3/11636 Handakten Dahnhardt, Reichstag Budget
Conmission Hearings 3.3.1898.
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suddenly change.

They are already high enough. 1112 The presence of

State Secretary von Posadowsky-Wehner from the Reich Treasury Office
as a Tirpitz supporter during the budget debates was only mildly
reassuring to the legislators.
The 1898 Naval Law passed the Reichstag on 26 March and was
signed by the Kaiser fifteen days later.

Just before the law was voted

upon, August Bebel gave the final plea of the SPD against the true
nature and purpose of the legislation.

In his analysis of that

speech and the Reichstag's reaction to it, Jonathan Steinberg wondered
whether Tirpitz s cautious parliamentary tactics were actually
1

necessary.

The house responded with

11

prolonged laughter 11 to Bebel's

warning that Germany would be crushed by Britain in a direct con
frontation

even if (our fleet) is finished to the very last
ship demanded in this law. 11 Only one thing was sure:
11

•••

What had been the closely guarded plan of an inner cabal in
January of 1896 had become the wish of a substantial
majority of the Reichstag by March 1898. 13
Coping with Rapid Expansion
In his memoirs, Tirpitz complained that he never had enough
money to draw the best possible personnel to the weak spots in the
naval administration. He rhetorically asked what the 11 democrats 11
would do if, following the British example, he appointed a chief

12Ibid., Hearings 3.2.1898.
13For Bebel 's speech and the Reichstag reaction: Steno
graphischer Bericht, der Reichstag, 9. Legisl. Periode, V. Session,
68. Sitzung Wed. 3.23.1898, 1746. For Steinberg's analysis see
Deterrent, 193-195.
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engineer at an annual salary of 100,000 marks. 14 He felt the RMA was
limited to small, quietly awarded bonuses to those who showed
technical and administrative originality and devotion to duty.15
Naval Law only exacerbated this problem.

The

The call for new personnel

rose with its passage, reflecting the demands placed upon both the
military and industry.

The Chief of the RMA's construction division

(Konstruktionsabteilung) asked for three dozen new inspectors and
master shipbuilders less than one month after the Naval Law passed the
Reichstag.

The expansion of the fleet would draw skilled and unskilled

people to every phase of naval affairs especially at the Imperial
Naval Yards in Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and Danzig.

There the need would

be most immediate. 16
The salaries the Reichstag was asked to appropriate for
individual officers and expert advisors give some idea of the huge
cost involved.

Perels, a high ranking civilian naval adviser

(Geheime Admiralitatsrath) earned 15,000 marks in 1896 at the top rung
of his pay scale and a junior man of the same rank earned 8,000 marks.
Naval designers took home between 1,800 and 3,800 marks, averaging
about 2,100 annually.1 7 Among the officers, the admirals usually

141b = 20 marks= $5.00. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo
German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London, 1980), X.
15A. Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. I (London, 1919), 130.
16BA/MA RM3/2489 "Bei MI vorzulegen, 11 signed, Dietrich,
Berlin 4.22. 1898. ·
17BA/MA RM3/2487 "Speziall Nachweisung 1896. 11 Prepared as
background for the formulation of the 1897/98 fiscal year budget
proposals.
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started at about 12,000 marks and the lowest grades were budgeted at
6,000 marks.

The major differences in personnel spending here came

with older, more experienced admirals.

In 1896, for example, the State

Secretary was paid 24,000 marks and the highest ranking officers were
in the 30,000 marks range.

The proposed salary for Tirpitz in 1898 was

30,000 marks, a 6,000 marks raise.

This was only the tip of the

iceberg.18
The size and scope of RMA authority reflected the responsibili
ties and challenges of rapid growth.
tion by Supreme Command standards.

In 1897 it was a small organiza
By 1914 however it had grown into

a huge bureaucracy for supervising every facet of naval affairs and
parliamentary relations with headquarters on the Konigin Augusta
Strasse in Berlin. 19 The section of it most directly related to
problems of shipbuilding, the Cvnstruction Department, did not become
an independent RMA division until 1904.

The development of the

construction department reflected the demand for a domestic ship
building industry and the necessity for expert naval construction
supervision.

In 1880 the navy possessed only a Technical Section

(Abteilung) for shipbuilding, most of which was done abroad.

The first

Construction Chief of the Imperial Navy, Dietrich, was then only an
engineer under the section's second in command, Admiralty Advisor
Bauck.

With the coming of von Stosch in 1881, an independent

18BA/MA RM3/2487 Reichsschatzamt an den Herrn Reichskanzler zu
Hohenlohe, Berlin 7.4.1896. Figures on Tirpitz: BA/MA RM3/2488
Naval Budget 1897/1898, Kap. 46 (RMA).
19See Rangliste, 1897-1914. The development of the RMA can be
proqressively examined as it grew from year to year. (See Table 4.)
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TABLE 4
EVENTUAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MATURE
REICHSMARINEAMT, 1914

RMA State Secretary
The following departments and sections under his direct authority:
(M) Central Section
(A) General Naval Department
(B) Dockyard Department (fonnerly Technical Department, changed in
1905)
(K) Construction Department
(E) Budget Department
(W) Weapons Department
(H) Nautical Department
(G) Medical Section
(J) Legal Divis ion

(N) News Bureau
(C) Administrative Department
All Naval Attaches
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Construction Bureau was created under Dietrich in Rear Admiral Batsch 1 s
Naval Department.

This structure remained the same until 1896, with

Dietrich s official appointment as Construction Chief in 1894 the only
1

alteration.

In 1896 the Bureau was raised to the level of a section in

the Naval Department now under Captain Buchsel and Dietrich was
appointed Section Chief.

Reflecting the plans of the new State

Secretary in the 1897 to 1900 period, the Construction Section had its
position redefined.

In 1898 it was placed under the authority of the

Administrative Department, and after one year returned to the Naval
Department before finding a permanent place in the Technical Department
in 190o.20 On 10 November 1899 Captain von Eickstedt21 was appointed
its director and under his guidance the Construction Section was
elevated to the level of a department in 1904.22
As State Secretary, Tirpitz controlled directly every department
and section of the RMA.

But, as the complexity of naval affairs

intensified after 1898, he relied heavily on a group of very
competent officers and civilian advisors to keep the RMA system
running effectively.

Corrmunication between departments on matters of

construction, budget, prices, research and so forth, were discussed in

20Rangliste, vols. 1880-1914.
21von Eickstedt: promoted to Rear Admiral 3. 11.02, Vice
Admiral l .27.06, held the position of Chief of the Construction
Department until his retirement in 1906 .
22The first Construction Department independent budget= 1905,
BA/MA RM3/2494-95. For purposes of clarity and consistency the term
11
Construction Department 11 will be used throughout this work, regard
less of date.
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Sitzungen or administrative session attended by representatives of all
RMA departments. 23 Depending on the subject of the session, particular
divisions of any given departme~t or section would attend according to
their specialty.

For the Construction DepartmentvonEickstedt was a

regular at these sessions.

His department had four divisions through

which the various stages of construction were supervised.

KI was in

charge of general ship construction matters and KII conducted all
relations with machine and motor finns.

KIII division supervised the

shake-down cruises of capital ships, smaller vessels, and all related
work; and KIV regulated the correct methods of ship construction
according to strict RMA guidelines.24 Tirpitz kept himself abreast of
the progress of the construction program in this way, involving himself
deeply while avoiding the headache of personally assuming every
responsibility.
Research and Development:

The U-Boat and the Turbine Engine

RMA policy regarding restarch and development did not strengthen
its position with industry.

The vacillation of the Heusner and Hollmann

years at the RMA had retarded technical development for a number of
reasons.

The RMA's demands for types of vessels and materials were not

consistent, so it could never convince the Reichstag to appropriate

23For an example of a typical Sitzung: BA/MA RM3/369l Berlin
l .13.04 . The subject was the quality of boilers for capital ships.
24Rangliste, 1908.
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adequate funding for any of its schemes.25

The directors of Vulcan

actually wrote to Hollmann in 1891 asking for a clearer idea of future
naval plans, as the firm wanted to profit from naval expansion but had
little idea of how it could adapt to the navy's needs.26
Tirpitz provided industry with the definition and direction it
lacked before 1897, but his attitude toward new technical breakthroughs
confounded industry in another way.

In his memoirs, Tirpitz revealed

his attitude toward research and development.

He believed that no

innovation should be adopted too quickly, i.e., before he thought it
was perfected.

Thus he delayed naval involvement in U-boat research

and complained that wireless telegraphy was installed in warships too
soon.

What he sought to avoid was the avalanche of technical problems

that usually accompanied hasty change.27 What he actually accomplished
was quite different.

Tirpitz s faith in the battleship and slow,
1

deliberate technological develo~ment led him to avoid any basic
changes in naval hardware.
The RMA encouraged some research and development but left
almost all of the work to the private sector of the shipbuilding industry.
The navy's effort in this area was limited to testing materials and to a
very restricted U-boat program.

Materials testing was done at the

Imperial Shipyards, the Royal Prussian Testing Office and the

25Hurd & Castle, op . cit., 112.
26BA/MA RM3/347 Vulcan, Stettin-Bredow an SS/RMA, Berlin
l O. 14 . l 89 l.
27A. Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. l (London, 1919), 36-37.
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Technische Hochschule in Berlin-Charlottenberg.

Among imperial yards

the U-boats were the exclusive province of Danzig.

The U-boat work at

Danzig, however, was in no way as intense or advanced as that of Krupp
at the Germaniawerft. 28 The goal of the various departments under
Tirpitz's control was merely to keep themselves abreast of all current
innovations in naval related fields.
Tirpitz was well informed of French and American progress in
U-boat development.

Early German efforts between 1867 and 1870 by

Friedrich Otto Vogel failed.

In the 1890 1 s, however, the American

John P. Holland had a great deal of success with his Plunger, and the
RMA records contain many of the press reviews provided by the German
Foreign Office.29 He knew of these developments and of the presence
of the French U-boat experts d'Equevilley and Laubeauf at the
Germaniawerft. 30 Yet naval policy did not allow the emergence of
the U-boat from the shadow of the capital ship until 1914.

In spite

of this situation the relationship between the RMA and industry
relating to Research and Development was a good one, even if the
former's lack of official involvement and monetary support slowed
the process. 31

28BA/MA RM3/2249-52 passim ( 11 Versuche mit Materialien 11 ) .
29BA/MA RM3/1074 For example see clippings from Le Matin
4.22.1898.
30E. ~6ssler, Geschichte des deutschen U-Bootbaus (Munich,
1975), 22-23.
31BA/MA RM3/2240-50 passim.
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The importance of the RMA research and development policy under
Tirpitz is twofold.

His technical personnel found themselves without

experience in many areas of high technology and thus were often
incapable of exercising effective control over what the RMA was
purchasing from private industry.

In most instances they knew the

theory behind certain innovations because the international flow of
naval research information was still very free.32

However, there was

a considerable gap between theoretical knowledge and practical
experience.

More importantly, Tirpitz 1 s policy tended to shift the

spons i bi l ity of research and development to those firms whose financial
stability and technical expertise could support such programs. Too often this
resulted in a monopoly by a single firm or a select group of dominant
firms expert in an area where RMA was at its weakest.

This is not to

say that Tirpitz should have possessed a clairvoyance that would have
made him aware of the later importance of inventions like the LI-boat,
but a deeper interest, greater official involvement, and a measure of
financial support could have substantially improved the RMA s position.
1

The expertise thus obtained would have resulted in more informed
judgments regarding new developments and a greater control over their
possible production by private industry.
A prime example of this problem is the length of time it took
to place steam-turbine engines in German warships.

The German naval

32BA/MA RM2 (Marinekabinette)/34 Senden-Bibran, aboard the
Imperial Yacht Hohenzollern to Capt. Barber, U.S. Naval Attach~,
Berlin 7.14.1898. RM3/1072 See Technical information sent by German
Legation in Washington, D.C., 1895-97.
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authorities carefully traced the development of the Parsons Turbine in
Britain.

The experiments with the Parsons prototype, the H.M.S.

Turbina, were a constant topic in reports from the German Naval
Attach~ in London.33

Clearly, the RMA had no wish to depend upon a

foreign firm to supply this remarkably better form of naval propulsion.
Unfortunately German private enterprise was at a loss.

The RMA first

saw possibilities in a turbine developed by the engineer Adolf
MUller, but he was judged in violation of Parsons' patents.34 The
other options open to the RMA were not exclusively German.

There was

a system created by the American Curtiss Company in association with
Allgemeine Electrizitats Gesellschaft (AEG), and another of Swiss
origin called the Zoelly System.

Left with no option, the RMA later

contracted with the Parsons Marine Steam Turbine Co., founded in
Britain in 1897.

It was not until 1903 that it built the navy's first

turbine powered capital ship, the light cruiser S.M.S. LUbeck, in
cooperation with Vulcan-Stettin.35
Without a private Gennan finn involved deeply enough in turbine
research to supply the navy with a Parsons quality engine, the RMA
found itself without recourse.

It was dangerous to rely so completely

upon a foreign contractor for such an important breakthrough.

There

was no guarantee that the flow of parts and technical assistance would
continue during wartime.

Navy cfficials felt obliged to approach Krupp

33BA/MA RM3/2106 (1897-98) passim.
34BA/MA RM3/2106 passim.
35Ibid.
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through the Kaiser in 1906, hoping that the Essen firm's substantial
resources could successfully solve the problem.
failure.

The effort was a

By 1911-12 the Parsons Co. still controlled the market.

It

powered two of the four Konig Class dreadnaughts with turbines manu
factured by its subsidiary in Germany.36
The Armor Monopoly
Contrary to some historical interpretations, the naval
authorities did direct efforts against signs of monopoly and price
fixing.37

However, the RMA met with mixed results in this area.

In

1897, for example, the Construction Department was worried about the
growing dominance of the Rheinische Metallwarrenfabrik of DUsseldorf
in the production of boiler pipes.

Concerted efforts in this area

brought about successful competition from Mannesmann and Phoenix.
Thus the RMA found itself with a group of very capable firms, excellent
products and lower, more stable prices.38
It was not as easy to restrain Fried. Krupp of Essen, the
best known land and sea arms manufacturer in the world.

Anything

related to high grade iron and steel was within the firm's area of

36BA/MA RM3/2298 "Lieferantenliste der deutschen Kriegsmarine"
(Berlin, 1907), 66 (Section No. 46); S. Breyer, Battleships and
Battlecruisers, 1905-1970 (Garden City, NY, 1973), 276.
37Here I take issue with P. C. Witt's assertion that the naval
authorities were less than ener£etic in this regard. See P. C. Witt,
Die Finanzpolitik des Deutschen Reiches von 1903 bis 1913 (LUbeck and
Hamburg, 1970), 140 (Historische Studien, Heft 415).
38BA/MA RM3/2193 Bericht:

KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 5.5.1897.
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expertise.

Between 1890 and 1897 the RMA was fairly successful in

finding a reasonable amount of competition for Krupp.

J\rnong others,

Fritz Thyssen, the BismarkhUtte, Borsig and the Pilsen firm of Skoda
competed to some degree in all areas of naval steel save one.39

In

alliance with Dillinger HUttenwerke in the Saar, which began in 1893,
Krupp completely dominated the armor plate industry.40 Both of these
firms were masters of armor technology, but Krupp alone was capable
of producing the quantity the navy required.

Here was the one

alliance the RMA found nearly impossible to manage.
Dillinger was the major supplier of the navy s armor plate
1

between 1876 and 1890.

Before 1876 the modest amounts of armor

Germany needed for naval use were made in Great Britain.

Dillinger

produced Wilson Process compound armor for the German Admiralty during
the 1880 s.
1

The RMA invited Krupp to participate in armor production in
1890.

Three years later, almost simultaneously, the firm purchased

the company of Gruson-Magdeburg and entered into its alliance with
Dillinger.41

Their perfection of the 420 nickel-steel armor process

in 1894 gave the alliance, now dominated by Krupp, a monopoly in the

39BA/MA RM3/2190 11 Zu BII 6466 von BII 6065 11 11.24.1891 (RMA
inter-office correspondence). RM3/2192 11 Bi smarckhUtte to SS/RMA,
Berlin 10.19.1895. RM3/2298 "Lieferantenliste," Berlin, 1907,
Sections 1,2,3.
40BA/MA RM3/2193 Report:

KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 9.1.1897.

41HA Krupp, Krupp, 1812-1912 (Jena, 1912), 365.
Grusson-Magdeburg on l May 1893.

Krupp acquired
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production of top grade armor.42

By 1898, when Krupp's German patent

on the nickel-steel armor process expired, the firm made sure its
patent was extended to restrict the possibility of new firms entering
the market. 43
Early in Tirpitz's term at the RMA, he encouraged firms like
Skoda, Thyssen and Rother Metallwerk in DUsseldorf to compete with
Krupp and achieved some success in orders of small armor plate, rivets,
container coverings and fasteners.

Yet as naval expansion and more

effective artillery required larger quantities of high grade steel
armor, the Krupp-Dillinger alliance became unequaled.44 They
constantly drove ship prices up and shared responsibility for
contracts signed by one or the other with the RMA.45

42HA Krupp WA IV 753 The History of Armor Plate Manufacturing
by Fried. Krupp, 17. 420 Nickel-Steel Armor= 150 lllll. thick, 3
layers, .34% carbon, .3% nickel, 2% chrome. (Process perfected:
7.14.1894. First sales: 1895. First ships: S.M.S. Freya, Hertha
and Kaiser Class Battleships.) The use of nickel-steel armor
reduced by almost 50% the amount needed to render a ship 11 safe. 11
It was also over 2300 marks/ton as opposed to about 1500 marks for
the old compound plate . Some historians see this as a true saving
for the RMA and a value worth the price. The latter was definitely
true, but given Krupp's high prices during this period, the former
was hardly the case. For the opposing view, see Richard Owen,
op. cit. Armor and its foreign and domestic price will be further
explored in later chapters.
43HA Krupp, FAH III B39 11 Gesichtspunkte, die fUr die Frage der
Behandlung unseres neuen Panzerplatten-Fabrikations . . . 11 1898.
44BA/MA RM3/327 Fried. Krupp, Gusstahlfabrik, Essen to SS/RMA,
Berlin 2.26.1897. RM3/327 Dillinger Huttenwerke, Dillingen, Saar to
SS/RMA, Berlin 2. 19.97. RM3/327 RMA-Construction Division to
Dillinger 1.12.97.
45Armor prices sometimes forced budget amendments in the midst
of constructi on: e . g., Light Cruiser 11 K11 : (11.16.1896) original
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A report by the Weapons ~ivision of the RMA in 1899 blamed the
rapid price changes and the monopoly of the Krupp-Dillinger alliance
on advanced technology. 46 Only a few firms successfully employed the
new Harvey Process of manufacturing nickel-steel armor:

Krupp and

Dillinger in Germany; Vickers and Armstrong in Britain; and Schneider
in France.

In the United States the armor powers were Carnegie,

Bethlehem, and later Midvale.

However, the anti-trust groups in the

U.S. made it difficult for American firms to appear close to an
alliance or combination.

There were no such legal or popular limita

tions in Germany.
The 1899 report gave much attention to the United States where
the Congress and Secretary of the Navy Herbert were monitoring the
drastic rise in armor prices.

Herbert was a Democrat, an anti-trust

advocate, and he did not hide his suspicions regarding collusion in
the steel industry.47 The Congress was even investigating the
pass i bi 1i ty of a government-owned factory, and there were efforts to
legislate the lower price of 1200 marks ($300) per ton.

estimate for armor= 500,000 marks: (1.18.1897); portion paid for=
193,004.82 marks; difference= 306,995.18 marks; payment necessitated
by price increases= 470,000 marks; total budget increase needed for
1898 = 163,000 marks. See: BA/MA RM3/6071 KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin
1.18.1897.
46 BA/MA RM3/6650 11 Denkschrift uber die Entwicklung des
Panzerplattenmaterials in den letzten 10 Kahren unter besonderer
Berucksichtigung der Preissteigerung" Berlin 11.29.1899. Weapons
Division (W), RMA.
47B. F. Cooling, Grey Steel and Blue Water Navy. The
Formative Years of America's Militar Industrial Com lex 1881-1917
Hamden, Conn., 1979 , 120.
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The latest figures for American naval armor purchased raised a
few eyebrows at the RMA.

Bethlehem and Carnegie wanted 2180 marks per

ton for first quality 4% nickel steel (1899).

Krupp, which sold its

superior steel for 2320 marks per ton in Gennany, offered it to the
U.S. Navy for 2192 marks.

The reduction of 128 marks only served to

underscore the difficulty the RMA was having with the armor
a11 iance. 48
The RMA attacked Krupp's position whenever it felt there was a
chance for success.
against the RMA.

But in this case, the odds were overwhelming

Krupp produced not only most of the navy's best

armor, but also naval steel for every other use and all of the heavy
guns for Tirpitz's battleships.
vital to the navy's growth.

Its shipyard facilities at Kiel were

Tirpitz and his construction people

consequently found themselves in a dilemma.

They had to make sure the

firm received every bit of help the navy's resources could muster,
while they sought to draw new competitors into the armor field. 49
Such

\'Jas

not the case in areas where the RMA committed itself

to research, such as the exploration of ways to insulate battleship
bulkheads.

The navy needed a non-flanmable, light-weight material for

this purpose.

The problem here was not a lack of subcontractors, but

48BA/MA RM3/6650 op. cit., fn. 125.
49BA/MA RM3/1072 For example, in the l890's Freiherr Speck von
Sternberg (the Army's AttacM in Washington, D.C.) sent a great deal
of U.S. armor and artillery trial results to Krupp. The Naval
Attach~ did the same on a regular basis, e.g., Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA
3.27 .1893--acknowledging the receipt of such information. Other firms
did not receive similar treatment.
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one of discovering a specialized material.

The RMA worked with many

firms supplying asbestos, rubber, wood, cork, and various synthetics.
Afterwards it decided to employ a number of different materials
according to the changing requirements in various sections of the
ship.

In this area the RMA directed research and relegated the firms

to a secondary role.50
Involvement in materials research was a natural thing for any
enterprise obliged to keep pace with engineering techniques.
no surprise that the RMA was advanced in this respect.

So it is

Something like

the turbine engine, however, was a dramatic innovation in engine
design requiring extensive amounts of time, capital, and testing.
Here it was always Tirpitz s policy to wait and to allow private
1

business to perfect these systems before the navy judged them fit or
unfit for military use.
Overruns in Time, Weight and Cost:

The Formation of the Protocol

System
Building capital ships required such a diversity of materials
and skills that it resulted in many problems.
German shipbuilding industry was still growing.

In the early 1890 s the
1

It was backward and

often lacked the skills or tools to keep up with the work schedules
adopted by the RMA.

In 1894 and 1895 the S.M.S. Kaiser Friedrich III,

Victoria Louise, and Hertha were all finished behind schedule.

The

50BA/MA RM3/2552 11 Versuche mit Materialien 11 (See also:
RM3/2249-51 passim, on the insulation question).

BA/MA
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subcontractors were often at fault.

Flue pipes, boiler steel, armor

and other parts and tools were frequently slow in arriving at the
construction site. 51 This was understandable then, but many manu
facturers, especially Krupp and Dillinger, kept up this annoying habit
well into the l900's.
Overruns in cost and weight were chronic problems.

The

Construction Inspectorate had to report every variation in cost or
weight which deviated from those specified in the contract.

Thus the

construction docLBT1ents of all German ships were cluttered with cost
and weight reports on everything from locks and hatches to armor
plate. 52 The overruns ranged from insignificant sums to difficulties
costing thousands of marks and kilos.

One inspection report from the

Imperial Yard in Kiel informed the RMA that the parts inventories for
two light cruisers averaged 3,300 marks above specified contract
cost. 53 Many other cost problems were attributable to inflation and
overpricing by firms.

Three armored capital ships purchased by the

RMA over a five year period rose dramatically in price from 4.5
million to 9.6 million marks.54

51BA/MA RM3/6650 11 Die Frage: 1 Weshalb hat sich die Fertig
stel lung der Armierung bisher versp'atet und Weshalb wird das
Konmende schneller Fertig werden. "' RMA Memo "An N( 'dept')" 11.27.
1899.
52BA/MA RM3/443 Construction Records:
1898-1902.

S.M.S. Wittelsbach

53BA/MA RM3/607l BBS, KWK 12.24.1896 to SS/RMA, Berlin.
Light Cruisers "K" and "N."

Re:

54BA/MA RM3/347 "Zusa1TD11enste11 ung van Schiffsneubauten bei
1897/98 und Neubauten den Schiffe Sachsen Klasse."
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The RMA responded to such problems with a very effective system
of regulations and protocol.

It began during the Hollmann period and

was refined and perfected during the Tirpitz years.

The accounting

functions of the Imperial Shipyards, the role of the Purchasing Office,
and the resident instructor at every yard represented only a small part
of the entire picture.

This RMA Protocol System involved the firms in

a labyrinth of requirements, tests, and screening that became the
single most important lever the RMA possessed in its relationship with
industry.
The roots of the RMA protocol lay in its first efforts to reach
the level of technical expertise shared by the world's naval leaders.
Under Dietrich's direction, construction experts attended most of the
major international conferences dealing with topics essential to naval
development.

Most important among these were the international

congresses on testing methods held in Zurich in 1895 and Stockholm in
Here RMA officials accumulated valuable information regarding

1897.

new construction methods, all manner of tests for materials, and
procedures for shakedown cruises.55 This free exchange of technical
information enabled the RMA to take advantage of sophisticated
procedures, like the Zerissenprobe, or breaking test, which strained
such substances as Siemens-Martin cast iron and Schneider-Creuzot
steel to their limits.

The new techniques and information allowed

Dietrich's people to judge the quality of the supplies it purchased

55BA/MA RM3/2098 "Bericht Uber die Verhandlungen der inter
nationalen Konferenz zUr Vereinfachung einheitlicher PrUfungsmethoden
II

9.9-11.1895.
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more accurately and to formulate a strict set of quality codes govern
ing all naval purchases.
German naval attaches gathered further information on foreign
firms.

Besides developments in Britain, the RMA was particularly

interested in the United States because the theory of battleship
superiority reigned supreme in the U.S.

That placed the Americans in

a situation closely akin to the Germans both in strategic theory and
in their stage of naval growth.

The RMA closely followed the U.S. Navy

Department's relations with Carnegie and Bethlehem Steel on the armor
issue. 56

It also kept close tabs on publications in American technical

journals and shake-down cruises.

One example was the first trip of

the light cruiser U.S.S. Cincinnati.

The information in this report

to the State Secretary included data on boilers, steering mechanisms
and propulsion.57

In the case of the battleships Alabama and Kearsarge

the naval office scrutinized American purchasing procedures as well as
the engine systems.58
The RMA built a foundation of regulations to govern its work
with industry.
appeared.

By 1894 the General Guidelines for naval projects

These regulations stipulated routine construction site

inspections and strict adherence to technical specifications.

Every

yard that contracted with the Rt>'iA received these specifications, called

56BA/MA RM3/1073 N.Y. Times article 2.26.1895.
57BA/MA RM3/1073 Trials of the U.S.S. Cincinnati.
58BA/MA RM3/1074 Report on the Probefahrten of the U.S.S.
Alabama and Kearsarge. German Naval Attache, Washington, D.C. to
the SS/RMA, Berlin 9.7.1899.
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the General Construction Guidelines, which varied according to the
ship being built.

The General Guidelines required a weekly accounting

of man hours, work accomplished, and the amount and type of materials
used.

Safe working conditions and the purchase of construction tools

and materials were entirely the responsibility of the yard or sub
contractor.

The Construction Department received quarterly financial

reports, and any requests for RMA assistance became part of the
monthly reports submitted by the project directors.

Certain projects

required workmanship guarantees from three months to one year.59
All shipyards in Germany were subject to the same forms of
supervision and review regarding work for the RMA.

The RMA Technical

Department always had experts at the various naval yards whose duties
included further inspection of sophisticated system components.

In

this function they were, in many instances, double checking the tests
performed by the Purchasing Office of the RMA, which restricted its
work to the production sites of the various subcontractors.

If

material was acceptable, then the Technical Department people super
vised and often assisted in its installation at the yard.
The ultimate authority regarding all phases of ship construction
at the individual yards was the Construction Inspectorate.

Usually one

naval official functioned as inspector for every project in every yard
and reported directly to the Construction Department.
common method of supervision.

This was a very

Even foreign countries with projects

underway at German shipyards attached an official to that yard as

59BA/MA RM3/ll5664 Allgemeine Bestimmungen, 1894.
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inspector.

There were Russian, Greek and Dutch naval personnel at

Schichau, Vulcan and Blohm und Voss, while Germania often played host
to Austrians, Chinese and Norwegians.60 Both the Foreign Office and
the RMA had to be informed of their presence, but the latter had no
control over relations between the private yards and foreign nations until
the War.

The only dividend the RMA received was the designs and

specifications of all foreign ships built in domestic yards.
The Construction Inspector was the ultimate interpreter of the
maximum amount of hours and output the RMA could expect from any
yards

1

workforce.

It was also his duty to pinpoint and remedy any

technical snags in construction in order to avoid falling behind
schedule.

Dietrich and his successors at the RMA Construction Depart

ment found it profitable to allow the inspectors as much independence
and responsibility as possible.

In that way the officials were able

to adapt more quickly to any problem confronting them without
constantly contacting Berl in.

lhe Private Shipyards sent all

correspondence with the RMA via the resident inspector.

In this way

the latter could comment on the contents of any communication and the
RMA would inmediately see both sides of an issue. 61 This procedure
also confirmed the authority of the Inspectorate and strengthened the
RMA in its relationship with the Private Yards.

(See Appendix B)

60BA/MA RM3/1063; see also volumes 1098; 913-15, passim.
61BA/MA RM3/421 See, for example, KI, KI! and KIV inter
office correspondence.
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The most important element of the valuable RMA protocol system
was the Lieferantenverzeichnis or Suppliers List.

This directory was

a list of all firms, great and small, which were pennitted to work on
naval projects.

Without a listing here a company could not act as a

subcontractor to a shipyard working for the Imperial Navy.

The

complicated qualification procedure required a formal petition.62 A
company could apply for a listing for one or more of its products in a
specific category or categories.

Very often smaller firms would have

themselves introduced by their Chambers of Commerce.

Then a

Construction Department official would go to the firm to inspect its
plant facilities, labor force, and its capital and financial stability.
If the RMA expressed no reservations a company had to supply
samples of its material or product at its own expense for tests at
some official navy testing center according to established RMA
standards.

Provided the tests were acceptable, the firm was then

added to the Suppliers List, but only in the specific category for
which it applied.

Very often a firm could fail to qualify one of its

products but have no difficulty with another.

The Suppliers List was

the ultimate screening procedure used by the RMA.

If a finn once

qualified and the Purchasing Office or Construction Inspectorate felt
its products were falling below standard, it was removed.

Unless it

requalified there was no hope of further contracts with the RMA.
When Tirpitz arrived at the RMA in 1897 a good deal of the
protocol system was already in existence.

It was left to him to

62BA/MA RM3/2210 Consideration of a firm for the Liefer
antenverzeichnis (1910).
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expand it as the needs of the fleet required and make it work
effectively in a wide variety of situations.

Because he was able to

provide the navy with ample parliamentary funding, the navy's expansion
was a potential source of huge profits for German industry.

If

businesses wanted to work on naval projects they had to follow the
RMA's regulations.

With the exception of areas of high technology this

procedure assured the RMA of a strong position in its relations with
industry.
SulTlllary
In the early years of Tirpitz's naval program, he often felt
obliged to make industry more secure and responsive by favorable
treatment.

The State Secretary needed to develop a core of firms

willing to extend themselves enough to prepare the navy for the
eventuality of mobilization.

In his memoirs the Admiral gave this as

one guiding precept of his contract policy:
At the time I gave out contracts, including victualling,
clothing, coal, etc. on the condition that the contracting
private firm made arrangements to proceed forthwith to an
increased output in the event of mobilization.63
The preferential distribution of contracts was an important
informal tool to force the annaments industry to conform to naval
requirements.

They supplemented the Protocol System which served as

the primary tool Tirpitz used to deal with industry.

The effective

ness of the system was vital because of the accelerated pace of
production after the navy's success in the Reichstag.

63Tirpitz, op. cit., vol. 1, 38.

Industry no
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longer had to question RMA promises of possible profits.
Law of 1898 made Tirpitz s promises good.
1

The Naval

Now that his program was

underway, his most irrrnediate task was to impose his system of controls
on industry.
During this period the naval authorities rapidly discovered
certain areas which would present the greatest difficulties.
first was in the production of armor plate.

The

Krupp and Dillinger

possessed the strongest armor monopoly in the world.

They were

charging the navy higher prices than their foreign customers paid and
openly resisting any controls imposed by the RMA.

Secondly, the

Construction Department was hard pressed to curb massive cost and
weight overruns on projects large and small.

Tirpitz and his

associates were discovering early the problems involved in large scale
expansion.
Other areas of difficulty originated with the RMA.

Tirpitz 1 s

cautious policy regarding research and development was intensified by
his determination to populate the fleet exclusively with battleships
and cruisers.

This combination restricted the activities of the

Technical and Construction Departments of the RMA.

They had to play

the role of observers while the Parsons company extended its lead in
turbine development far beyond the scattered and primitive efforts of
German firms.

The same was true of experimentation with the U-boat.

The RMA was well aware of French, .American and German research efforts
with submersible vessels.

According to official RMA policy, however,

official involvement was both too expensive and a wasted effort in
terms of accepted strategy.

CHAPTER II
FURTHER EXPANSION AND THE SECOND STAGE:

1899-1901

Between 1899 and 1901, Tirpitz maintained the momentum gained
by the fleet expansion plan.

As he began to push the second stage of

his program through the Reichstag in the form of the 1900 Naval Law,
the world situation seemed to bear out the State Secretary s political
1

argument for increased naval expenditure.

Germany 1 s relations with

Britain, France and the United States deteriorated markedly, and
Tirpitz sought to convince the public that the lack of naval clout was
responsible for Germany 1 s poor performance in various international
crises.
There was no need to court industrial support for further
expansion.

German and foreign firms were anxious to benefit from

Tirpitz s substantial budget.
1

The major difficulties Tirpitz and his

associates had encountered in their early relations with industry
continued.
few.

The options open to the RMA in some of these matters were

Although the Protocol System seemed well conceived to address

overruns in cost and weight, the RMA seemed doomed to only limited
success in arresting the overruns:

a permanent solution was unlikely.

The RMA could only impose the strictest sanctions possible against
these particular violations, which were not likely to disappear unless
the building program ended.
In the case of the armor monopoly, Tirpitz tried to press
Fritz Krupp officially and publicly, only to discover that the head of
81
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the House of Hohenzollern was the industrialist's trump card.

The

State Secretary's policy of limited research and development
heightened the RMA's difficulties.

His technical personnel found

themselves at an increasing disadvantage as recent products of high
technology proved useful for naval purposes.

Tirpitz's policies also

increased the confusion in efforts to develop a continental turbine to
rival the Parsons machine.
the Admiral's policy change.

Only in the area of U-boat technology did
Submarines were already a proven part of

the French navy and the Americans were interested in the Holland
vessel.

Both public opinion and Reichstag pressure forced a reluctant

Tirpitz to obtain a number of Li-boats from the Gennaniawerft and to
extend the development efforts 0f the Imperial Shipyard in Danzig.
Political Background
In 1897, Bernhard von Billow became Foreign Minister and, in
1900, Chancellor. 1 His rise, along with Tirpitz's appointment as
State Secretary, clearly signalled the adoption of the so-called
course" toward a Weltpolitik for the Reich.
ambitions for world power.

11

new

Billow shared the Kaiser's

A naval force was the tool essential for

establishing and protecting Germany's position as a world, rather
than merely continental, power.

Therefore, BUlow never sought an

alliance with Great Britain because he knew Tirpitz's naval plans and
the Kaiser's attitudes.

As Paul Kennedy pointed out, the new foreign

lBernhard Furst v. BUlow: 1888 - Legate in Bucharest; 1893 Ambassador in Rome; 1897 - Foreign Minister; 1900-1909 - Reichs
chancellor and Prussian Minister President.
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minister saw the need to preserve good formal relations with Britain
for a period of time:
. . . he himself told the Kaiser and Tirpitz in 1897 that "a
really honest and trustworthy Anglo-German alliance" was
irreconcilable with the intended naval expansion and "more
or less means the renunciation of it."2
This was the source of lasting antagonism over which the Haldane
negotiations faltered in 1912.
BUlow and the Kaiser interpreted every crisis in terms of how
Germany would appear in contrast to other powers.

Moreover, every

tense situation seemed to echo the Kaiser's request for a vastly
increased navy.

The growing power of the United States in South

America, the Far East, and the South Pacific made it seem a direct
threat to Germany's emergence upon the world scene.

BUlow and the

Kaiser insisted upon some share in the carving up of Spain's Pacific
Empire and overreacted to American successes in the Spanish-American
War.

This attitude nearly led to a shooting confrontation between

Comnodore Dewey and Vice Admiral van Diedrichs' superior cruiser
force off Manila Bay in June of 1898. 3
Inmediately afterward, in 1899, Bismarck's old settlement of
the Samoan problem broke down.

Faced with a full-scale island civil

war, Germany, Britain and the U.S. had to repair or replace the
tripartite supervision of Samoa outlined in the Berlin Act of 1889.
In return for securing her reputation, prestige and, possibly, a few

2p_ Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, 226.
3H. Herwig and D. Trask, Politics of Frustration (Boston,
1976), 28-29.
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coaling stations, Germany exacerbated its relations with the U.S. only
one year after the Dewey-Dietrichs confrontation.

The friendly

attitude of the British toward the Americans during the war with Spain
pulled the English-speaking powers together.

The Germans became all

the more isolated.4
These setbacks served to reinforce sentiments among Germany's
citizenry that she was the victim of superior power.

Would the U.S. or

Britain have dared act as they did if Germany's fleet was up to
standard? They interpreted the rise of American power as an open
political and military challenge and regarded Britain's performance in
Samoa in the same light.

The English search of a German commercial

ship in Delago Bay in 1899 set off sparks in the German press to the
glee of naval expansionists.

The seizure of the Bundesrath and other

steamers on the suspicion of supplying contraband to the Boers was
only one more in a succession of outrages.

The Kaiser and Tirpitz

returned to these themes repeatedly and, bolstered by economic and
political pressure groups, argued for more fleet money.

Ships were

the key to Germany's relief and Wilhelm characteristically blustered
to B"ulow in 1899 that the fleet would change things:

"After twenty

years, when it is ready, I will adopt a different tone. 115 With
Tirpitz in charge of naval development, these words took on a more
concrete significance.

4see:

P. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle (Dublin, 1974), passim.

5H. Herwig, et al., Politics of Frustration, 34.
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The last step in the creation of the modern naval command
structure came on 14 March 1899.
the Admiralty Staff.

The Supreme Command was replaced by

In peacetime this new organization was in charge

of strategic planning, training officers in staff duties, and naval
intelligence.

During war it directed all naval operations with the

Kaiser's approval.6
In the year 1899, the Construction Department also experienced
a change.

Dr. Dietrich had retired the year before after seventeen

years as the director of naval construction.

His post was left vacant

for a few months while Tirpitz searched for someone to pilot the new
construction program authorized by the Reichstag.

On 10 November 1899

Captain von Eickstedt was appointed head of naval construction and held
the post until his retirement as a Vice-Admiral in 1906. 7
The Progress of Construction
In the first naval law the Reichstag recognized an existing
German fleet of twelve battleships, ten heavy cruisers and twenty-three
light cruisers in service or under construction by April 1, 1898.
Therefore, the limits set by the law for construction through 1903
included seven battleships, two heavy cruisers and seven light
cruisers in order to bring the total in service and reserve,

6H. Herwig, The German Naval Officer Corps (Oxford, 1973), 26.
7von Eickstedt: Rear Admiral - 3.11.02; Vice Admiral l .27.06; Vice Admiral (ret.}-1906. The discussion about a man for
this post also involved some industrial leaders, like Hanns Jencke,
Director of the Krupp Firm. HA Krupp, FAH III B127. Jencke to
Krupp 3.24.1899.
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to a legal limit of nineteen battleships, twelve heavy and thirty
light cruisers. 8
The first class of battleships laid down according to these
regulations was the five-ship Wittelsbach Class (Wittelsbach, Wettin,
Zahringen, Mecklenburg and Schwaben).

Built between 1899 and 1903

these ships cost an average of 22.3 million marks each, with a dis
placement of 11,774 tons normal . 9 The main armament consisted of four
guns of 25 cm., eighteen of 15 cm. and twelve of 8.8 cm.

This class

brandished one submerged torpedo tube more than the five which the
Kaiser Friedrich III Class possessed.

The Torpedoes used were of the

45 cm. variety.lo During this period advances in propulsion and
gyroscopic guidance extended torpedo range to at least 1600 meters. 11
Armor specialists and gun designers consequently had to strengthen
waterline belt armor and extend the range of heavy guns.
The ships of the Wittelsbach Class were capable of a maximum
steaming range of 5,850 sea miles (at 10 knots) and a minimum of
3,150 sea miles (at 16 knots).1 2 The power-plant consisted of three

8Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 328-29.

(Text of the 1898 Naval

Law.)
9The term normal is employed to designate weight at the time of
shakedown cruise, with partial complement and less than half of
normal fuel load.
lOE. GrBner, op. cit., 20.
llH. Herwig, The Luxury Fleet (London, 1980), Table 6. Also:
l knot/hr= 1.15 mph or 1.85 km/hr; l sea mile= 1 nautical mile=
1.85 km or 1. 15 miles.
12E. Groner, op. cit., 20.
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triple expansion engines powered by six Schulz-Thornycroft and six
cylindrical boilers.13
The bids entered for the Wittelsbach Class prompted the RMA to
award two to an Imperial Shipyard and three to private firms.

The

S.M.S. Wittelsbach and Schwaben were given to Wilhelmshaven while
Schichau received the Wettin; Germaniawerft, the Zahringen; and Vulcan,
the Mecklenburg.

While the cost of the ships at the private yards

varied very little, the same was not the case for the Wilhelmshaven
contracts.

The 22.7 million marks paid for the Wittelsbach (1899-

1902) was the highest amount of the five, by a slim 100,000 marks.
However, the Schwaben (1900-1904) was markedly cheaper, costing 21.7
million, i.e., between 600 and 900 thousand marks less than any
private firm. 14 Once the Wilhelmshaven Yard was properly tooled and
prepared for a particular ship design, it was fully capable of saving
the RMA a great deal of money.
In the later Deutschland Class the 24.25 million marks it cost
to build the S.M.S. Hannover at Wilhelmshaven was the lowest as
compared with Germania, Vulcan and Schichau.

The Imperial Yard's first

experience with a dreadnought, the S.M.S. Nassau (1907-1909), resulted
in an expenditure of 37.39 million marks.

This represented the most

expensive ship in the class after the S.M.S. Westfalen (A. G. Weser,
1907-1909).

see:

However, in the next dreadnought class, the price the RMA

13A. Preston, Warships of World War I (Harrisburg, Pa., 1972),
Wittelsbach Class.
14E. Groner, op. cit., 20 .
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paid at Wilhelmshaven for the 0stfriesland (1908-1911) was 43.5
million marks.

This ship was the cheapest of the four in the Helgeland

Class by 2.3 million marks.
The comparison between the Wittelsbach-Schwaben example and the
Nassau-0stfriesland case illustrates well the capability of the
Imperial Shipyards to enforce sorely needed economies to the benefit
of Tirpitz's strained finances.

As well, the Wilhelmshaven Yard was

mark for mark, as good or better than the private shipyards in
battleship building, and a valuable alternative for the RMA when bids
seemed a bit too high.

Doubtless, Tirpitz often wished that

Wilhelmshaven could build more ships than its limited capacity allowed.
The Schwaben project saved enough for the entire Wittelsbach
Class to remain within the appropriation.15

Based on the 1899

budget, for example, the Wilhelmshaven Imperial Shipyard saved the
RMA 662,000 marks which, along with Germaniawerft's 214,000 marks
saving more than balanced out the cost overruns experienced by Vulcan,
Schichau and Wilhelmshaven's S.M.S. Wittelsbach project. 16
Both of the heavy cruisers budgeted during this period were
given to the Imperial Yard at Kiel.

The S.M.S. Prince Heinrich

ultimately cost 16.6 million marks and weighed 8,887 tons, nonnal.
At a speed of 18 knots it had a range of 2,290 sea miles which could be
extended to 4,580 at 10 knots.

This cruiser carried two 24 cm guns,

ten of 15 cm, ten of 8.8 cm and four 45 cm torpedo tubes.

15v. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan, 618 (Table 34).
l6Ibid.
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The S.M.S. Adalbert, laid down in 1900, had similar dimensions
and the same armament as the Prince Heinrich.

For that matter, all

German heavy cruisers finished before 1905 had a similar offensive
power.

However, the Prince Adalbert exhibited a marked increase in

speed and range over the Prince Heinrich.

The former held greater

amounts of coal and oil, and at a speed of 18 knots exceeded the
Prince Heinrich's range by 690 sea miles.

At 12 knots the Prince

Adalbert was capable of 4,970 sea miles, an expanse the earlier
cruiser could match only at 10 knots.

The Friedrich Carl, Roon and

Yorck later continued this trend of ever greater speed and steaming
range for the heavy cruisers through 1905.17
Only one of these two heavy cruisers exceeded the budgets
appropriated for it.

In 1898, the Prince Heinrich went 1,329,000

marks over its yearly budget, but in 1900 the Prince Adalbert came in
1,258,000 marks under its projected cost .

This deficit of 71,000 marks

for Tirpitz s first two cruisers in their initial budget years marked
1

a beginning almost as favorable as that in the battleship program.1 8
Construction of the smaller vessels was also accelerated.
small cruisers were laid down between 1898 and 1900:

Six

three at A. G.

Weser (Niobe, Ariadne, Medusa); two at the Germaniawerft (Nymphe,
Amazone); and one at the Imperial Yard at Danzig (Thetis).

All but

the Niobe and Nymphe, both begun in 1898, were built within appropria
tion, and the cheapest of the six was the Danzig's Thetis at 4.5
17 E. Groner~
..
op. cit., 23.
18v. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan, 618 (Table 34).
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million marks. 19 The larger high seas torpedo boats were produced at
approximately one million marks each.

Schichau had been the exclusive

producer of these boats since 1886,20 and that only changed slightly
in 1900.

The Elbing firm started eighteen new boats between 1898 and

1900, and the RMA awarded Germaniawerft six.21
The Protocol System:

Cost and Weight Overruns

Along with its inspection system, the Suppliers List remained
the strong point of RMA protocol policy vis-a-vis industry.

The

latter was always in flux and never final, because the RMA deleted or
added firms as it saw fit.

In 1900 the RMA circulated versions of the

Suppliers List among all the finns dealing with the navy.

It recorded

companies removed for financial instability, legal and military code
violations22 or those deemed unreliable because of certain business
practices.23 Other firms listed were those being readmitted to the
List after their products passed standards set by the RMA.24 Beyond

19E. Groner, op. cit., 27.
20The one exception to the virtual Schichau monopoly of torpedo
boats between 1886 and 1900 was the D-10. It was a product of
Thornycroft, London.
21E. Groner, op. cit., 34.
22The "military code" violations in the area of supply were
determined by the Prussian War Ministry. See: BA/MA RM3/2304
11
Mittellungen uber Ausschliessungen und Wiederzulassen van Lieferern
und Unternehemern, 11 Berlin 7.3.14.
23BA/MA RM3/2294:
formation of the L.V.

regarding controls developed during the

24For example: BA/MA RM3/2307 Torpedo Inspectorate, Kiel to
SS/RMA, Berlin 9.16.16.
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these controls, the officials of the Purchasing Office25 and the
Construction Department both cleared naval purchases and conducted on
site plant inspections of naval contractors.26 The system was strict
and effective, limited only by its designers' abilities and the
political and economic power of heavy industry.
Private industry often encouraged the RMA to expand the number
of firms on the Suppliers List in order to keep the prices charged by
subcontractors down to a minimum.27 However, if the RMA included many
privately favored firms, the coercive power of that instrument would
decline.

On the other hand, many industrialists regarded any efforts

to use the List strictly as too restrictive, and they occasionally
accused the RMA of interfering with free competition.

That accusation

did not overly impress Eickstedt or Tirpitz in their struggle to get
the best deal for the navy.
In awarding contracts to shipyards the RMA's system was somewhat
similar to other world naval powers.

Much of the fine print in German

naval contracts was taken from the standard British forms.

For

example, the RMA replaced the "controller" of British contract language
with the Inspector who was directly responsible to Tirpitz, via the
Construction Department, for his project.

These parallels with

25Kaiserliches Marine Abnahmeamt (ABA), Graf Adolfstrasse 53,
DUsseldorf.
26BA/MA RM3/2066, passim. Max Krause (Director of Borsig
Berg- und Huttenverwaltung) to Herrn Langner, Geheime Admiralit~tsrat,
RMA, Berlin 10.1.01.
27BA/MA RM3/458 Vulcan, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.25.00.
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British policies applied also to product guarantees, pay schedules,
work stoppages or slowdowns, patent matters and cost and weight changes
among others.28
There were occasional exceptions to RMA contract provisions.
In one instance, Schichau successfully approached the Danzig Construc
tion Inspectorate for pennission to raise the price of a ship's coal
bunker.

As a result, the spending ceiling, spelled out in the

contract, required adjustment.29 Contract specifications formed a
structure within which the RMA and its primary suppliers operated.

It

was up to Tirpitz, in close cooperation with von Eickstedt,30 to keep
exceptions to a minimum and firms within contract restraints as well
as they could.
Like the naval authorities of other nations, the RMA imposed
financial penalties if the construction schedule outlined in the
contract was not met.

In one such instance, the RMA informed

Germaniawerft that a 3.5% penalty would be imposed if the proper
schedule was not maintained.

The percentage pertained to the ship as

a whole or any material Germania had agreed to supply within a
specified time.

The total price of the object multiplied by 3.5% and

28BA/MA RM3/6007 British Admiralty Contract F_onns; Correspond
ence between KII and KIV, April 1901.
29BA/MA RM3/452 Correspondence between Schichau and BBS
Danzig, August 26~29, 1901.
30Tirpitz - Construction department cooperation was the basis
for contract awards. E.g.: BA/MA RM3/471 Construction Department
Memo to SS/RMA, May 1901.
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the length of the delay, was deducted from the total price paid to
the yard. 31 This financial penalty system was similar, but not
identical to that of other navies.

The United States, for example,

used a flat rate by the day for ships that were behind schedule.
There was a $300 penalty per day for the first month and $600 every
day thereafter.32
Construction schedules proposed by the shipyards were an
important consideration in the awarding of RMA contracts.
did not expect capital ship bids to vary greatly.

The navy

In the Braunschweig

Class, the ultimate prices paid for the five ships varied only between
23.8 and 24.3 million marks.

However, the suggested pace of construc

tion and the schedule of installment payments varied greatly.

Every

battleship was financed in four installments.33 Blohm und Voss
suggested that the second payment, bringing the S.M.S. Braunschweig
to half completion, would come after sixteen months and the final or
fourth payment should come due in the twenty-third month.34 Gennania
offered a somewhat tighter schedule.

Payment two would come at month

twenty-one and the final installment in the twenty-fifth month.35

31BA/MA RM3/471 SS/RMA, Berlin to Gennania-Tegel, Berlin,
5. 24. 01 .
32BA/MA RM3/1077 Naval Attache U.S. Embassy, Berlin 7.6.03 to
SS/RMA, Berl in.
33BA/MA RM3/6026-27-28 passim. Final ship prices were usually
higher than original bids. However, neither figure varied dramatically
from PW to PW on any given project.
34BA/MA RM3/471 Bl ohm und Voss, Hamburg 5 .8. 01 to SS/RMA, Berl in.
35BA/MA RM3/471 Germania, Tegel-Berlin 5.11 .01 to SS/RMA, Berlin.
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Vulcan 1 s schedule called for payment two at the twentieth and the
final payment at the twenty-seventh month.36 Germaniawerft received
the contract for the S.M.S. Braunschweig, the first of its class,
mostly because of the RMA 1 s preference for Krupp 1 s proposed payment
scheme and its efficient construction schedule.
The navy paid any monies owed to a subcontractor for armor,
guns, electrical parts and the like through the shipyards.37 The only
major concern here was to keep the project on schedule and material
quality up to par.

If the Construction Inspector did not consider the

subcontractor's obligation fulfilled, for any reason, the finn 1 s money
would not appear in the installment paid to the shipyard.38
In response to questions from the new State Secretary of the
Imperial Treasury Office von Thie lmann, 39 Ti rpitz defended his disburse
ment of shipbuilding funds.

Whether small contracts handled by the

Imperial Yards or huge payments via installments to shipyards, he
asserted that the current form of disbursement of shipbuilding funds
11

is not only the cheapest but also politically the best. 11

However, he

did not take all the credit for himself, noting that the system s
1

36Ibid., Vulcan-Stettin, 5. 10.01 to SS/RMA, Berlin.
37For example, see:

BA/MA RM3/6029 "Rathenwertheilungsplan,

1901, II

380ne such case developed with Krupp armor in 1901: · BA/MA
RM3/6073 Krupp, Essen 3.14.01 to SS/RMA, Berlin.
39von Thielmann - SS/RSA 1897-1903.

95
history recommended it:

11

As proof I declare that it had functioned

faultlessly from 1887 to 1897. 11 40
One of von Eickstedt's first efforts to address the more
difficult problems of construction pertained to cost and weight
control.

Together, the contract and the General Guidelines dictated

RMA expectations of time, weight and cost for every stage of a
project.4 1 Unfortunately these standards were not easily enforced.
The puzzle was not how to set weight standards for an entire ship or
class, although the RMA found some of the yards less than cooperative
on that count.4 2 The major difficulty was the increase in a ship's
construction time, weight and cost from small overruns on individual
projects adding up over the long run.

The proper procedure in these

smaller cases was to clear any cost, time or weight overrun with the
Construction Inspector at the yard and then report it to the RMA for
final approval.

The General Guidelines stipulated that the RMA would

pay for additional materials, labor, and supervision.

In these cases,

the RMA placed a 15% ceiling on the amount the yard could take as
profit. 43

40BA/MA RM3/6029 Tirpitz to SS/RSA, Berlin 12.22.01.
41BA/MA RM3/458 Construction Department, Berlin to KWW
3.16.00. RM3/277 Allgemeine Bedingungen, 1900.
42BA/MA For example: RM3/360 Schichau, Elbing to SS/RMA
9.29.1899. Schichau complained that light cruisers could not be built
at less than 3100 tons, let alone the 3000 tons the RMA wanted.
RM3/360 11 Bericht des Marineattach~s des Kaiserlichen 11 Botschaft zu
vJashington #77. Die neue Kreuzer van Denver Klasse.
Washington,
D.C. 7.19.1899. American light cruiser tonnage averaged between 2500
to 3400 tons for the Denver Class.
43BA/MA RM3/277 (see fn. 44).
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Many cost, weight and time overruns resulted from the failure of
various industries and businesses to solve the problems posed by
increasing demand.

Sometimes a lack of cooperation between yards in

sharing designs and technical information created expensive slowdowns.44
Changes in designs frequently revealed just how little conmunication
there often was between the yards and subcontractors.

This, in turn,

caused delays in the final designs and increases in weight and conse
quently costs increased. 45 An RMA memo of 1899 also blamed slow and
expensive plant expansion on the suddenness of naval needs46 and the
problems of adaptation.
Growing pains were not entirely to blame.

Schichau's work on

the S.M.S. Wettin of the Wittelsbach Class, plagued by cost and weight
overruns, seemed to run consistently in the red.

Difficulties arose

with everything from turrets much heavier than anticipated, to a more
expensive ventilation system to technical problems with watertight
doors.47 The S.M.S. Wettin was not the exception; it was the rule.

44BA/MA RM3/452 Construction Dept., Berlin to Schichau,
Danzig 12.28.01.
45For example: BA/MA RM3/458 Vulcan, Hamburg to SS/RMA
6.29.00. See also RM3/449 and 285 passim.
46BA/MA RM3/6650 Die Frage: 11 Weshalb hat sich die Fertig
stellung der Annierung bisher verspatet und weshalb wird das Konmende
schneller Fertig werden?'' RMA Memoranda "An News Bureau" 11.27.1899.
47BA/MA RM3/452 Correspondence between Schichau, Eickstedt
and Boekholt (BBS, Danzig) August to December 1901, re: Wittelsbach
Class.

97
The RMA tightened its system of accounting and supervision and
eliminated incompetent subcontractors through the constant revisions
of the Suppliers List.

Yet this problem was never really resolved,

not even at the Imperial Yards, because a combination of swift
technical advance, profiteering by certain firms, and the necessity of
treating these cases one by one rendered a satisfactory solution
impossible.48 The RMA could only seek to minimize the problem in the
long run.
Industry and Monopoly:

Armor and the Electrical Firms

In 1900 the German iron and steel industry produced 6.65
million tons.

This represented 23.8% of the world's output as compared

with Britain's 17.6% and the 38w5%effort of the U.S. and Canada.

The

101 independent firms that supplied materials for shipbuilding assured
the RMA of sufficient competition in most areas.

Twenty-one firms

dealt in fine finished steel plate and machine parts, and twenty-two
supplied lesser grades of stee1.49 Only in the specialized areas were
the firms fewer in number.

Eight companies were responsible for

special steel and parts for boilers, five for zinc treated material,
and only two for armor plate.SO
The most outstanding impression one gets from the construction
of the Hittelsbach and later the Braunschweig Classes is the dominant

48For a few illustrations see:
SS/RMA 12.7.00.

BA/MA RM3/441 KWW an

49schwarz and Halle, vol. 2, op. cit., 208-209.
50Ibid., 208-209.
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position the Krupp Firm held in all phases of steel production,
including research and development.

In the field of naval artillery

the Chief of the Admiralty Staff spoke only of Krupp products.51
For both of these battleship classes Krupp also supplied more than its
share of conventional steel products such as steel plate and all manner
of the fasteners' including some made of nickel steel to fasten the
armor. 52 Krupp's monopoly in supplying armor was another accepted
fact.

Dillinger's armor was just as good as that of the Essen firm,

but Krupp jealously guarded its design specifications 53 and relegated
Dillinger to piece work when possible.54 This partnership with the
Dillinger firm sometimes created snags in cooperation that delayed
projects for months.55
In 1901, the armor requirements for the Wittelsbach Class were
estimated at 7,353 tons.

The contracts for the five battleships and

one additional heavy cruiser split the task of production between

51BA/MA RM3/3701 Report: The Chief of the Admiral Staff to
SS/RMA, Berlin 10.24.01. BA/MA RM3/327 Construction Dept. to every
yard, Berlin 4.5.97. RM3/458 Vulcan, Stettin-Bredow to SS/RMA,
Berlin 7.5.00.
52BA/MA RM/470 Construction Dept. to Germania, Schichau,
Vulcan and Blohm und Voss, Berlin 4.3.01. RM3/458 Construction
Dept., Berlin to Vulcan, Stettin-Bredow 10.5.00.
53BA/MA RM3/439 Dillinger to SS/RMA Dillingen-Saar 3.28.99.
54BA/MA RM3/440 Dillinger to SS/RMA, Dillingen-Saar 1.25.00.
55BA/MA For example:
SS/RMA, Berlin 12.21.99.

RM3/440 Vulcan, Stettin-Bredow to
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Krupp and Dillinger, 3,907 tons to 3,446 tons, respectively.

Half of

the six ships were split between the two firms, showing the RMA's
faith in their smooth interchange of materials and technique.
Eickstedt obviously expected nearly equal quality and workmanship.
Dillinger was to outfit the S.M.S. Schwaben completely and Krupp was
to do the same with the S.M.S. Zahringen and heavy cruiser "B. 11 56
If the navy and the Reichstag had one thing in common, it was
the desire to lower armor prices without destroying quality.

In

Germany the Krupp-Dillinger alliance presented no opportunity to
accomplish these ends.

There was no third competitor that could

provide the RMA with an alternative,57 nor did the Reichstag Budget
Commission have any practical suggestions to offer.

The RMA needed

to curb high prices, overruns and waste, while encouraging industry
to keep pace with the quality of foreign armor.58

In 1901, Krupp

nickel-steel annor was the best in the world, and the firm was glad
to sell its product but never its techniques.59

It was hard to see

any hope for RMA success.
The Wilson Process had first introduced nickel into armor for
strength and resilience.

Krupp and Dillinger employed the superior

56BA/MA RM3/6029 Notes on armor contracts for Wittelsbach
Cl ass - 1901 .
57B. F. Cooling, op. cit., 154.
58BA/MA RM3/2 ~Jerftdepartment an Zentralabteilung 3.31.00.
59Clive Trebelcock, "British Annaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914," EHR Series XXVI No. 2 (May 2, 1973), 256.
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Tresidder-Harvey Process in successfully establishing their monopoly
in Germany.

This technical advance, according to the RMA, was surely

a response to the ever growing power of naval artillery between 1890
and 1901.

In Germany, Krupp's influence with the Kaiser and the

firm's advance research and development facilities gave it the edge.60
Efforts in the early l900's to reduce armor contracts to Krupp
had obviously failed.61

The navy suggested that it was primarily

responsible for Krupp's success in armor and demanded some considera
tion,62 but Fritz Krupp answered by hinting that he would close his
armor plant if any further action was taken.

This was obviously a

bluff, but he had the RMA right where he wanted them.

They could not

rely solely on Dillinger for the quantities needed, so Krupp demanded
a steady stream of lucrative contracts to keer this dimension of his
business profitable.63
The Imperial Treasury was equally annoyed with the Krupp firm.
Its representative, Johann Jencke, argued that the Essen firm was
fortunate to benefit from the 1898 Fleet Law with the prospect of
another law in 1900.

Given these benefits, Krupp should seriously

60BA/MA RM3/6650 11 Denkschrift uber die Entwicklung des
Panzerplattenmaterials in den letzten 10 Jahren unter besonderer
Berucksichtigung der Preissteigerung." Berlin, 11.29.99 -- signed
"Sack" for the Weapons Division.
6lp_ C. ~!itt, op. cit., 140.
62BA/MA RM3/2 SS/RMA, Berlin to Krupp Essen, 4.4.00.
63Ibid. Jencke, Essen to Tirpitz Berlin 3.30.00.
to Tirpitz4.6.00.

Krupp, Capri

l 01
consider a downward revision in the price for armor.64 The result of
this plea, so similar to that of the RMA, was Fritz Krupp's assertion
that the firm was his and he felt free to charge any price he
wished. 65 This curt reply exposed tensions that were privately and
publicly building over ever increasing armor prices.
Only two months earlier in February of 1900 the German press
accused Krupp and Dillinger of rampant profiteering.

The liberal

Frankfurter Zeitung, Eugen Richter's Freisinnige Zeitung, and many
other publications printed a basically similar story, accusing these
two firms of collecting an unheard of 176 million marks in armor
profits from state contracts.66
In appearances before the Reichstag Budget Commission Tirpitz
was confronted with demands to explain the assertions in the press.
Reichstag representatives Richter and Paasche argued that the armor
manufacturing process that Krupp used was widely known.
competition not be found?

Why could

To a certain extent Tirpitz presented the

Budget Commission with the reasons given by Krupp director Hanns
Jencke to similar questions asked by the RMA, viz. costly technology,
higher wages, and increased general overhead. 67 However, the State
Secretary alarmed Krupp by openly supporting suggestions that new
competition in this area was necessary and overdue.

He told Richter

64Ibid.

April (no day), 1900.

65Ibid.

Krupp, Capri to Tirpitz, Berlin 4.6.00.

66HA Krupp, FAH III B36, passim.
67Ibid.

Jenckes Essen, to Tirpitz, Berlin, March, 1900.
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and his colleagues that the navy was equally bewildered at the
willingness of foreign powers to buy Krupp armor, in spite of high
prices, and, in some cases, viable competition.68
During February, March and April of 1900, the press deliberately
deemphasized the name of the Stunm-owned Dillinger Huttenwerke in its
accounts, most of which surely originated with the RMA News Bureau.69
Clearly, Dillinger was not the threat to the RMA that Krupp was, so
Tirpitz directed his efforts at the Krupp side of the annor alliance.
If he made headway against the Essen firm 1 s high prices, then
Dillinger would surely follow Fritz Krupp s lead.70
1

It was at this point that Fritz Krupp, on holiday on Capri,
told his director Hanns Jencke to arrange a meeting with the Kaiser
for early May through the latter s close friend, Graf Eulenburg.71
1

The meeting did not materialize until later in May, in Wiesbaden.
There, Krupp spoke to Wilhelm and insisted that the pressure from the
RMA would only drive him to turn the portion of his finn concerned
with annor into a joint stock company.

This suggestion, and Krupp 1 s

agitation, clearly disturbed the Kaiser, prompting him to urge
Tirpitz to calm the situation.72

68Ibid.

In a later discussion with Krupp,

Weckruf Nr. 77, 4.1 .00.

69Ibid., 74-75.
70Ibid.

Press clippings from Feb., Mar. and April, 1900.

71Ibid.

Krupp, Capri to Jencke Essen 4.17.00.

72Ibid., Fritz Krupp s account of the meeting with the Kaiser
and van Senden. The Krupp firm did become a joint stock company.
However, this took place in 1903, many months after Fritz 1 s death.
1
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the Chief of the Naval Cabinet von Senden expressed the feeling that
Tirpitz would not want the Essen firm's annor production independently
incorporated.

It probably never occurred to Senden that the State

Secretary also preferred the existing composition of the Krupp Firm
because it remained vulnerable to future pressures in the person of
Krupp himself.

Tirpitz was hardly defeated, only put off.73

The State Secretary, however, was not deprived of a parting
He advised Krupp to restrict his questions on naval matters to

salvo.

RMA headquarters on the Konigin Augusta Strasse in Berlin before going
to higher authorities.74

In Tirpitz 1 s price policy,75 the public

pressure fomented by the press was another tool to strike a blow at a
situation unfavorable to the navy, as were the priority of awarding
contracts, the composition of the Suppliers List and Tirpitz s politi
1

cal skill in the Reichstag.

These factors were, at least partially,

responsible for a reduction in Krupp armor prices in 1901 from 2300
to 1900 marks per ton.76
Besides the eagerness of Krupp to increase his profits, there
were other, more fundamental reasons for the level of armor prices in
Germany.

Both rising raw material costs and advanced production

73w. Manchester, The Arms of Krupp (Boston, 1968), 217.
74 BA/MA Nachlass Tirpitz N253/4 Tirpitz, Berlin to Krupp, Essen
1. 23. 99.
75G. Leckebusch, Die Beziehungen der Deutschen Seeschiffswerften
zur Eisenindustrie an der Ruhr in der Zeit 1830 bis 1930 (Cologne,
1913), 64.
76HA Krupp, FAH ..III 836, 74-75 BA/MA RM3/l1634 Handakten
Dahnhardt: 11 Panzer: Ubersicht Uber die Panzerpreise in verschiedenen
Landern, 11 3. 3. 15.
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techniques caused increased prices.

The RMA and the Imperial

Treasury both recognized the increased metal ore costs,77 but still
jealously eyed the efforts of U.S. Congressmen to limit 4% nickel-steel
armor to $300 (1200 marks) per ton.78
Cheaper Krupp armor prices in the U.S. further aggravated
German naval officials.

In the Reichstag and press the liberals

called it outright robbery.

In March of 1901 the Freisinnige Zeitung

said that if Krupp continued to sell in Germany at about 400 marks
more than its current price in the U.S., it would cost the Gennan
taxpayer sixty million marks over the duration of the 1900 construction
program.

They suggested the alternatives of securing armor abroad or

building a government owned foundry.

Other publications like the

Tagliche Rundschau agreed heartily.79
The Krupp Firm responded that the figures in the newspapers
were overestimates.

The price for armor at the factory was 28 marks

cheaper than the press insisted and the material delivered to Kiel and
Wilhelmshaven was barely over 2300 marks per ton.
domestic prices exceeded 2300 marks.

None of the firm's

Indeed, they asserted that the

difference in Krupp prices for armor in the U.S. and Germany was
actually only 222 marks per ton rather than the widely quoted 400 marks

77BA/MA RM3/6648 Jencke, Essen to Tirpitz, Berlin 2.27.00.
Jencke, Essen to Tirpitz, Berlin, Telegram 2.27.00.
78BA/MA RM3/3699 Tirpitz to RMA Budget Dept., Berlin 11 .18.99.
79HA Krupp FAH III B40 Press clippings, 1901.
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figure.SO The finn's directors cited the RMA's "extraordinarily
strict" inspection practices ancl the complicated technical and design
problems in the production of modern warship armor as the reasons for
high domestic prices.

As for the lower U.S. prices, the Essen finn

claimed that the American Navy gave it bulk orders for an entire class
of ships in contrast to the RMA's ship by ship contracts.Bl

Tirpitz

presented this information to the Reichstag Budget Conmission as the
Krupp Firm requested.82

However, nobody in the navy or the Reichstag

was any less outraged by a difference of 222 marks than they were by
400 marks save possibly a few defenders of industry.

With no

alternative domestic source of armor available, the RMA paid dearly.
In April of 1901, Krupp's portion of the payment for the S.M.S.
Mecklenburg's armor was 2.3 million marks.

Along with its part of the

S.M.S. Wettin and the annor for heavy cruiser 11 B11 Krupp's receipt for
that month alone was 3.6 million marks.83
The RMA could have driven a wedge between Krupp and Dillinger,
but this idea was counterproductive.

The volume of business offered

80Ibid., Krupp Direktorium to SS/RMA 3.5.01.
81Ibid., Krupp Direktorium to SS/RMA 3.5.01. Rebates, for
example, were often considered in RMA-Krupp business relations, but
did not seem popular with Krupp. See also: FAH III B127 H. Jencke to
Krupp, Essen 4.10.00.
82Ibid. Report by-the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
(3.8.01) on the Reichstag meeting of 3.7.01, 1 P.M. (63rd Session).
83BA/MA RM3/6042 KWK to SS/RMA (Construction Dept.) Berlin
5. l 1. 01.
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to each by the RMA offered a good starting point.

Tirpitz was also

in an ideal position for playing one side against another; a powerful,
self justified Krupp84 versus an outraged press and Reichstag.

This

would have been the perfect situation for a man of Tirpitz 1 s political
talents.

However, while it produced armor of equal quality, Dillinger

could never have supplied all of the navy's needs if Krupp retaliated
with a production slowdown.

Furthermore, Tirpitz and von Eickstedt

risked alienating the firm responsible for all naval artillery, and
the owner of the Germaniawerft.

These considerations, much more than

Krupp's political friends and royal connections, kept the RMA tied to
a policy that rebounded to Essen's benefit nearly every time.
However, RMA measures against emerging monopolies were
occasionally successful.

In one instance the Imperial Shipyard at

Kiel informed the Technical Department that the firm of Schulz-Knaudt
was rapidly increasing its control over the supply of steel ships'
flues.

According to Kiel:

"If this independence from a single

supplier has, up to now, not led to major error, it appears still to
lie in the interest of the navy to break the monopoly of Schulz-Knaudt
and likewise to approach the productive competing firms about
supplying flues. 11 85 The officials at Kiel suggested that the RMA might
switch frequently from Firma Schulz-Knaudt to Duisberger Eisen- und
Stahlwerke.

Not only did this advice dilute the possible monopoly

84HA Krupp, FAH III 840. A study of these papers shows just
how self-justified Krupp felt. This was not merely a facade.
85BA/MA RM3/2196 KWK to SS/RMA Technical Dept. 6.17.01.
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situation, but Duisbergers I proc uct quality guarantee turned out to be
1

longer and more appealing to the RMA.
The situation in the electrical industry was more favorable to
the navy than that in armor.

Here the RMA had to deal with many

companies including the two giants, German General Electric (A.E.G.)
and the Siemens companies.

However, the diversity of smaller firms

created adequate competition in this field.86
In 1847 Werner von Siemens and J. G. Halske formed the firm of
Siemens and Halske.

With the growing diversity of uses for

electricity the company prospered and, by 1897, became a joint stock
company with branches in England and Russia.

Eleven years after the

death of their father, Wilhelm von Siemens supported his brother Carl
in establishing the Siemens-Schuckertwerke in 1903.

Although united

by family ties Siemens and Halske remained separate from Siemens
Schuckert until 1970.87
The Siemens family were the premier German electrical con
tractors of their day.

They were involved in many phases of warship

construction for the RMA, including wireless-telegraphy, cables,
wires, switches and dynamos.

Unlike the situation in the steel

industry, this family had stiff competition that placed the RMA in a
far better bargaining position.

Emil Rqthenau's A.E.G. competed with

both Siemens companies in nearly every field.

In addition, there was

86BA/MA RM3/l231 KW~l to SS/RMA (Construction Dept.) Berlin
5.11.01.
87Brockhaus Enzyklopadie, vol. 17 (Wiesbaden, 1973), 404.
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Brown and Boveri, which was the first German company to produce
turbines along the Parsons model as well as dynamos in competition
with both S.S.W. and A.E.G.

Felton-Guilleaume competed in wire and

cable and Voigt and Hoffner switching systems were considered as good as
or better than those of the Siemens Firms.BB The greater competition
within the electrical industry caused a phenomenon that never occurred
in the armor and artillery area:

In 1900 Siemens and Halske guaranteed

a 10% rebate on electrical systems and parts for the navy in return
for increased contracts.B9
The contrast between the Krupp-Dillinger situation and that of
the electrical firms is instructive.

The latter had to respond to an

ever growing public market in electrical tools, appliances, streetcars,
and gadgets of all kinds.

There was a widespread demand that allowed

room for a number of large companies and a host of small ones.
Siemens and Halske s pioneering efforts in warship electrical systems
1

just opened up new possibilities. 90

In addition, the widespread

commercial market drew a large number of firms into research and
development with the hope of ever increasing profits.

The size of

the market did not attract many to the armor and artillery industry.
It was small and risky and required a great expansion of plant
facilities and a long term corrrnitment to research and development.

BBBA/MA RM3/1229-1233 passim.
SS/RMA (Technical Dept.) 6.26.01.

RM3/1229 For example:

B9BA/MA RM3/1230 KWW to SS/RMA, Berlin 10.5.00.
90Schwarz and Halle, op. cit., 253.

KWW to
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Besides, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the
reputation and capabilities of German firms like Krupp and Dillinger
and Schneider-Crusot in France would have presented a nearly
impossible hurdle.

The electrical industry possessed no such long

standing giants, and at the turn of the century showed considerable
promise for the newcomer.
Research and Development:

The Turbine and U-Boat

All during this early period of naval growth the RMA was
involved in broadening its technical expertise.

There was a constant

correspondence between the Construction Department and inventors of
all kinds, from quacks to innovators of genius. 91 The RMA was of
necessity supportive, or directly responsible for the creation, of
several research institutes devoted to naval related fields.
course, it had its own research center at Kiel.

Of

This was closely

linked with another naval research institute at Marienfelde near
Berlin.

Private centers that worked with the navy included the Royal

Research Institute for Shipbuilding and Hydraulics in a northwest
suburb of Berlin 92 and the facilities of the North German Lloyd in
Bremerhaven.

The latter was particularly helpful in developing towing

tests, to determine the stability and durability of new ship
designs. 93 Close cooperation between the navy and private shipping

91BA/MA RM3/2248 (1900-1901), passim.
92BA/MA RM3/l002-1015 (1900-1910), passim.
93BA/MA RM3/272 North German Lloyd, Bremerhaven to SS/RMA
7. 16.00, 1. 14.01, 4. 15.01, 6. 18.01.
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firms also facilitated the process of establishing standards of
quality.

The construction experience and testing laboratories of

Albert Ballin 1 s Hamburg-America Line (HAPAG) and those of the North
German Lloyd frequently benefitted the navy in problems requiring
expertise in physics, naval architecture, and engineering.

In other

cases Tirpitz and Eickstedt supported new research associations and
explored those of other countries.

In 1899 Eickstedt played a

personal role in the founding of the Society for Shipbuilding
Technology.

Along with other naval officers, he became one of the

first members.

By 1902 the Society facilities were providing the

navy with research.94 The Construction Department also sent its
people abroad to examine the latest in research techniques at
foreign institutes.

One such trip produced suggestions on structural

testing from the British Naval Research Centers in Dumbarton and
Haslar. 95
The shortage of personnel in the Construction Department
prevented a significant broadening of the RMA 1 s research efforts.
von Eickstedt constantly reminded the RMA 1 s Central Section of this
shortage as the latter formulated the budget for the RMA.

Cuts in the

proposed budget frequently affected the numbers of qualified ship and
machine building inspectors, whose expertise or lack of it would

94BA/MA RM3/90 Schiffbautechnischen Gesellschaft, 1899.
95BA/MA RM3/272 Fact Finding Trip Report by Construction
Inspectors Edgar and Schumann to SS/RMA Berlin 7.8.01.
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reflect the RMA 1 s commitment to research and education.9 6 von
Eickstedt realized that high technology was one of his department s
1

weakest points vis-~-vis certain segments of industry and that cuts
in the budget at just his point would exacerbate present shortcomings.
The education of RMA inspectors and the efforts of the navy to
keep abreast of modern ship technology did nothing to dislodge
Tirpitz 1 s axiom that advanced research and development was part of
the private sphere.

Perhaps the best illustration of this was the way

the RMA left the entire turbine question in the hands of private
industry.

Before the formation of the Turbina A. G., which was the

official Parsons' Steam Turbine company in Germany, Brown, Boveri and
Co. managed to obtain exclusive rights to the production of the new
engine system in Germany. 97 This was a period, however, when
Parsons• patent rights were not yet fully recognized on the continent.
Other firms in France and Germany had similar engines under develop
ment.

The French systems Laval and Rateau were not ready for service

when three private German yards undertook to produce acceptable
turbine powered ships.

Germaniawerft decided to build a torpedo boat

(S-35) with its own turbine and a schulz boiler system and poured more
than 194,000 marks into this prototype.9 8 Schichau followed along the

96BA/MA RM3/2492 K(Construction Department) to M(Central
Section), Berlin 3.27.01.
97BA/MA RM3/2107 Brown and Boveri, Mannheim to RMA 8.23.00.
98BA/MA RM3/2107 Schiff- und Maschinenbau Germania, Kiel to
Imperial Torpedo Inspectorate, Kiel 11.23.00.
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same lines while the RMA urged Vulcan to cooperate with Brown and
Boveri in producing a Parsons' boat. 99
Save for the Parsons' system, all these turbines were still very
much in the development stage.

RMA involvement in the situation might

have provided some early uniformity and a later advantage for Gennan
industry but the RMA completely rejected any notion of an Imperial
Yard entering into this process.loo By insisting that naval ships
employ the already tested Parsons' system, the RMA could have brought
turbine power to the navy earlier, and forced all of the yards to
learn the same basic technology.

Firms with research funds to spend,

like Krupp could have mastered c1nd improved the system, later providing
the RMA with a domestic, perhaps better variation of the original.
The brief dependence on a foreign propulsion system could have given
the Imperial Navy long range dividends.
Instead, the situation degenerated into patent fights and ended
with the complete dominance of the Parsons Co.

The firm of John J.

Thornycroft brought suit against the Schulz Co. for violation of their
boiler system patents, which retarded the efforts of Vulcan.101
Germaniawerft just barely managed to avoid this problem by earlier
signing an agreement with Thornycroft for exclusive use of its newest

99Ibid.

See also citation in footnote 100.

l00BA/MA RM3/2107 Torpedo Inspectorate, Kiel to SS/RMA, Berlin
10.13.00. "Verhandlung mit der Firma Brown and Boveri uber Parsons
Turbinen. 11
101BA/MA RM3/1244 John J. Thornycroft and Co., London to
Vulcan, Stettin 9.27.99.
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boilers in turbine research. 102 Domestic setbacks in development
became the rule in the application of turbine technology in the
Imperial Navy.
It was also during this period that Tirpitz first grudgingly
acknowledged the possibilities presented by the U-boat.

His

attention was not drawn by any sudden revelation that the U-boat might
one day challenge the battleship, but by the obvious interest of the
other major naval powers in this invention.

As early as 1899, the

French were having a good deal of success with the Gustave Zede,103
and by 1900 the U-boat was becoming an integral part of the French
navy.

Late in 1899, the French authorities ordered twenty-six of the

vessels, and twelve were nearly finished by February 1900.104 The
British were experimenting with two-man submarine prototypes late in
the same year,lOS and the American boats built by Holland in
Baltimore were testing very well. 10 6 The RMA was engaged only in a
small scale development effort at Danzig. 107 Krupp alone,

102Ibid., Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 2.12.00.
103BA/MA RM3/3685 Daily Graphic clipping from 2.3.99.
104BA/MA RM3/l049 Naval Attache, Paris to SS/RMA 2.13.00.
105BA/MA RM3/3876 Naval Attache, London to SS/RMA, Berlin
11.9.00.
l06Ibid.

Naval Attache, Paris to SS/RMA, Berlin 1. 10.01.

l07BA/MA RM3/6062 passim.
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in Germany, was proceeding with U-boat developmentlOB at the
Germaniawerft.l0 9
Tirpitz thus paid attention to the U-boat only because he had
little choice.

When Eugen Richter confronted him in the Reichstag

with the RMA's lack of interest in U-boats, in spite of the French
advances, the RMA chief responded:

"The U-boat is, at present, of no

great value in war at sea. 11 110 He made similar statements before a
Reichstag Budget Corrmittee session in March 1901.

In his marginalia

to a report by the Naval Attache in Paris one finds corrments on every
imperfection the French U-boats had.

Here again was his old axiom

that the navy should not become involved with new weapons or other
hardware while they were still under development. 111 He noted for
example that the French were yet to perfect a practical periscope for
their boats.

How could they attack submerged?

Tirpitz never posed

the possibility that Gennan firms, with the RMA's assistance, might
succeed where the French had not.

The RMA never played the role of

catalyst among its firms and businesses, especially in the case of the
U-boats.

Tirpitz was also hesitant, no doubt, because the U-boat

108HA Krupp, WAXa 4,160. This is a published account of U-boat
development at the Gennaniawerft.
109Ibid., WA IV 714. Barandon was the chairman of the two
sections of Germania, Tegel-Berlin and Kiel. Each section had its
own director.
11 OBA/MA RM3/ll 603 Handakten von Gohren.
der Budgetkorrmission von 1900-1903. 11

11

U-bootsdebatten im

lllBA/MA RM3/3876 l) Daily Mail 3.2.01, 2) Naval Attach~,
Paris to SS/RMA, Berlin 1.10.01.
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had no part to play in his beloved Risk Theory at this stage in its
development.
The Naval Law of 1900 and Further Progress in Construction
On 12 June 1900 the Second Naval Law was passed in the Reichstag
by a vote of 201 to 103. 11 2 As was the case two years earlier, a
barrage of RMA propaganda preceded this legislation.

Only nine months

before, Tirpitz proposed to the Kaiser his plan to increase the navy
to forty-five battleships and auxiliary vesselsll 3 at a cost of
2,759.5 million marks.1 14 This scheme projected RMA plans through
1917, if one believed that Tirpitz intended to stop at these stated
goals.

Few observers did.
In his

11

Bitter Need Speech" of 18 October 1899, Wilhelm struck

the first note for the State Secretary's new proposals.11 5 His main
theme--the protection of the Empire against the British navy--became
the basis of the RMA News Bureau's propaganda efforts. The British
seizure of the mail steamer Bundesrath 116 during the Boer War, the
Boxer Rebellion in China, the embarrassing situation in Samoa and the
11

lessons 11 learned from the Spanish-American War were cited in support

1900:

ll 2p. Kennedy, 11 Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of
A Strategical Critique, 11 MGM 1970 (part 2), 35.
113Ibid., 34.
114p_

c.

Witt, op. cit., 142.

115p_ Kennedy,

11

Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law, 11 34.

116Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 119.
Antagonism, 417.

P. Kennedy, Anglo-German
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of the idea that Germany had to have a larger fleet to prosper in a
world of far flung empires.
During the propaganda campaign for the 1900 Naval Law the RMA
became increasingly aware of the power held by private pronaval groups.
The German Naval League, the Pan-German League, the Colonial League and
the Liberal Association for Fleet Expansion all became involved in
supporting the Naval Law, but were not under the control of the
RMA.117
1900.

The Naval League alone had grown to enormous proportions by
In its drive for the passage of this Naval Law the Association

increased its private membership by more than 155,000.

It also added

176,881 organizations to its roster and the circulation of its
periodical, Die Flotte, by 175,000 copies in the fall of 1900.118
While the RMA invested 222,035 marks in the propaganda campaign, the
Naval League alone expended 760,000 marks.

With the aid of other
groups the total outlay easily exceeded one million marks.11 9
Most of these efforts aimed at Germans who were middle class
and politically centrist or slightly right of center.

Although the

large industrialists had everything to gain, the conservatives whose
privilege and economic security lay in agriculture were not sure that
this campaign was in their best interest.

Many feared that the

117w. Deist, Flottenpolitik, 140-42.
118 w. Marienfeld, op. cit., 83. Membership statistics from
1.l.00 to 12.31.00: Single= 93,991 to 269,370; Organizations=
152,890 to 329,771. Die Flotte circulation: Jan. 1900 = 125,000;
Dec. 1900 = 300,000.
119w. Deist, op. cit., 81-82.
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mobilization of the middle and lower classes would upset their place
in society as their economic security was subordinated to the
interests of the industrial Free-Conservatives.

It is in this

atmosphere that the compromise ~roposed by the State Secretary of the
Prussian Finance Ministry, Johannes Miquel, christened Sammlungspolitik
by Eckart Kehr, must be appreciated.

Within this compromise the

agrarian Prussians received tariff protection for their foodstuffs
and heavy industry won its fight to broaden an already profitable
naval construction plan.

Above all, the existing German social order

was strengthened by the successful cooperation between these two
factions.

The existing monarchical order in Gennany had purchased a

new lease on life.120
It was an indication of Tirpitz's determination and industrial
support that the Reichstag passed the 1900 Naval Law in the face of
huge budget deficits.121

Tirpitz was willing to throw the Reich even

further into debt for the fleet, but his padding of naval appropria
tions and careful spending always managed to create a surplus large
enough to ensure continual construction over leaner times to come. 122
The passage of the Second Naval Law allowed the Construction
Department to continue its building plans.

In 1901 and 1902 the RMA

began construction on Braunschweig Class battleships at an average
cost of 24 million marks per ship.

Germaniawerft received both the

120v. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan, passim.
12lp_ C. Witt, op. cit., 139-41.
122V. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan, 285-286.
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Braunschweig and the Hessen.

Schichau in Danzig contracted for the

Elsass and the Lothringen, Vulcan for the Preussen. 123 The normal
displacement of these ships was about 13,200 tons, powered by triple
expansion engines and boilers on the Thornycroft system.

The main

armament consisted of two double 28 cm turrets, with a strong
secondary battery of fourteen 17 cm, and fourteen 8.65 cm guns. 12 4
They had a maximum range of 6,500 km when steaming at ten knots and
could do 3,470 km at a top speed of sixteen knots.

When they were

ready for service between 1904 and 1906, these ships finally gave the
Imperial Navy a class that compared favorably with the ships of the
Royal Navy.
Five other vessels made possible by this law were the heavy
cruisers Friedrich Karl, Yorck, Scharnhorst, Gheisenau and Roon.
Blohm und Voss of Hamburg built the first three at prices between 15.6
and 20.3 million marks.

A.G. Weser won the Gneisenau and the

Imperial Yard at Kiel built the Roon for the lowest price of the five,
15.3 million.

They could steam at fourteen knots with a range of
between 4,800 and 5,100 km.1 25
The most ambitious expansion took place in the area of light

cruisers.

Tirpitz authorized twelve in all between 1901 and 1905.

As

was the_case after the passage of the first Naval Law, Weser received
most of the light cruiser contracts from the RMA.

The Imperial Yard at

l 23E . Groner,
••
·
20 .
op. c,t.,

124A. Preston, op. cit., see closeup on Braunschweig Class.
125E. Groner, op. cit., 23.
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Danzig qualified for two, Kiel one, Howaldswerke one, Vulcan two and
Weser the remaining six. 126 The most expensive of these ships was
Vulcan's LUbeck, which was the first German warship powered by a
turbine.
Schichau and Vulcan shared the three cannon boat contracts
awarded by the RMA.

Vulcan built the Eber and Schichau both the

Tsingtau and Vaterland.

The Eber was similar to earlier models, like

Panther and Luchs, while the two ships awarded to Schichau were much
sma 11 er. 127
Turbine experimentation also took place with these smaller
ships.

In Schichau's S-125 (T-125), 128 the Parsons System appeared for

the first time in high seas torpedo boats.

Schichau was responsible

for all the boats in the 114-131 series, which cost approximately one
million marks.

The S-125 was the exception at l .27 million.

Germaniawerft won a contract for five other torpedo boats at an
average price of 1. 18 to 1.20 million marks each.
Summary
The 1899-1901 period represents the beginning of the RMA's
routine relationship with industry.

The actual construction of the

126Jbid., 27.
127Ibid., 31. Eber - l ,193 tons - 1,632,000 marks; Tsingtau 280 tons - 497,000 mari<s';Vaterland - 280 tons - 492,000 marks.
128Whi1e a torpedo boat was still under construction, its
designation revealed the yard responsible for it. Thus the S
(Schichau) - 114 through 131 or the G (Gennania)-132 through 136.
Upon commissioning the prefix 11 T11 replaced the first initial of the
yard. Ibid., 34.
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first ships made possible by the Naval Law of 1898 revealed the
strains placed upon industry by sudden naval expansion.

These strains

manifested themselves in intra-industry relationships as well as the
difficulties arising between industry and the RMA.
In 1900, an RMA commission studying the shipbuilding industry
made suggestions, all of which the navy pursued.

They discouraged

specialization in a single product or system, because the business
investment was too great and the promise of profits too small.

The

navy needed a core group of reliable competing firms to find better
products at the lowest possible prices, and the stability resulting
from a measure of diversification in a number of good firms would be
its best possible asset.
Where the navy might have only a few firms at its disposal, the
corrunission suggested using the Imperial Yards and, when possible, the
Private Yards to organize a front against any excessive prices
proposed by subcontractors.

In dealing with the Private Yards,

secret sealed bids for whole ships would provide the navy with the
best prices when awarding contracts.

The shipyards could make bulk

purchases to keep their costs low, and the navy could try to apply
pressure on them or their subcontractors as it saw fit.

This could be

important in matters of price, building time, and prompt material
delivery.129 Above all, the Commission encouraged consistency in all
the RMA' s relationships with industry.

The problems the RMA faced

during these yeais were of a diverse nature, and many could not be

129BA/MA RM3/2 Tirpitz to Wilhelm II, Berlin 10.17.00.
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completely resolved.

The RMA protocol system reduced cost and weight

overruns and construction delays.

The real puzzles were posed by

firms like Krupp, which appeared to survive and prosper in its
monopoly in spite of concerted attacks by the RMA.

Tirpitz, Capelle,

von Eickstedt and many other naval leaders never completely resigned
themselves to this phenomenon, and a good deal of their efforts
against other, would-be monopolists succeeded.
Their real failure came in the decision to leave major
research and development efforts to the private sector.

On the one

hand, greater involvement in research and development would have
absorbed a large percentage of the RMA s annual budget.
1

On the other

hand, this involvement would have placed the RMA in a better position
vis-a-vis possible monopoly, made possible by the high technology
involved in some areas of research.
-In the case of the turbine and perhaps even armor plate, deeper
RMA involvement in research and development might have made a dent in
Krupp's monopoly or paved the way for an even better engine than the
Parsons.

The least that could come from these measures was a higher

degree of technical expertise among the naval inspectors and an
ability to disseminate an understanding of naval related technology to
new or already established, interested firms.
Between 1899 and 1901, the U-boat became a reality for Tirpitz.
Whether he liked it or not, he could no longer ignore the vessel.
Advances in submarine technology, actual sales by Krupp, and
Reichstag pressures forced the State Secretary to divert part of the

122

funds won in 1900 to acquiring weapons of this sort.
the navy's commitment was, however, still in doubt.

The extent of

CHAPTER III
BUSINESS AS USUAL:

1902-1904

It is ironic that just as naval-industrial relations settled
down to

11

business as usual, 11 the Risk Theory was called into question

by the changing international situation.

Tirpitz chose to ignore the

determination of the British to maintain their naval supremacy.

He

relied on public and industrial support to maintain the momentum of
his fleet program, despite opposition from the treasury.

At the same

time it was quite evident that he was completely preoccupied by the
construction of the fleet.
By 1902 the Protocol System was an accepted part of life in
naval-industrial relations.

The RMA felt secure enough to involve

itself in every transaction affecting the navy. van Eickstedt presumed
that every business deal pertaining to the fleet was within RMA
jurisdiction.
The theme of "business as usual" also characterized U-boat and
turbine development.

Tirpitz 1 s reluctance to become directly involved

in these areas rebounded in ways his administrators regretted.

Krupp

continued to dominate the U-boat industry and many shipyards and
electrical firms frantically tried to provide the Parsons company
with competition.
An interesting twist during this period was Krupp's determined
but futile effort to annex the giant Vulcan Shipyard of Stettin.
tendency to consume as much of its competition as possible also
123

This

124
extended itself to Essen's American U-boat rivals.

However, Krupp was

even less successful in coaxing the American Laker Company into
collusion than it was in annexing Vulcan.
Political Background
Between 1902 and 1904, Tirpitz's building program hit full
stride, with two classes of battleships under construction and the
Deutschland Class up for bids in 1904.

It is sobering, however, to

consider these events in the political context of the period.

These

three years witnessed the emergence of Great Britain from "splendid
isolation" and the revelation of the fatal flaws in the Risk Theory.
During this period Great Britain's position and world fortunes
improved markedly.

The naval treaty with the Japanese in 1902

stabilized the British position in the Far East and gave London greater
freedom to become more involved in the European political situation.
France was suggesting closer cooperation regarding matters of
continental and colonial policy since the successful stand made by
Britain at Fashoda.

A conflict with the United States seemed less

likely than ever with the signing of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in
1901 and the Alaskan Boundary Settlement of 1903.

The British

government also discarded the burden of protecting the Ottoman Empire
in the East.

By 1902-03 the "status quo" in the Dardnelles region no

longer represented a vital portion of British foreign policy.
Internally Great Britain engaged in extensive army reforms and
drastically increased the naval budgets of 1900 and 1903.

The latter
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eventually took concrete form as ten new battleships and eighteen
armored cruisers. 1
The German service attach~s in London were sending back ominous
reports of the treatment of German naval expansion in the British
press.

An article in Vanity Fair recalled the 1807 "Copenhagening" of

the Danish Fleet and suggested the same technique be used against the
Germans.

The author promised that the destruction of emerging Gennan

naval power would guarantee world peace for two generations. 2 This
would hardly prompt the naval or military attaches in London to suggest
scrapping Tirpitz 1 s plans.3

However, Chancellor BUlow 1 s effort to calm

the British press in a 1904 interview with Brashford of the Nineteenth
Century failed completely.

The British mood was clearly changing, and
the Chancellor 1 s claim of a defensive fleet fell on deaf ears. 4 · As
Paul Kennedy observed, Britain was

11

•••

clearly looking very care

fully at the expansion of the German fleet, which, due to the agitation
of the National Review, Spectator, the Times and other journals,
1P. Kennedy, Anglo-Gennan Antagonism, 265.
2Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, ed. by J.
Lipsius and A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, vol. 19/2 No. 6149: Coerper,
Naval Attache in London, to Kaiser Wilhelm II, 18 Nov. 1904.
3rbid., 360-65. Maj. Graf von der Schulenberg, Military
Attach~ in London, to Chancellor von Billow, Berlin 13 Dec. 1904.
4Ibid., 372-73.
26 Dec. 1904.

Chancellor von Billow to Kaiser Wilhelm II,
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had entered the

11

danger zone 11 much earlier than Tirpitz suggested was

likely. 115
By the end of this period the political fortunes of Germany had
taken a turn for the worse.

Relations between Germany and the United

States had not improved since the confrontation over the Philippines
and Samoa.

Indeed, the navy was actually exploring alternative

strategies should war with the U.S. break out. 6 In April of 1904 the
British and French eliminated one of the old fundamental presumptions
of Gennan foreign policy by concluding the Entente.7 With the appoint
ment of Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord (1904-10), the British also
adopted a strategy greatly strengthening the Home Fleet at the expense
of the Mediterranean forces.

The Entente with France made this

possible, and the entire change of strategy was clearly aimed at
countering the new German threat.

This more aggressive policy by the

British was rapidly rendering Tirpitz's 11 danger zone 11 a permanent
rather than transitory situation.8
In these circumstances it is not surprising that Tirpitz
wanted to avoid a confrontation with Britain.

Many took this as a

5P. Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, 265.
6BA/MA N253/21 Nachlass van Tirpitz, 11 Politische und Militarische
Beatractungen uber einen english-deutschen Krieg," Berlin 11.27.04.
7p_ Kennedy, Anglo-Gennan Antagonism, 268-273. The traditional
continental and later colonial antagonisms between England and France
were a basic assumption of German foreign policy since 1871.
8Jbid., 272.
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lack of nerve or fighting spirit.

At the German Foreign Office,

Friedrich von Holstein concluded that Tirpitz's lack of inclination to
fight over Kiaochow in China or during the crisis surrounding the Boer
War revealed an absence of

11

kampfnerven. 119 However, given the

primitive stage of the fleet construction program, Tirpitz's lack of
nerve seems sensible rather than spineless.

He was too busy trying to

create a tool Germany could use effectively against Britain to allow
any premature confrontation with the Royal Navy to destroy everything.
The Admiral's attentions were riveted on construction, extending
the power and prestige of the RMA, and staying out of war.

To these

ends he strengthened the RMA by making it the compulsory channel
through which all matters related to naval politics, finance, and
construction found their way to the Kaiser. lO He raised von Eickstedt's
Construction Division to the status of a full RMA department,11 while
the building program was so successful that a Second Battle Squadron
was well on its way to completion by 1904. 12 The last thing Tirpitz
lacked was

11

kampfnerven."

He knew better than Holstein when Germany

might be prepared to confront the British.

The period between 1902

and 1904 was definitely not the appropriate time.
9F. von Holstein, Die Geheimen Pa iere Friedrich von Holsteins,
ed. by N. Rich and M. H. Fisher, vo. 4 G6tt1ngen, l 62, 22
Diary excerpt 1. 11.02; 496: Holstein to BUlow 8.21.08; 510: Holstein
to Billow, Dammhaus, 9. 13.08.
l0BA/MA RM3/108 Wilhelm II to Tirpitz, aboard the S.M.S.
Hohenzollern (Kaiser's yacht), Kiel 6.28.02.
llBA/MA RM3/2493 Tirpitz to von Eickstedt, Berlin 6.20.02.
12c. A. Gemzell, op. cit., 103.
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Whatever the project or expense, the RMA was increasingly at
odds with the Imperial Treasury Office over expenditures and the
budget.

In the preparation of the 1904 budget there are some

revealing illustrations of this relationship.

The sources of

contention here were the very headaches the RMA was trying to control:
costly design changes, material and labor costs, expensive testing
and research, and shipyard overhead.

Pertinent discussions revealed a

serious lack of colTITlunication between the Imperial Treasury and the
navy.

The Treasury, for example, insisted that the RMA budget

estimates for battleship construction were too high given the fact
that only two private yards were able to build this type of ship.
This claim was, of course, entirely false and was a cause of consider
able bewildennent at the Konigin Augusta Strasse.
Stengel, State Secretary of the Imperial Treasury from 1903 to
1908, furthennore insisted that the Imperial Yards would have to
build battleships to keep RMA expenses down.

Tirpitz had adopted this

policy long ago and the Imperial Yards were already doing this sort of
construction.

The recent decision to renovate them would increase

this capability.

Stengel also challenged the RMA installment system

of payment, as every RSA secretary seemed obliged to do.

Repeatedly

having to defend this system did not endear the Treasury to Admiral
Tirpitz. 13 Stengel then suggested that no payment should be made
until nine-tenths of the work specified in a contract was complete.

13BA/MA RM3/6008 For example: "Neubau 107, Turretdampfer
fUr die Erzfahrt an die Herrn L. Possehl and Co., LUbeck" 3. 17 .04.
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Given the number of ships taken on by the six major private yards at
any given time, this was absurd.

With the possible exception of the

Germaniawerft, none of them could muster enough capital to absorb
all costs until the job was only 10% short of completion.1 4
Stengel's attitude reveals a lack of understanding at the
Imperial Treasury regarding the shipbuilding industry and its rela
tionship with the RMA.

It also betrays Tirpitz's propensity for

isolating the RMA from interaction with the rest of the Imperial
government.

All he desired was that the Treasury find a source for the

appropriations he squeezed out of the Reichstag.

The Treasury never

felt that the State Secretary of the RMA was genuinely trying to get
the best value for each mark spent.

They understood the Admiral's

flaw as one of opulence and mismanagement when it was nothing of the
sort.

Tirpitz's hunger for ever increasing funds was a result of his

self-imposed imperative to give Germany a tool that could truly
challenge England.

In the process he alienated some colleagues in

the navy, and left Stengel with the problem of finding new sources of
income for the Reich.

This repeatedly raised the unsavory political

issue of tax reform before the Reichstag and a harried Chancellor van
Bulow. 15
In spite of an appropriation of ten million marks less than
requested, the RMA budget rose in the financial year 1904-05 for the
fifth consecutive time since 1899-1900.

The Reichstag granted the

14Ibid., RSA to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.7.04.
15p, C. Witt, op. cit., 112-113.
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99.3 million marks requested for projects already under way, but
shaved 5.5 million from the categories covering new construction and
armaments and another 4.5 million from

11

special projects. 11 16

Among Britain, the U.S., France, Russia and Germany, the last
was one of three countries which did not reduce their naval
appropriations between 1903 and 1905.

In France the naval budget

fell from a high of 265.4 million marks in 1901-02 to 250.3 million in
1904-05. 17 The Russian budget fell a relatively modest five million
marks between 1903 and 1905. 18 The 109.7 million spent on ship
building, however, remained constant in order to support the
construction program begun in 1903. 19
In the United States, primarily because of the efforts of
President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-09), the naval expenditure by the
turn of the century was second only to that of Great Britain s.20
1

The American naval budget rose consistently between 1899 and 1902 to
351. l million marks.

After dipping slightly in 1902/03 it rose again

l 6Nauti cus (Berlin, 1904), 18.
Granted
1904 Budget:
Proposed
Continued Projects
99.3 mil. marks 99.3 mil. marks
Shipbuilding and arming 100.4 mil. marks 94. 9 mil. marks
Special projects
25.7 mil. marks 21.2mil. marks
225.4 mil. marks 215.4 mil. marks
17Nauticus, 1904, 439.
18Ibid.
l9J. Rohwer, op. cit., 215-227.
20Ibid.
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to 404.6 million marks in 1905. 21

Congressional appropriations for

shipbuilding 122.6 million per year between 1899 and 1905, but
expenditure on new ships fluctuated constantly.

It was not until the

threat of war confronted the Wilson Administration that the building
program of the U.S. Navy genuinely got under way.22
The German naval budget climbed 81.6 million marks between 1899
and 1905 averaged 185.5 million per year, and totaled 1,113.1 million
marks for the whole period.
it was still small.

But by comparison with other major powers

In 1902/03 the British naval budget was 637.6

million marks, 432.6 million more than the German allocation for that
year.

In the 1903/04 naval appropriations the British made a quantum

leap for the reform and expansion of their navy of 91.2 million above
the previous year.
The Protocol System:

The German increase was a mere 6 million.23
Cost and Weight Problems and the Koch Case

In the struggle to make every mark count, the RMA pressed the
Construction Department and inspectors to complete and publish the
first full edition of the Suppliers List.

This took place in 1902 and

this handbook of all naval vendors was far clearer and easier to use
and revise.

There were four editions of it between 1902 and the

war,24 and the pre-war system of supplements, called Deckblitter,

21Nauticus, 1904, 439.
22J. Rohwer, op. cit., 215-227.
23Nauticus, 1904, 439.
24BA/MA RM3/2296 1902 edition of the Lieferantenverzeichnis.
Other pre-war editions: 1905 (RM3/2297-98) and 1907 (RM3/2298).
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appeared periodically to list deletions and additions.

The Deck

blatter included everything from a correction on the quoted diameter
of some pipe supplied by Mannesmann to a baking machinery manufacturer
complaining about not finding his finn listed.25
It was a measure of the list's importance that participation
in its compilation and accuracy rarely had to be solicited by the RMA.
Many suggestions on format, and possible use were forthcoming from RMA
inspectors whose reputations often depended upon the reliability of the
firms admitted to the Suppliers List.26

If their judgment failed one

time too many, Tirpitz would strongly complain to von Eickstedt as he
did in 1903 regarding boilers, coal chutes and ventilation systems.27
Vendors also notified the RMA very quickly if they were omitted from
the list or listed inaccurately.

Carl Flohr reminded the RMA in April

of 1903 that his firm manufactured cranes, munition conveyors and
small elevators.

He wondered why the RMA failed to list it in these

machinery categories.28
The smaller firms, which were more dependent on RMA contracts,
were just as responsive.

In most cases they took care to protect their

position on the Suppliers List by following the requirements and

25BA/MA RM3/2294 Revisions for the 1902 L.V. RMA Construction
Dept., Berlin 4.28.03. Richard Lehman, Dresden~RMA, Berlin 6.5.03.
26BA/MA RM3/2295 passim (1904).
27BA/MA RM3/328 Tirpitz to von Eickstedt, Berlin 4.3.03.
28BA/MA RM3/2294 Carl Flohr Maschinenfabrik to SS/RMA,
Berlin 4.4.03.
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specifications laid down in all RMA quality control publications.29
In 1904, when the Rheinisch-Westfalischen Copper Works failed to
deliver sheet metal to the Imperial Yard at Kiel in time or with the
expected quality, the firm was put on probation and investigated at
the suggestion of the Construction Inspectorate.30
Of course, the RMA was fallible.

In one case van Eickstedt

went against the advice of his inspectors and approved the admission
of the Richard Gradenwitz Co. to the Suppliers List for manometers.
Later evaluations of this firm's work prompted conments like

11

terrible 11

from the Kiel Torpedo Inspectorate and the Imperial Yard in Kiel.
Other firms, like Schaffer and Budenberg,were already prepared to solve
this problem with a better product.31

The offending firm disappeared

from the Suppliers List until it showed a marked improvement.
Sometimes the formal and organization of the Suppliers List
subtly created problems that the RMA did not foresee.

Of the five

approved vendors in competition for contracts in the List's category
number 52, electrical gauges, three were small privately owned
companies in Frankfurt, Berlin, and Hannover.

The other two firms

were Siemens-Schuckert and A.E.G., the two biggest electrical firms
in Germany.

This was certainly unfair competition, and if the product

in question had not been highly specialized the three smaller firms

29BA/MA RM3/301 1904 edition of the Vorschriften fur die
Lieferung und AbnahmeprUfung van Materialen und Apparaten.
30BA/MA RM3/2295 KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 7.28.04.
31Ibid.

Richard Gradenwitz Co. to RMA, Berlin 9.2.03.
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would have had an even harder time surviving.32

In other cases a

parent firm was listed in a single category along with two or three
of its subsidiary companies.

An-,ong eight companies supplying parts

for heavy marine machinery, for example, Krupp and three of its
subsidiaries controlled half of the competition. 33 A closer
examination of the firms in each category of the Suppliers List and
more care in contract distribution could have increased the RMA's
chances for an even better price in most product categories.
In many instances, other regulations took the variations of
size and capability more closely into account.

The Construction

Department always required a list of ship parts inventories
accumulated at each yard.

This regulation appeared in the General

Construction Guidelines34 so that the RMA would have a better idea of
each yard's ability to manufacture, store, or otherwise stockpile
goods related to ship construction.

The private yards less able to

gather very large inventories before construction needed more RMA
funds earlier than other yards.

Thus contract rate payments for the

smaller private yards were scheduled to help the company progress in
construction without encountering an acute capital shortage.35 The

32BA/MA RM3/2298 ~ (1907 edition), 72.
33BA/MA RM3/2294 L.V. (1902 edition).
34A.B.B. = General construction regulations.
abbreviations.

See list of

35BA/MA RM3/6008 SS/RMA, Berlin: "Auf die Schrieben vom
7 April 1904 und vom 10 September 1904, 11 to Budget Dept., and KWK to
Vulcan, Stettin 6.8.04.
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RMA arranged other pay schedules without special consideration and,
when possible, to their own convenience.
Besides the Suppliers List and the General Construction Guide
lines the Construction Department published many technical handbooks
for maritime finns to ensure that they met naval standards.
publication was the

11

One such

Basic Guidelines for Electrical Systems" issued

to Siemens-Schuckert, A.E.G. and any other firms involved in warship
electrical work.36 These pamphlets compiled RMA technical expertise
and contained rules which were effective if properly enforced .

The

Construction Department used constant testing to approve a company's
admission to the Suppliers List, detennine the quality of products
purchased for naval use, and ascertain the perfonnance of these
products while in naval service.
The problems the RMA encountered here, again, stemmed from the
rapid pace of expansion.

Its virious testing agencies were spread so

thinly that it was difficult to acconmodate each firm as it produced
needed materials.

The RMA broadened its capability and employed

resources of private testing agencies with greater frequency.

As was

the case with the North German Lloyd, some private companies were ih
the RMA's service for many years as research centers.

The Lloyd's

facilities were important to the RMA for testing new ship prototypes. 37

36BA/MA RM3/1170 11 Grundzuge fur elektrischen Anlagen."
37BA/MA RM3/328 RMA, Berlin to North German Lloyd, Bremen
6.21.02. RM3/502 RMA, Berlin to Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden
l. 8. 03.
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The RMA employed other independent firms, or gave its permission to
use certain firms to augment the services of the Purchasing Office.
Schichau employed the Cassirer firm to test cables delivered to the
yard in 1902. 38

In addition, the Construction Inspectorate more often

supervised the shipyards' tests of their own materials.39 Regardless
of the method, the guarantees of product quality demanded by the RMA
regulations remained in force.

If a private firm substituted for the

Purchasing Office as in the Cassirer case, the testing firm assumed
the responsibility of guaranteeing the product.

If the Inspectorate

supervised, the guarantee obligations rested with the producing firm.
The Purchasing Office was an RMA agency composed of a combina
tion of naval inspectors and approved independent engineers under
contract to the navy.
navy.

The importance of this agency grew with the

On-site inspections by the Purchasing Office were becoming

increasingly important.

Catching defects in naval supplies at the

factory reduced expensive delivery and return costs, as well as lost
time.40

By 1903 the RMA required many of the Private Yards to share

the cost of the tests at their yards.41
38BA/MA RM3/1238 RMA, Construction Dept., Berlin to Schichau,
Elbing 2.22.02.
1

39BA/MA RM3/2040 11 Materialabnahme fUr die kleine Kreuzer
G und 1 H, 111 Berlin 1.11.02.
1

40Ibid. KWK to RMA, Technical Dept., Berlin 8.4.02.
Correspondence between Technical Dept. and the six major shipyards
Oct., 1901-June, 1902. Handelskammer fUr den Kreis Essen to SS/RMA,
Berlin 1902.
41Ibid.

RMA Construction Dept., Berlin to KWK 11 .7.03.
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The RMA testing and approval system was usually adequate to
meet the navy's needs.

The admission of a weak finn to the

Suppliers List would occasionally reveal its limitations.

However,

the Technical Department assured Tirpitz in 1904 that the testing
methods and rigorous inspections were permitted in far fewer flaws in
naval building materials.42 More importantly, the technical and
administrative expertise of the RMA was proving itself equal to the
task Tirpitz had asked it to assume.
The RMA effectively evaluated materials, detennined their
relative suitability and then demanded that industry abide by that
decision.

Boiler construction presents a case in point.

Up to 1902

the most common form of steel used in the construction of ship's
boilers was crucible steel.

This form of tool steel had a high

chromium and low silicon content and was first produced in 1740.

A

century later crucible steel was the standard material used by Krupp
on many navy and army contracts although it often required re-smelting
to obtain the desired quality.43

In 1902, the RMA decided that

Siemens-Martin steel was a far better material for boilers because the
finer quality control afforded by that company provided a far more
reliable product.

In spite of Krupp's argument that insufficient

quantities of the new product would make construction more difficult,
the RMA ordered a changeover and Krupp abided by its decision.

42BA/MA RM3/2100 KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 2.3.04.
43oer Grosse Brockhaus, 16th edition, vol. 3 (Wiesbaden, 1953).
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Krupp's facilities were already producing large quantities of
crucible steel, and the RMA's request obliged it to change to the
Siemens-Martin process for boiler material.

The quantities of crucible

steel Krupp already had were thus unsuitable for future RMA boiler
projects.44

In this case, the RMA had a sufficient number of firms

willing to supply the type of steel desired if Krupp refused, so even
the most powerful of Germany's steel firms had to bow to its decision.
The RMA continued to test its vessels after they entered
service.

The Konigin Augusta Strasse received a constant flow of

reports on every aspect of a vessel's routine performance.45

In this

way the RMA ironed out every flaw, from faulty boat cranes to the
rudder problems that briefly plagued the ships of the Braunschweig
Class.46
By 1902, the RMA was discovering the true complexity of having
ten new battleships under construction.

Those of the Wittelsbach

Class were nearing completion, and the Braunschweig Class were all in
the early stages of construction.

In addition, heavy cruisers and a

multiplicity of smaller vessels were being built.

As many more companies

flocked to obtain their share of lucrative navy contracts, the adminis
trative problems involved strained the RMA 1 s abilities to the limit.

44Ibid.
45BA/MA RM3/3701 Commander of the 1st Squadron, North Sea to
SS/RMA, Berlin 9.5.02.
46BA/MA RM3/483 RMA Construction Dept., Berlin to Vulcan,
Stettin 1.31 .02. BA/MA RM3/480 Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to
SS/RMA, Berlin 11.4.04, RM3/446 RMA Berlin to KWW 4.27.04.
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The virtual avalanche of cost and weight excesses that dropped
into the Construction Department offices in Berlin pinpointed the most
vulnerable point in the entire building program, with the possible
excepti~n of the armor monopoly.

van Eickstedt's staff had to verify

and evaluate each and every additional cost report.47
Most of the problems causing cost and weight overruns also
wasted valuable time.

Since these construction obstacles were inter

laced, it was not possible to solve one separately from the others.
Their origins lay mostly in the private sector, as Krupp's periodic
inability to meet delivery deadlines exemplified.

Tirpitz had

previously approached Wilhelm II about Krupp's late deliveries during
the construction of the S.M.S. Kaiser Friedrich III and inquiries by
the Kaiser obtained almost immediate results on that project.48 Then
the Krupp directors blamed RMA design changes, production errors, and
early RMA delivery deadlines for the problem.49 Their suggestions for
improvement involved greater competence of the firm's technical
personnel and closer cooperation between the shipyard, the RMA and the
subcontractors. 50

47For example, see:

BA/MA RM3/500-ll, passim.

48ttA Krupp, FAH III Cl81, F. A. Krupp, Villa HUgel to
Direktorium, Essen 11.2.1898.
49Ibid., Direktorium to F. A. Krupp, Essen 12.7.1898.
50Ibid., 11 Bericht betreffend die verspatenten Lieferungen
des Artillerie-Materials fUr S.M.S. Kaiser Friedrich III 11 (Direktorium
to Krupp, Essen 12.7.1898).
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The evaluation of every overrun was the worst part of the RMA's
task.

The very nature of this process, including the large number of

firms involved and the variety of reasons proposed for the increases
and excesses, diffused the RMA's power to act effectively.

This

inescapable consequence of a very ambitious building program represented
a vulnerable point which a single complaint to the Kaiser could not
possibly solve.
One typical case involved the manufacture of drinking water
containers for the Braunschweig Class.

In each case these seemingly

insignificant items increased the ship's weight over 100 kg. and cost
between 330 and 449 marks more than the contract allowed.

Thus in

this one minor instance the RMA had to approve an additional 2000 marks
for these battleships.51

It would not take long for an accumulation of

small cases like this to create a financial crisis for the RMA,
retarding the success of the entire program.
The major causes of these headaches were diverse.

In some

instances various contractors or yards would overextend themselves by
accepting too many projects.
situation.

Usually the RMA was able to avoid this

However, when it happened, the burden would often cause

production flaws, a decline in quality, and disrupted schedules.
Problems of this sort arose between the RMA and Krupp over the

5lsA/MA RM3/488 Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.24.04.
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latter's diverse contract commitments to the Deutschland
Class. 52
Late delivery, damage to important ship parts, the failure
of designs to arrive at the factory on time, all of these general
reasons·resulted in extra spending, lost time and often increased
weight.

Siemens-Schuckert's late installation of the radio

telegraphy system delayed the construction of the cruisers Prinz
Adalbert and Hamburg.53

Vulcan complained that Krupp took far too

long in making the cannon mountings for the S.M.S. Mecklenburg,54 and
Schichau appealed to the RMA for greater pressure on the S.M.S.
Wettin subcontractors to keep them on schedule.55
Krupp's efforts to economize damaged the foundations of the
15 cm. turrets on the cruiser S.M.S. Prinz Heinrich.

The bolts used

to anchor the turret housing at various deck levels were spaced further
apart so fewer would be required.
caused damage to the turrets.

The resulting lack of stability

When the builders of the S.M.S.

Wilhelm der Grosse employed the same design, the RMA had a terrible

52BA/MA RM3/502 Krupp to SS/RMA, Berlin 11.4.02. 11 Notizen zum
Immediatvertrage Uber der Inbaugabe von Kriegschiffen, die 1903 neu
gefordert werden, 11 Berlin 10.30.02.
53BA/MA RM3/1100 KWK to RMA Construction Department, Berlin
14. 5. 04.
54BA/MA RM3/462 Vulcan, Stettin to Kaiserliche.
Flach, Berlin 9.10.02.

Marinebaurath

55BA/MA RM3/453 11 Ruckstandige Angaben fUr den Bau S.M.S.
Wettin, 11 Danzig 3.29.02.
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time trying to get Krupp to admit the error and change the plans.56
The Imperial Yard at Kiel was left to repair the damage to the Prinz
Heinrich. 57
Most design difficulties, however, were smaller, and their
number made them expensive.

A change in specifications for the stern

galley in the S.M.S. Wettin eventually cost 1655 marks extra and added
another 436 kg to the ship.58 Extra work needed to strengthen the
cannon mountings on board the S.M.S. Wettin and Zahringen cost 8,172
marks and 2,787 marks, respectively.59

Both the Braunschweig and

Deutschland Classes had problems with excessive vibrations in the
steering system and rudder.

The firm of Haniel and Lueg in DUsseldorf

installed systems with similar defects in both the S.M.S. Hannover and
Pommern.60 Schichau received similarly flawed designs for the S.M.S.
Lothringen, and rudder alterations made on the S.M.S. Braunschweig at
the Imperial Yard at Kiel cost an extra 6,850 marks. 61

Eight new

56BA/MA RM3/286 Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.8.02.
SS/RMA, Berlin 4.3.02.

KWK to

57Ibid., KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 7.19.02.
58BA/MA RM3/453 Schichau, Danzig to SS/RMA, Berlin 2.17.02.
59BA/MA RM3/455 KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 5.15.03.
60BA/MA RM3/517 KWK to RMA Construction Dept. 12.20.04 (Tele
gram). RM3/527 Haniel and Lueg, DUsseldorf to SS/RMA, Berlin
12.16.04, and RMA Construction Dept., Berlin to KWW 12.23.04.
6lBA/MA RM3/495 Schichau, Danzig to SS/RMA, Berlin 10.7.03.
RM3/481 KWK to RMA Construction Division, Berlin 2.25.04.
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watertight doors for the S.M.S. Wittelsbach came in 400 kg and 1600
marks over projections,62 and the chains for the S.M.S. Braunschweig
added 1,612 kg and 7,104 marks to that ship's contract weight and
cost.6 3 These examples only begin to show the extent of the problem.
For the RMA, the cost of alterations or repairs to Krupp
projects was the most trouble.

The extra expense of reinforcing the

S.M.S. Preussen's 15 cm turrets was 41,282 marks.64 Similar altera
tions to the 15 cm turrets of the S.M.S. Zahringen, Wettin and
Mecklenburg involved a total of 43,885 marks.65

Krupp absorbed none

of these costs and the RMA had to pay the firm or have the work done
at one of the Imperial Yards.
money and time were lost.

As a result substantial amounts of

Krupp completed most of the heavy guns on

time, but delays were usually considerable.

In one case the delivery

of 10.5 cm cannon for the light cruiser S.M.S. Merkur was delayed six
months by a minor design change that Krupp deemed necessary.

In these

cases, the RMA could not turn to a competitor, so it had to absorb
the losses.66
Eickstedt used the RMA cost accounting system to inject order
into the process of coping with these overruns.

In every case the

62BA/MA RM3/444 KWW to SS/RMA, Berlin 3.20.02.
63BA/MA RM3/478 Germaniawerft, Kiel to SS/RMA, Berlin 2.4.04.
64BA/MA RM3/463 Vulcan, Stettin to RMA, Berlin 10.31.03.
65BA/MA RM3/462 Vulcan, Stettin to RMA, Berlin 7.20.03.
66BA/MA RM3/360 RMA, Berlin to Krupp, Essen 2.16.04.
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firm or yard claiming the overrun had to submit a strict spending
breakdown.

Using quarterly spending control reports compiled by the

Imperial Shipyards for all projects, the RMA was able to evaluate the
various cost changes for each ship, determine their overall effect,
and plan official action.67 Tirpitz also increased the control of
the Construction Inspectorate over releasing funds for work they felt
met RMA standards.

Krupp protested this action as unwarranted inter

ference by the RMA in business affairs, especially between the private
yards and subcontractors.68 Nevertheless, Tirpitz and von Eickstedt
insisted on the measure, and closer cooperation between yard, sub
contractor and RMA, in order to strengthen the position of the
latter.69
The shipyards were also feeling the impact of steady expansion.
The RMA evidently expected some yards and subcontractors to feel the
strain and ordered the Imperial Yards to extend credit or determine
some disbursement schedules according to the financial need of the
more reliable naval vendores.70 Wilhelmshaven and Kiel were

67BA/MA RM3/460-61 passim. RM3/6112 11 Vierteljahrliche
Ausgabekontrolle uber den Fonds fur den Neubau des Linienschiffs
11
Mecklenburg 11 fur das 3. vierteljahr 1903," (KWW). RM3/489 Vulcan,
Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 12.17.04. RM3/504 RMA, Berlin to
Germaniawerft, Kiel 2.11.04.
68BA/MA RM3/6007 KWD to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.7.04. KWK-BBS to
SS/RMA, Berlin 4.6.04. Krupp, Esse.n to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.16.04.
Vulcan-BBS, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.22.04.
69 sA/MA RM3/462 Tirpitz to Construction Dept., RMA (handscript
notations), Berlin 2.16.03. RM3/455 Tirpitz to Kaiserliche KoITJTiando
des I. Geschwader, Berlin 5.23.03.
70sA/MA RM3/6008 Abschrift
Berlin 9.26.03.

ZU

KIV 3457, zu EI 1625/03,
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responsible for most payments on capital ship projects, while Danzig
dealt mostly in smaller craft and U-boats. 71
An interesting clash over contract payments took place between
an Imperial Yard and a private subcontractor in 1904.

The case of

tne Imperial Shipyard at Danzig versus the Stettin firm of Bruno Koch
was actually atypical of shipyard-subcontractor relationships.

It

was, however, illustrative of the power of an Imperial Shipyard in its
function as RMA bursar and the ability of the naval authorities to
support their subordinates in some situations.

In September of 1904

the Koch Firm extended the shipyard facilities at Danzig for the RMA
to include a large breakwater, a new 67,000 cubic meter dock and quite
a few pilings to stabilize the dock's shoreline foundation.

Koch's

engineers determined that even more pilings were needed than
originally estimated. 72 The Imperial Yard decided that since the
additional work and departure from the contract was not cleared first
with Berlin, the 3,300 marks cost overrun was not a legitimate
expenditure.

Therefore, that part of the bill was not paid.

In the prolonged legal battle that followed, Koch brought suit
against the RMA for its contract restrictions.

He contended in

court that the work at Danzig was well done, only 5% over contract

71BA/MA RM3/6078 KWK to SS/RMA.

Construction Dept., Berlin

11. 14. 04.

72BA/MA RMA/10857 Firma B. Koch, Stettin to RMA, Berlin
2.27.05, 11 Beschwerde gegen die Handlungsweise der Kaiserlichen Werft,
Danzig.ri KWD to SS/RMA Technical Dept., Berlin 3.27.05; and
Mitteilungen des Verbandes des deutschen Tiefbauunternehmer, No. 3,
March 1905.
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cost, and justified according to conditions at the construction site.
He was battling

11

not against a person, but against a system 11 that in

his opinion was far too restraining. 73

In this instance, the RMA was

able to focus all of its authority and influence on a breach of
naval-industrial protocol, something difficult to do when the subject
was a ship on a tight schedule.
against Koch completely.

It supported Danzig's arguments

The case dragged on until 1921 when the

navy handed it over to the civilian government and washed its hands
of the affair. 74 By that time his claim against the Danzig Yard was
all he had left, for the Firm of Bruno Koch went bankrupt before 1914.
The Koch case inadvertently resulted from an RMA plan to
renovate the Imperial Yards.

The private shipyards were expanding

their facilities with their own resources, but the Imperial Yards
were degenerating out of sheet neglect as the head of the RMA Shipyard
Department, van Ahlefeld, openly complained.75

It was becoming more
difficult to keep official prices below private shipyard levels.7 6

73BA/MA RM3/10857 Firma ~- Koch, Stettin to RMA, Berlin
4. 17.05.
74Ibid., Reichswerft, Danzig to Reichswehrministerium,
Berlin 3. 3. 21 .
75sA/MA RM3/6033 11 Vergebung der grossen Kreuzer 'C' und 'D' an
Privatwerften, 11 Berlin 6.2.04 (Shipyard Dept. to SS/RMA).
76sA/MA RM3/6030 11 Vergleich der Neubaukosten auf Kaiserlichen
und Privatwerften, 11 Berlin 9.24.02. This was a constant concern for
the RMA. Tirpitz sent a Professor Bernhardt to Britain to evaluate
the Royal Navy's State Shipyards in 1904. Bernhardt felt their
machinery was a bit out of date but concluded that they bore a
heavier burden for the British than the KWs did for the RMA. BA/MA
N253/7 Nachlass Tirpitz, Prof. Bernhardt to SS/RMA, Essen: Report on
his fact-finding trip of June 1904.
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The only way to remedy the situation was to spend a great deal on
expanding the facilities at each Imperial Yard according to the RMA
expectations of that yard.

The work given the Koch Firm was a partial

response to this problem.
Krupp:

The Vulcan Scheme and the Armor Monopoly
A firm the RMA could never conquer the way it did Koch was

secretly trying to broaden its shipyard holdings.

In 1903 the Krupp

Finn directors approved a plan to begin a takeover of the Vulcan
shipyard at Stettin.

The initial plan was to negotiate a gentleman 1 s

agreement with the Stettin firm for close cooperation, something like
the alliance with Dillinger.

However, when Vulcan rejected these

initial approaches the Director of Krupp, Max Rotger,77 ordered the
slow but steady purchasing of the shipyard 1 s stock.78 Vulcan 1 s
stockholders received a two part appeal to help quicken the pace of
the annexation.

Essen guaranteed a consistent 4% dividend on Vulcan

shares and a thirty year period of minimum changes and experimenta
tion, which was to assure Vulcan's stability after the takeover. 79

77Max Rotger: b. 8.27.1860 Wittenberg, d. 4.7.1923 Berlin
GrUnewald. Successor to Hanns Jencke as chairman of the Krupp
Direktorium 6.1.01-10. 1.09. See: HA Krupp FAH III B261.
78HA Krupp FAH IV Cl6 Gustav Hartmann, Dresden to Rotger,
Essen 11 .5.03. Rotger, Merau, Habsburger Hof to Hartmann, Essen
11.9.03. WA Xa 3,7 and FAH IV C276 Gustav Hartmann, generalia.
See also: FAH IV Cl3 and HA IV 1264. Hartmann was a member of the
Krupp Board of Governors from 1903 to 1909.
79HA Krupp FAH IV Cl6 Rotger to Hartmann, Baden-Baden
4.30.04.
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Vulcan was particularly vulnerable to this type of attack.
Its contracts with the RMA were not coming rapidly enough to keep its
entire workforce employed on a continuous basis.

In 1902 it received

contracts for a light cruiser and a cannon boat, with another cruiser
fo1lowing in 1903 and a battleship in 1904.

It finished the lighter

vessels in less than twenty-four months and released many highly
specialized workers at various stages of construction without
alternative work.

Before the acquisition of its larger Hamburg

facility in 1906, Vulcan was limited in the number of capital ships it
could simultaneously accommodate.

The Hamburg site would enable a

vastly increased capacity later, but the firm's employees needed the
additional work irrmediately.80
To make it more difficult for Vulcan's directors to oppose the
Krupp move, the latter endangered Vulcan's position with the RMA by
slowing down on armor and cannon deliveries.

This could affect both

Vulcan's reputation with the navy and the status of Vulcan stock on
the exchange. 81

80BA/MA RM3/514 von Maltzahn, Oberprasident of Pommern to
Chancellor van BUlow, Berlin 1903. By way of comparison, Germania
werft1s contracts between 1900 and 1905 were as follows:
1900 - 6 torpedoboats (TB)
1901 - l battleship (BB)
1902 - l BB
1903 - l BB
1904 - l U-boat
1905 - l BB
The greater frequency of contracts and the overlapping of projects
made it less likely that Germania would have difficulty keeping its
workers on the job. E. Groner, op. cit., passim.
81BA/MA RM3/460 Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 1.4.02.
RM3/461 Vulcan, Stettin to Krupp, Essen 6.26.02.
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Krupp 1 s aim, of course, was to possess shipyards on both the
North Sea and the Baltic, effectively doubling its value to the RMA
if not its output and profits as well . 82 This effort continued
throughout the period before 1914, as the Vulcan directorate under
Herrn Flohr and Stahl barely kept Krupp at bay.
During the 1902-1904 period the Krupp Finn continued to
dominate German annor plate production.

It managed to keep this and

its lucrative business in high percent nickel steel products beyond
the reach of the Association of Steel Works.83 Otherwise Krupp, as
one of the association 1 s larger companies, observed the Association 1 s
quotas governing steel production and profits in the Ruhr.84

Essen

benefitted both in and out of cartel organizations.
Although it often seemed so, Krupp was not the only steel
producer employed by the navy.

Many firms produced a variety of

special steel products, and not all were as well known or powerful as
Krupp, Dillinger, Thyssen or Stinnes.

Furthermore, many of the

shipyards deliberately varied the steel finns they used in an effort
to reduce overhead, among other reasons.

Schichau, for example,

frequently used Borsig, Harder, or the BismarckhUtte rather than
Krupp for nickel stee1.85 Vulcan also approached Harder in Westphalia

82HA Krupp FAH IV Cl6 Rotger to Hartmann, Baden-Baden 4.30.04.
83BA/MA RM3/2290 KWK to RMA Construction Dept., Berlin
5.9.04.
84G. Leckebusch, op. cit., passim.
85BA/MA RM3/494 Schichau, Danzig to SS/RMA, Berlin 2.28.03.
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on the S.M.S. Preussen contract and preferred Dillinger to Krupp for
armor when possible.86 Given Krupp efforts to take over this company,
it was no surprise that Vulcan was not anxious to rely too heavily on
Essen for anything. 87 Vulcan also contracted with the Panzer firm in
wo·lgast for small quantities of armor plate. 88 These other companies
did not present much of a threat to Krupp.

Nonetheless, these cases

clearly illustrate that neither the shipyards nor the RMA were ready
to surrender to Krupp's position in the steel industry.
The RMA had to endure Krupp prices for armor and artillery.
In a discussion of this matter during October of 1902, Geheimrat
Rudloff of the Construction Department felt that Krupp did not
seize all of its opportunities to cut costs.

He referred Capelle of

the Administrative Department to one case where a 80,000 marks
saving on armor costs might have been possible.
if he pressed the issue with Krupp,
question would again unravel."

11

•••

Capelle replied that

the entire armor plate

Capelle was only too aware of

Tirpitz's failure in his efforts against Fritz Krupp, and he did not
want to return to that state of affairs. 89 Between Fritz Krupp's death

86BA/MA RM3/485 Hoerder Bergwerks- und Hutten Verein, Hoerde
to RMA, Berlin 3.4.03.
87BA/MA RM3/484 Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.28.02.
Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 7.31.02. Vulcan, Stettin to
SS/RMA, Berlin 12.10.02. Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 5.6.02.
88BA/MA RM3/2040 BBS, Stettin to RMA Construction Dept.,
Berlin 9. 16. 04.
89BA/MA RM3/2527 "Protokoll uber die SitzUng am 27. Oktober
1902, 11 RMA, Berlin.
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in Italy on 22 November 1902 and the subsequent marriage of his
daughter, Bertha, to Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach in 1906, 90 the
situation began to change.

The firm's grant of a 2.5% rebate on all

naval orders in April of 1903 was interpreted as a hopeful sign.
However, nobody at the RMA was rejoicing too loudly,9l as the rebate
would not alter the prices dramatically.92
Research and Development:

The Turbine Engine and Li-Boat

The few areas of research and development in which the RMA
participated indicated its priorities for the future of naval
technology.

By 1902, for example, the consensus among RMA leaders

was to steer artillery research toward larger weapons with a much
greater muzzle velocity.93 The 28 cm. (11 inch) guns which would
arm Germany's first dreadnoughts were already perfected, along with a
new ship design capable of 19.5 knots.94

90BA/MA RM3/479 Gennaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA. Berlin
4.30.04. RM3/6076 KWK to SS/RMA Construction Dept., Berlin 1.2.03.
Information on F. A. Krupp; Georg von Alten, Handbuch fUr Heer und
Flotte, vol. 5 (Berlin, 1913).
91 BA/MA RM3/2527 Weapons Dept. to Central Division RMA,
Berlin 4.2.03.
92BA/MA N253/7 Nachlass Tirpitz. 11 Zusammenstellung des
Gesamtverbrauchs an Krupp'schem Vertikalpanzennaterial 11 (survey of
cost between 1894 and 1906).
93BA/MA RM3/329 RMA memo regarding 24 cm. guns for battleships,
Berlin 9.26.04. 11 Aufstellung der Artillerie in Kasematten,
Einzelturmen und Zwillingsturmen, 11 Berlin 11.3.04. RMA memo:
Construction Dept. on 21 cm. guns for new battleship contracts, Berlin
12.13.04. RM3/3701 "Protokoll Uber die Sitzung am Montag den 24.
November 1902. 11
94w. Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab (Frankfurt a.m., 1958), 115-16.
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Events abroad heavily influenced the decisions of the RMA
Sitzungen or planning sessions.

The RMA received a constant flow of

technical information from its naval attaches which it shared with the
private shipyards and private firms. 95 Another important foreign
source was 0berleutnant van Lowenfeld, who observed the Battle of
Tsushima between the Russians and the Japanese in late 1904 from the
battleship Tsarevitch.

His report emphasized Japan's effective use of

torpedoes against the Russian battleships. Torpedoes became a topic
of intense debate within the RMA, 96 as the German navy was well
equipped with these weapons.

But any hope of using the torpedo in

conjunction with the U-boat perished in tactical discussions and
evaluations of battleship performance.

In a fourteen page memo

entitled "Reflections on the Tsarevitch, 11 Vice-Admiral van Prittwitz,
Chief of the Cruiser Squadron, concluded that torpedo nets had
justified themselves by keeping damage to Russian ships to a mini
mum.97 Twelve years later the navy discarded these defensive nets
after evaluating the Battle of Jutland (Skaggarak).

Nonetheless, the

lessons gleaned from an actual war were considered invaluable oppor
tunities to improve the quality of decisions mapping the future of a
navy.

With few exceptions, however, the lessons learned from the

95BA/MA RM3/l077 Blohm u. Voss, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin
5.4.03.
96BA/MA RM3/l002 Report by 0berleutnant z. S. van Lowenfeld
regarding his experiences on board the battleship Tsarevitch at
Tsingtau (Kiaochow) 8.20.04.
97rbid. 11 Beobachtung auf Cesarewitsch, 11 Tsingtau (Kiaochow)
9.1.04. (Author: v. Admiral v. Prittwitz.)
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Russo-Japanese War reinforced already predominant points of view,
rather than provoking experimentation.
In all areas of research and development, the RMA depended
upon the private sector.

Tirpitz had a very modern facility in the

Research Center for Shipbuilding and Hydraulics in Berlin, but it
required extensive technical cooperation from Siemens-Schuckert, the
Germaniawerft, and other finns. 98 Thus research and development
remained what it had been since 1897, an effort to augment Tirpitz's
naval plans conducted mostly in the private sector.
One result of research and development, the Parsons Turbine,
monopolized the attention of the electrical industry.

In the spring

of 1902, Tirpitz sent a naval commission to Great Britain to examine
first hand the performance of the Parsons' engine, and advise the
Construction Department on the system's suitability for use in the
Imperial Navy.

The group returned enthusiastic about the engine's

possibilities, with only one reservation.

They were not sure how

this high powered system would work as part of an on board electrical
dynamo. 99
As far as industry was concerned, the generally favorable
evaluation was the go-ahead signal.

Up to 1902, only Brown and Boveri

was licensed to manufacture the Parsons' engine in Gennany.

In that

98BA/MA RM3/1003 Memo regarding the versuchsanstalt fUr
Wasserbau und Schiffbau, Berlin 7.9.04 . SS/RMA to Finance Minister,
Berlin 10.21.03.
99BA/MA RM3/2108 "Bericht der nach Schottland und England zum
Studium der Parsonsturbinen entsandten Konmission 11 to SS/RMA, Berlin
5.16.02.
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year, however, the British Parsons Co. opened its own German branch.
The "Turbina, 11 Deutsche Parsons Marine A.G. was named after the first
successful British turbine ship prototype.lOO Brown and Boveri was
reduced to a 11 Turbina 11 affiliate where the Parsons• System was
concerned.
The rest of the German electrical industry was not standing
still while these developments took place.

The North German Lloyd,

Krupp, Siemens-Schuckert and M.A.N. were all exploring the Swiss
Zoelly Turbine system.

Indeed, the Berliner Tageblatt reported that

the formation of a huge combine among these firms was imminent.101
This was not yet the case, however, for Krupp was investigating
propulsion systems of its own and was tied to no single engine design.
A.E.G. and Vulcan began joint research, while Siemens and Halske
continued to deal with Parsons through Brown and Boveri. 102
In spite of any potential continental breakthrough, the Parsons
system remained the only engine already designed and proven effective
tests.

It soon became recognized around the world as the most advanced

form of reliable marine propulsion.

Jay Gould and J.P. Morgan jointly

paid b 100,000 in 1902 for the American rights to the Parsons patent

lOOibid. Promotional brochure for "Turbina, 11 Deutsche Parsons
Marine A.G::-T902.
101BA/MA RM3/2109 Clipping from the Berliner Tageblatt of
2.15.04.

102Ibid.
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in order to power five quick trans-Atlantic steamers with 50,000 h.p.
Parsons' turbines. 103
In Germany, the Parsons case seemed the one exception in a naval
expansion otherwise dominated by German domestic industry.

Although

the turbine situation presented a problem for Tirpitz, it also
indicated something even more important.

Germany had finally reached

the stage of self-sufficiency that Stosch had hoped for thirty years
earlier.

For all intents and purposes the navy needed only home-based

firms and yards to fulfill Tirpitz's naval ambitions.

Even in the

case of the turbine, the position of the RMA did not seem nearly as
tenuous after 1902.

Nearly every German electrical firm and even a

few shipyards were in some way involved in research to upset the
dominance of Parsons.104 With the foundation of an affiliate of the
Parsons Co. in Germany, it was unlikely that the RMA would find itself
cut off from vital technical information in case of war.

Domestic

engineering expertise, coupled with the facilities of 11 Turbina 11 and
Brown and Boveri, would ensure independence in cases of extreme
necessity.
Other problems confronting the electrical finns and the RMA were
relatively minor.

The RMA was upset by frequent minor design

modifications required by some electri-cal hardware.

Often these were

lamps, lanterns and lighting fixtures found ineffective in their

103BA/MA RM3/2108 See fn. 113.
104w. Hubatsch, Kaiserliche Marine (Augsburg, 1975), 375-84.
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originally intended position.105 On-board electric dynamos, powered
by small turbines presented problems of space and stability.106 The
Construction Depar'tment feared that the Siemens companies were
approaching a monopoly of the installation of wireless telegraphy, but
the RMA still considered the amount of competition in the industry
sufficient. 107 Between 1902 and 1904, the RMA outfitted some forty-one
new and old ships with the latest forms of wireless telegraphy for
about 1,500 to 2,000 marks per ship.108 All the navy wanted was
strict adherence to the Suppliers List and the official guidelines for
wireless apparatus installation.109
The Germaniawerft began construction on the first RMA approved
U-boat in 1904.

By that time, three of Germany's top naval rivals

were far ahead in this area.

In 1903, the French boat 11 Forelle 11

successfully completed a three nautical mile test cruise, during
which the sixteen ton vessel simulated a submerged attack and returned
to base.

About three months later the German Kaiser saw the boat in

105BA/MA RM3/ll72 See 1171-72 passim, 1903-04.
l06BA/MA RM3/ll73 KWK to RMA Technical Dept., Berlin 10.3.02.
l07BA/MA RM3/1232 RMA Construction Dept., Berlin to Siemens
and Halske, Berlin 4.30.02. Construction Dept. to Weapons Division,
RMA (eight page memo), Berlin 1902.
l08BA/MA RM3/ll00 Dockyard Dept., section VII to section V,
RMA Berlin l .3.04.
109 rbi d. "Genera11 e Vorschri ften Uber Ei nri chtung van
Funkentelegraphenkammern, 11 Berlin 11.8.02.
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action and later his brother, Prince Heinrich, became the first
German officer to ride in a U-boat. 110
In the first few years of the new century the French led in
submarine development and offensive use.

France had forty-six U-boats

in service or under construction by 1904, manned by fifty-four
officers and 531 men and financed by a budget of 1,337,858 francs. 111
The Americans were not far behind in research and development, but the
U.S. Navy was a bit slower than France to find a strategic place for
the new vessels on the high seas.

The design perfected by Holland was

under production by 1897 and nine successful boats were manufactured
before the end of 1901, at an average cost of $700,000 per boat.

The

British approached the American inventor in 1902 with an eye toward
producing the new American boat in England under license.

The

Admiralty had already completed four submarines at state shipyards
and five others at Vickers• Sons and Maxim.112
In Germany only Krupp's work at Kiel made any genuine progress
with U-boats.

By 1904 an RMA memorandum testified to the lack of

official naval corrmitment in these matters and the secretive nature of
the work at the Germaniawerft. 113 Both of these were natural, for the

110H. Techel, Der Bau von Unterseebooten auf der Germaniawerft
(Munich, 1969), 5.
lllNauticus, 1904, 103-108.
112Ibid., 109-110. BA/MA RM3/3877 British Submarine Boat Co.,
Ltd., London to SS/RMA, Berlin 10.6.02. RM5/1947, passim; Comparative
notes on U-boat development in: France, Britain, U.S.A., Japan and
Germany.
113BA/MA RM5/1947 "Fortschritte im Bauder Unterseeboote," 1904.
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RMA was following Tirpitz 1 s dictum about minimal involvement in U-boat
work, and the Krupp Firm was always secretive about its research.
Between 1902 and 1904, however, the RMA s U-boat policy began to
1

crumble under domestic and international pressure.
Krupp built the first German U-boat prototype at Kiel under
the supervision of the French expert d Equevilley in 1902. 114 The
1

Krupp firm sought to rely on a bare minimum of subcontractors in
production in order to maximize profits, but it still had to procure a
light, reliable diesel engine for surface running from M.A.N., Fiat
(Turin), or Korting. Krupp spent the better part of the next decade
trying to surpass the designs these firms had to offer. 115
Essen first entered the U-boat market by applying for a German
patent to construct diesel-electric boats in 1904.11 6 The firm
imnediately encountered international competition at home and abroad.
The American based Lake Company was peddling the Ho 11 and "Protector"
class submarines in St. Petersburg, London, and Berlin. 117 Initially,
the Krupp Firm approached this challenge the same way it dealt with
Dillinger and Vulcan.

Max Rotger and other directors suggested

negotiations with the Lake Co. with an eye toward cooperation in
U-boat sales to the Tsar s navy.
1

They were resigned to a head-to-head

114H. Techel, op. cit., 5.
115Ibid., 21-22.
116Ibid., 5.
117sA/MA RM3/3877 See fn. 125.
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competition if Lake did not respond favorably. 118 Krupp was well
aware of the potential of the American vessel, having purchased a
Holland boat of a similar type for research purposes.119 The appeal
to Lake, however, was no more successful than their recent approach to
Vulcan.

Germaniawerft foreign sales were a minimal success, but they

were guaranteed a near monopoly at home now that Tirpitz was, however
reluctantly, realizing the need for this new type of weapon.

Between

1902 and the end of World War One, the Germaniawerft built 101
U-boats, 120 of which the RMA bought eighty-six. 121
With the beginning of construction on the U-1, the RMA Chief
quickly saw the need to educate his engineers and inspectors for work
with this new vessel.

In 1904 Tirpitz ordered the Technical Depart

ment to recruit engineers and to take some of its younger personnel,
on a volunteer basis, and subject them to an intensive course in the
niceties of U-boat construction.
Progress in Construction
The last pre-Dreadnought class of Gennan battleships was also
laid down between 1903 and 1905 .

The Deutschland Class included the

Hannover, Ponmern, Schlesien, Deutschland and Schleswig-Holsten. 122

118HA Krupp FAH IV C13 Rotger and Eccius, Essen to Hartmann,
Dresden 12.20.04.
119BA/MA RM5/1947 See fn. 126.
120H. Techel, op. cit., 101.
121E. Groner, op. cit., 40-45.
122All technical information on these vessels came from:
Groner, op. cit., 20-40; s. Breyer, op. cit., 262-263.
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Germaniawerft received the first and last ships while Vulcan and
Schichau would build the third and fourth, respectively.

The Imperial

Yard at Wilhelmshaven contracted for the S.M.S. Hannover for 24.2
million marks, the lowest price of the class by 130,000 marks.

The

five ships averaged about 14,000 tons and had a top speed of between
eighteen and nineteen knots.

Their main armament consisted of two

double 28 cm. turrets and fourteen 17 cm. guns along with a number of
smaller quick-firing cannon.

The final type of vessel built under the

financial auspices of the 1900 Naval Law was the U-1.
the RMA about 1.9 million marks and was ready by 1906.

This boat cost
It was

capable of 1,400 sea miles submerged at five knots.
By the time the U-1 was half-complete, the RMA was already
gearing up to supplement the old 1900 Naval Law.

The 1906 Supple

mentary Naval Law was the first of three pre-war bills of its kind
successfully presented to the Reichstag.

Tirpitz's continued good

fortune with the legislature gave him both the means to respond to
the H.M.S. Dreadnought and the money to perpetuate the new U-boat
program.
Summary
Between 1902 and 1904 a far more active and aggressive British
response to RMA ambitions destroyed the foundations of the Risk
Theory.

Tirpitz's position, however, remained strong because the

battleship retained its position as the master of the seas and
analyses of the Russo-Japanese War confirmed this turn of the century
dictum.

Outside the military establishment, the public still
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believed that an imperial policy and a strong navy went hand in hand
as part of the image of a great power.
It is difficult to determine Tirpitz's state of mind during
this period.

Politically astute and realistic, he certainly detected

the British change of policy.

His decision to explore the possibili

ties of the U-boat represented less an admission of a strategic flaw
than a stopgap measure to ensure German technological parity.
Rather, a combination of lasting capital ship predominance, an inner
imperative to challenge Britain, and the dependence of his position
and reputation on the Risk Theory allowed the true nature of events
to change with little noticeable reaction from the State Secretary .
In relations between industry and the RMA these three years
were characterized by an increasingly accepted routine.

The navy

was still expanding at a rapid pace, but the protocol system and
testing procedures were firmly established.

Industry was well aware

of the standards it had to meet and the extent to which the RMA would
go to insure compliance.

In some instances, the RMA even sought to

regulate not only its contractors, but also relationships between the
latter and their subcontractors as well.

On the one hand it became

clear that the RMA regarded any industrial contact involving naval
construction as its province.
On the other hand, Tirpitz's refusal to co111TJit the RMA to
research and development led to problems with the turbine and to
Krupp's prominence in the U-boat industry.

Despite these flaws, the

German naval-industrial relationship was rapidly producing a
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formidable high seas fleet, and the potential of domestic industry to
meet naval needs by 1904 far surpassed even Stosch's expectations.

CHAPTER IV
CRITICISM, CONTINUITY AND LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS:
1905-1908
From 1905 to 1908 Tirpitz began to confront an unusual degree
of opposition which openly criticized him for both his relentless
loyalty to the Risk Theory and his battleship strategy.

In spite of

scathing criticisms by Captain Persius, Admiral Galster and others,
Tirpitz kept to his course and struck back at his detractors.

He

successfully pushed two new supplements to the 1900 Naval Law
through the Reichstag in 1906 and 1908.

His aversion to the U-boat

prevailed, contrary to the growing popularity of the weapon in naval
circles, so there was no increased RMA commitment to U-boat develop
ment.

Thus, continuity prevailed as Rollmann replaced the retiring

Eickstedt as chief of the Construction Department in 1907.
The problems facing Rollmann were basically the same as those
which plagued his predecessor.

The annor monopoly was costing the

RMA more money and contributing to overruns beyond contract cost and
weight 1 imits.

The Parsons "Turbina" Company still completely

controlled the turbine industry in spite of efforts by Siemens,
A.E.G., Krupp and others.

Furthermore, the cost of building the

fleet was now rising more drastically.

Tirpitz became more conscious

of a need to give every advantage possible to the Imperial Shipyards
as the navy 1 s only alternative to private industry.

In the face of

a 20% to 25% rise in the Wholesale Price Index after 1905, and the
163
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usual degree of industrial price gouging, the RMA needed every
advantage it could muster.
Political Background
By 1906, the British had resolved to adjust themselves as the
The Director of British Naval Intelligence

naval scene required.

commented that Germany would soon surpass Russia as the principal
Baltic naval power.

He was certain that the Admiralty would shift the

focus of the two-power standard to France and Germany, rather than
France and Russia, as the next most powerful fleets. 1 Thus Ambassador
Metternich's 1905 comment that

11

No reasonable man here (i.e., Great

Britain) thinks of war against Germany" soon required amendment.2 The
Royal Navy was planning to match and perhaps surpass any further
German naval expansion.

The British did not want war any more than

Tirpitz did, but they were not willing to play blind man while the
State Secretary guided his fleet program through the "danger zone. 11
The change in the British political climate between 1902 and 1904
destroyed the international foundations of the Risk Theory.
Why then did Tirpitz continue as planned? That his reputation
and position rested on the Risk Theory was surely the strongest
motive.

Other ingredients reinforced his continued course of action.

Tirpitz was a die-hard proponent of a strategic offensive school of
naval thought that found commerce war repulsive.

He felt that

lp, Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, 251-52.
2Die Grosse Politik., op. cit., volume 19/2, No. 6159.
Metternich, London to Chancellor BUlow, Berlin 1. 11 .05, 375-77.
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Germany would have to hold the field against Britain sooner or later
in the imperial and economic arena.

The only way to force the British

to respect Germany's right to compete was to bloody the Royal Navy in
battle.

A commerce war was only a last resort, after the deciding

battle was already lost.

The best this strategy could accomplish in a
contest against Britain was to extract 11 a favorable peace, 11 and, as
far as Tirpitz was concerned, Germany required more than that. 3
In 1907, the cornnercial-war theories of the newly retired,
U-boat advocate Vice-Admiral Galster were achieving a larger following
among many high-ranking officers in the German navy.4 Others were
arguing that a battleship strategy could only succeed against Britain
in the restricted waters in the Belts north of Kiel and east of
Denmark.

Both of these points of view had flaws which Tirpitz

considered fatal.

He never regarded the U-boat as an important
primary weapon, and hence dismissed Galster. The 11 belts 11 strategy

depended on the occupation of Denmark to secure the fleet's western
flank for offensive operations.

In the event of war, the Army

General Staff refused to detach troops vital to the northern wing of
the Schlieffen Plan offensive against France for action in Denmark.
Beyond this problem, it was doubtful just how the British could be
drawn out of the North Sea and into the Belts region. 5

3BA/MA RM3/11710 Tirpitz to Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin 4.20.07.
4G. Ritter, Staatskunst, 192-93.

See below, pp. 178-183.

5p_ Kennedy, "German Naval Operations against England, 18961914,11 English Historical Review, 89 (No. 550, 1974), 71.
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Furthermore, the British introduction of the dreadnought
served Tirpitz as both an open challenge and a reaffirmation of the
battleship's future dominance in warfare.

The RMA did not occupy

itself with Galster s theories, but rather with new, all big-gun,
1

ship designs.

Between 1904 and 1906 the RMA produced three designs

for a ship of the dreadnought type.

Project lOA (1904) was a 14,000

ton ship with all heavy guns, but of two calibers.

In 1905, Project C

weighed 17,000 tons with eight heavy guns of a single caliber.

The

true forerunner of the Nassau Class dreadnoughts was Project G76, an
18,000 ton vessel with twelve heavy guns, drawn up in 1906. 6
Other pressures to continue the fleet program unchanged
existed besides technical and strategic considerations.

In spite of

doubts, public and private, voiced by people like Albert Ballin and
Friedrich van Hal stein, support for fleet expansion was still growing. 7
The membership of the German Fleet League rose to 330,044 by 1906
with the participation of 621,778 organizations. 8 The RMA News
Bureau was producing more fleet propaganda than ever in preparation
for the presentation of the 1906 Novelle to the Reichstag. 9

6s. Breyer, op. cit., 263.
7F. van Holstein, Geheimen Papiere . . . , vol. 4, 439-440.
Holstein to Bulow, Berlin 8.29.07. L. Cecil, Albert Ballin
(Princeton, 1967), 350-51. Ballin was the Director of the Hamburg
America Line (HAPAG).

Bw, Marienfeld, op. cit., 83.
9For example, see:
SS/RMA, Berlin 12.2.07.

BA/MA RM3/10148 News Bureau (Boy-Ed) to
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For the shipbuilding ind~stry it was just as important that the
Tirpitz construction plan continue.

The expansion of the shipyards

and new capital investments made by firms interested in considerable
profits were a direct result of Tirpitz's projections of naval needs.
The entire industry would experience a setback if these estimates were
sharply reduced.

The RMA s relationship with industry had developed
1

an identity and momentum of its own that encouraged Tirpitz to
continue his past policies and played a role in limiting the scope of
German diplomacy during these years as well. 10
Without increased funds, Tirpitz s future plans as well as
1

needed technological and design developments would come to nothing.
Before the launching of the Dreadnought he had already determined to
present two revisions of the 1900 Naval Law to the Reichstag.
first of these was scheduled for 1906, the second for 1908.

The
Together

their purpose was to tie the Reichstag to a much accelerated naval
construction program in spite of the immense increase in the cost of
naval hardware.

In this effort, Tirpitz received the wholehearted

support of the Kaiser.

While the State Secretary focused on getting

the fleet through the 11 danger zone, 11 the Kaiser was pleased with the
support Tirpitz's frequent political successes gave the aristocratic
political and social order in Imperial Germany.

It was therefore just

as important to him that each Law arouse public support and hamstring

1Ov. Berghahn, Germany and the Cami ng of \~ar in 1914 (New
York, 1973), 92.
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the Reichstag, as well as provide money for a more formidable
fleet. 11
In both 1906 and 1908 Tirpitz rode into the Reichstag on a wave
of RMA inspired Fleet League propaganda and his own detailed projec
tions of naval needs.

The navy was better able to impress the

Reichstag with its budget defense than was the army, with its piece
meal fashion of presenting its financial needs. 12 However, in his
desire for these 1906 and 1908 Naval Supplements, Tirpitz rarely
showed any willingness to understand the financial pressures bearing
down on the Reichstag and the Treasury Office.

He always felt, to the

regret of Chancellor von Billow and Treasury Secretaries von Stengel and von
Sydow,1 3 that the government's job was to find enough money to
support naval needs approved by the Reichstag.14

Perhaps closer

cooperation with the Imperial Treasury would have given him a better
picture of the government's future ability to finance naval
ambitions.

Tirpitz relied neither on other government agencies nor

on any single administration to perpetuate the construction program.
He adjusted his techniques to circumstances and increased RMA power
vis-a-vis other divisions of government whenever possible.

llv. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan, 474.
12p_ C. Witt, op. cit., 204.
l 3secretaries of the Imperial Treasury Office: Frei herr von
Stengel (1903~l 908) and Freiherr von Sydow ( 1908-1909).

14P. C. Witt, op. cit., 141.
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The Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900 did not stipulate a standard
rate of naval growth to Tirpitz's satisfaction.

Thus the Supple

mentary Laws of 1906 and 1908 were designed to do just that.

These

laws changed the rate of replacement of battleships from twenty-five
to twenty years and accelerated the proposed construction schedule far
beyond this replacement rate.15 As usual, Tirpitz employed the
personal touch in Reichstag relations in order to support and promote
the image of naval power as a vital element in Germany's political and
economic growth.

In 1902 he had a large Reichstag contingent brought

to England to witness, with Germany's military representatives, the
naval review for the coronation of King Edward VII.

He continued to

keep many of the Reichstag people in touch with impressive signs of
naval power at home and abroad.

During the debate over the 1908

Supplementary Law, he provided tours for some of the wavering deputies
to naval bases, shipyards and even some of the newer capital ships. 16
In one case, the RMA took the Reichstag Budget Committee on a
tour of the Schichauwerft in Danzig to evaluate plant facilities,
materials, labor and working conditions.

This trip was not one of the

usual jaunts designed to impress possible political supporters.

The

Budget Committee was out to get a first-hand estimate of increasing costs at
one of the larger private shipyards. 17 Prices were rising very quickly,

11

15A. Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 1, 203.
Begrundung zur Novelle 1908. 11

BA/MA RM3/6674

16w. Deist, Flottenpolitik, 99.
17G.W.F. Hallgarten, Imperialismus, vol. 2 (Munich, 1963),
544.
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and the further increase in size, artillery and the amount of armor
for dreadnought types was the major issue in the 1908 debate.
Between 1905 and 1909 the price of a battleship rose nearly
96 %; the price of heavy cruisers, 107%.

Part of this can be accounted

for by a 20%to 25% rise in the German wholesale price index.

However,

responsibility for this drastic price increase rests with a number of
factors, among them increased production costs and profit taking.

A

battleship that cost 24 million marks in 1905 was 47 million by the
time the 1908 Supplementary Law was under debate. 18 A look at the
RMA's first installment payment on the Nassau (1907) and the Helgeland
(1908) Classes gives a good indication of the rapidity of rising
costs.

A.G. Weser received an opening payment of 12.02 million marks

for the S.M.S. Westfalen in 1907.

One year later the S.M.S.

Thuringen's first installment topped that figure by 2,681,000 marks.19
Both of these vessels were built at the same shipyard.

The artillery

and armor costs determined by the Krupp-Dillinger alliance accounted
for a substantial portion of these increases.

In 1905 armor and

artillery alone were between 30% and 40% of the entire cost of a
capital ship.20

l8p_ C. Witt, op. cit., 142.
19 BA/MA RM3/3609 RMA Inter-office correspondence:
Dept. to Dockyard Dept., Berlin 2.20.05.

Budget

20BA/MA RM3/2528 11 Notiz zum Immediatbericht, betreffend
Vergebung der Li nienschiffe 1907. 11 RM3/578 Construction Dept. to
Central Division, RMA, Berlin 6.25.08.
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The costs of running the RMA were rising as well.

In 1908 the

budget for 340 top administrative personnel amounted to over l .2
million marks. 21 No section of the RMA was content with the size of
its staff as compared with the job they were expected to do.22
Besides the numbers, wages were rising across the board.

Within the

RMA it was fairly easy to impose controls, but private individuals
under contract to· the navy and workers throughout the shipbuilding
industry were demanding more pay.

Foundry workers at Krupp were

awarded an eight pfennig per hour raise in 1908. 23
The other RMA budget priority, besides shipbuilding, was the
expansion and modernization of the Imperial Naval Yards.

By 1905 their

facilities were broadened and future plans emphasized the further
specialization of each yard.

Every Imperial Shipyard had its coal and

oil storage capacity increased as well as its facilities for stock
piling explosives, supplies, and ship parts.
Danzig was slated as a U-boat yard and a repair base for light
cruisers.

Kiel would be the central base for all torpedo work, and

its ability to handle capital ships was substantially augmented by
1908.

The property owned by the navy at Brunsbuttel, adjacent to the

Kiel yard, was developed into part of the yard.

Wilhelmshaven was

21BA/MA RM3/2499 RMA Budget for 1909 (Chapter 45 of the pre
pared budget presented in 1908).
22Ibid. For example, see: RMA Inter-office correspondence:
Construction Dept. to Budget Dept., Berlin 6.5.08.
23HA Krupp WA VII fll04 11 Arbeiter-Lohnstatistik vom l. Januar
1911-31. Dezember 1917. 11 Raises, per person, per day: 1908/09 =
.08 marks; 1909/10 = .08 marks; 1910/11 = .13 marks.
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largely left as it was, the primary place for battleship construction
among the three.

Like the others, its capacity for fuel and

explosives was also increased.24 These improvements required large
yearly appropriations over the entire period before the war.25
Tirpitz exploited every possible theme in his efforts to secure
the passage of both fleet law supplements.
pinpointed as the main adversary abroad.
11

England was publically
Tirpitz argued that the

danger zone 11 and the fear of 11 copenhagening 11 would disappear only if

the navy adopted a three-ship-per-year building tempo.

Tirpitz

targeted the opposition of the Progressives and the SPD for propaganda
attacks in the press,26 and he was once again convincing in political
debate.

The Reichstag passed the Supplementary Naval Laws on 5 June

1906 and 6 April 1908.27
The 1906 Law increased the Foreign Service Fleet by five heavy
cruisers and the Reserve Fleet by one.28 The more important of the
two laws, however, was the 1908 supplement.

This Law established both

the three ship construction tempo and a twenty year service life for
every ship.

For all intents and purposes this created a construction

24BA/MA RM3/3610 11 Denkschrift betreffend den Ausbau der
Werften. Stand im Mai 1908 und nachstliegende Zukunftsbedurfnisse, 11
Berlin 5. 16.08.
25BA/MA RM3/3608, 3609, 3610 passim.
26v. Berghahn, Tirpitz Plan, 485 ff.
27For the debates on the passage of the 1906 and 1908 supple
ments, see the Reichstagsverhandlungen for both 6.25.06 and 4.6.08
and the session just before these dates.
28Hurd & Castle, op. cit., 335.
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rate of four ships per year between new projects and replacements.29
This was the peak of Tirpitz s building program.
1

Between 1906 and

1912 the bulk of Germany s most effective capital ships joined the
1

fleet.
Research and Development:

Dreadnoughts and U-Boats

The revolution in ship design caused by the appearance of the
H.M.S. Dreadnought in 1906 caused the RMA to reevaluate naval
architecture, gunnery, and propulsion.30 von

Eickstedt shared the

determination of his chief that the navy should have practical and
effective weapons at a minimum cost.

They accelerated research on new

vessel designs at the Kiel Technical Institute, where the navy made
stress tests on .hull designs and cooperated with firms like Zeiss
Optical and Siemens on special instruments and gauges.
The RMA also planned to locate a new research institute at
Berlin Marienfelde31 and another for materials testing in Stuttgart.
The latter would complement those at Charlottenberg, the Berlin
Technische Hochscule, and the Purchasing Department offices in
DUsseldorf, Essen and Berlin.32 RMA technical personnel made mandatory
trips to these centers and the facilities of private companies to
29Ibid., 336.
30BA/MA RM3/1002-1015 passim.
31BA/MA RM3/1006 11 Denkschrift Uber die Notwendigkeit einer
Marine-Versuchsanstalt, 11 Berl in 10.11.07. RM3/l008 passim.
32BA/MA RM3/2204 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
7. 21 .07.
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improve their skills in the increasingly complex fields related to
ship construction. 33 At the Imperial Yards the RMA kept lists of
independent commercial and private research projects of possible
interest to the navy.34
In their joint research and experimentation, industry and the
RMA encountered few of the difficulties plaguing them during standard
construction projects.

The results of the research at Kiel, Berlin

and Danzig not only benefitted the navy, but also meant new business
for the firms involved.

Here the navy found less of the tension

usually found in government, military and business circles.

There

was a wide variety of specialized products competing for navy approval.
These research efforts were also of interest to other divisions of
the German government.35 The Ministry of Public Works, for example,
was a major source of funds for the work at the Research Center for
Shipbuilding and Hydraulics in Berlin.36 This relative hannony served
the navy well in the years before the S.M.S. Nassau, Germany's first
dreadnought style battleship, was laid down.
The RMA was aware that it was difficult to keep new ship
designs secret.

It was obvious that every naval power would now seek

33BA/MA RM3/2067 passim. RM3/2066 passim.
to Dockyard Dept., RMA, Berlin 6.20.06.

For example:

KWW

34For example, see the case of the Finn Posnansky and Strelitz
doing work on insulation materials: BA/MA RM3/2249 KWD to RMA,
Berl in l . 14. 03.
35BA/MA RM3/l003 passim.
36Ibid.
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to copy the design of the British all big-gun ship.

However, the RMA

intended not to copy the British, but rather to create a ship that
would best fit German needs vis-a-vis the Royal Navy in the North Sea
and the Baltic.

Thus the designs that ultimately resulted in the

Nassau and Helgoland Classes anc' the battlecruiservon derTann were
different enough to require a greater amount of secrecy than ever
before.

Designs were solicited from private firms and developed by

the navy.37

In a note to Gennaniawerft and Vulcan on this matter, the

RMA reminded firms who might become involved in the construction of
new designs "to maintain the greatest discretion regarding everything
pertaining to our ships of the line. 11 38 As the development of new
designs progressed the same secrecy reigned in the preparation of the
publications that revealed all design specifications and RMA construc
tion requirements to each shipyard and vendor.39
One of the areas in which the RMA initially departed from
British design was in the choice of heavy guns for the Nassau Class.
The H.M.S. Dreadnought carried 30.5 cm guns but the Gennan navy
initially favored a gun of a smaller caliber.

In 1905 and 1906, the

RMA did a good deal of research into the potential of the 21, 24 and
the bigger 28 cm. guns.40 The result was a move away from the old

37BA/MA RM3/329 RMA Construction Dept. to Weapons Division,
August 1905.
38BA/MA RM3/2528 RMA, Berlin to Vulcan, Stettin, Gennaniawerft,
Kiel 12.4.06.
39BA/MA RM3/2531 SS/RMA to Construction Dept., Berlin 10.2.06.
40BA/MA RM3/348 Marine Oberbaurat Prof. Otto Kretschner,
Baden-Baden to RMA, Berlin,August 1905.
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mid-range 21 and 24 cm. weapons in favor of a uniform big-gun
design. 41 However, the RMA rejected at first the 30.5 as its main
weapon.

The new Krupp 28 cm., 45 caliber model was not only as

effective as the 30.5, but also lighter and cheaper to produce.42
This weapon was designed by the Krupp Firm in 1907 as an
improvement on the 40 caliber 1901 type.

Although the 30.5 was

selected for the 1908 Helgoland Class and van derTann, the choice of
the smaller gun for the first German dreadnoughts was revealing.
Tirpitz was not simply out to copy the British.

Rather, decisions of

this sort took into account the needs of a German fleet with sub
stantial budget restrictions that nonetheless required a ship to
match the H.M.S. Dreadnought.

Speed, armor protection and firepower

were needed in harmonious balance.

Thus the 28 cm. gun was only one

factor in designing a ship like the S.M.S. Nassau.
presented the challenge.

The British

The form of the response was entirely an

RMA creation.
A wide variety of improvements went into the new capital ship
designs.

Max Krause, the Director of the Borsig Mining and Foundry

Company, presented a new design for the mounting of torpedo nets on
the sides of the ship that reduced the possibility of tangles, slack,
rust, and other problems occurring during deployment.43 The RMA also

41BA/MA RM3/357 Construction Dept. to SS/RMA, Berlin 6. 10.05.
42BA/MA RM3/577 RMA, Berlin 4.18.07. "Armierung der 1908
Linienschiffe an Seiner Excellenz dem Herrn Staatsekretar vorzulegen. 11
43BA/MA RM3/302 Max Krause to RMA, Berlin 3.1 .05.
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received a favorable consensus from the private shipyards on a new
method of hull construction which combined an oblique alignment of
steel plate on the surface with double wall construction.

Both of

these measures provided a better defense against torpedoes.44

Every

aspect of naval architecture and every sort of ship system was under
review.
One badly needed improvement had to wait for further explora
tion.

The increasing weight of capital ships required a better form

of propulsion.

The obvious answer--the turbine engine--was not yet

ready for use in the larger ships.

The engine was first successfully

adapted to a German battleship in the 1909 Kaiser Class.

Meanwhile,

the conventional engines required to power the new dreadnoughts used
an extraordinary amount of room.45
For the shipyards, this was also a time of increased activity.
In 1905, many of them could not build the new battleships because
their slips were not wide enough.

All six of the major private yards

began a crash program of alterations to their facilities.

In spite of

some efforts to claim certain wide berth construction techniques as
private property, 46 all of the firms adjusted well.

By early 1906

44BA/MA RM3/279 Correspondence between RMA and Vulcan,
Howaldtswerke, Blohm und Voss, Schichau, Gennaniawerft, and Weser
Nov.-Dec., 1907.
45BA/MA RM3/361 11 Denkschrift betreffend Erhohung der
Geschwindigkeit der kleinen Kreuzer, 11 Berlin 12.16.05.
46BA/MA RM3/331 Schiffsfonn Guljaeff, Kiel to SS/RMA,
Berl i n 10 . 2 . 06 .
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Vulcan was already using its new Hamburg facility, and the other five
private yards were ready to construct ships with berths from 20 to 41
meters.

Weser was the smallest of the six with a 20 to 30 meter capacity

and Vulcan the largest, covering up to 41 meters.47 Among the Imperial
Yards, only Wilhelmshaven could accorrmodate the larger ships.

The

increased specialization of the Imperial Yards evolved as a result of
their varying abilities to build certain types of vessels well.

Thus

Wilhelmshaven built every battleship assigned to an Imperial Yard
through 1914 save for the S.M.S. Kaiser.

The RMA then limited both

Danzig and Kiel to Li-boats and mid-sized vessels.
Thanks to the 1906 and 1908 Supplementary Naval Laws, the pace
of the U-boat program quickened.
this period.
scarce.
per year.

Eleven boats were laid down during

Naval money for research and development was less

In 1905 and 1906 the latter amounted to l .5 million marks
For the next two years the figure rose at one million per

year, finally leaping to five million marks in 1909.48 By his
statements at the time, and the array of technical faults he later
attributed to the first Li-boats in his memoirs, Tirpitz showed

47BA/MA RM3/330 Correspondence between RMA and the major
private yards, Dec. 1905-Jan. 1906. Hurd &Castle, op. cit., 322.
48E. Rossler, Die Deutsche U-Bootbau bis Ende des 1. Weltkriege
(Munich, 1979), 35. BA/MA RM3/4915 11 Denkschrift zum Immediatvortrag
betreffend Entwicklung des U-Boots-wesens" Berlin 9.10.09. BA/MA
RM5/l947 11 Fortschritte im Bau der Unterseeboote, 11 1905. C.-A.
Gemzell, op. cit., 62.
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consistency in his negative attitude. 49

In spite of the considerable

level of performance achieved by the U-1 and foreign boats he kept
the RMA 1 s investment in the weapon restricted:
I refused to throw away money on submarines so long as they
could only cruise in home waters, and therefore would be of
no use to us; as soon as seagoing boats were built, however,
I was the first to encourage them on a large scale, and, in
spite of the financial restrictions imposed upon me, I went
as far as the limits of our technical oroduction would
pennit.50
·
The needs of Tirpitz's battleships defined the limits of the RMA
commitment to the U-boat.

During his tenure as State Secretary,

Tirpitz made no secret that his interest in the U-boat was merely as
a possible auxiliary to the battleship.

In a Reichstag session in

January of 1908, Tirpitz listened to Progressive representative
Lionhart's favorable evaluation of a pamphlet on the U-boat and
conmerce war by Vice Admiral (ret.) Galster.

The State Secretary

responded that he was not going to suddenly convert to the gospel
according to Galster:

11

If the honorable representative believes

that, then he is badly misled. 11 51
Indeed, Tirpitz treated the opponents of his strategic ideas
ruthlessly.

He classified officers like Galster, Franz Rust, Kurtvon

Maltzahn and Lothar Persius as enemies of the navy and had their

49A. Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 2, 572.
50ibid., vol. l, 138.
5lsA/MA RM3/ll603 Handakten von Gohren, 11 U-Bootsdebatten im
Plenum und in der Budgetkommission von 1904-1914. 11
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writings banned while they were still in the service.52 After retire
ment, however, Lothar Persius was an ever present foe.

His series of

books and articles praising the possibilities of the U-boat in a
commercial war was severely critical of Tirpitz.

In the middle of the

First World War, when Tirpitz's theories were finally discredited and
he was forced into retirement, Persius administered a journalistic
coup de grace.

He indicted Tirpitz's strategic dogma and blamed him

for Germany's ill preparedness in 1914 to fight a U-boat war in a
booklet entitled 11 The Tirpitz Legend. 1153 When Persius began writing
and the first U-boats were built, however, Tirpitz was still in the
forefront among the world's naval leaders and the battleship was the
acknowledged king.
Of the boats built before 1908, the Imperial Yard at Danzig
received the U-2, 3, 4 and 9 through 12.

The Germaniawerft and its

U-boat chief, Techel, were give~ boats 5 through 8 after completing
the U-1 in 1906.54 Krupp charged 1.9 million marks for the U-1 and

52c.-A. Gemzell, op. cit., 60-61.
53BA/MA RM3/9754 See Persius' work:

11

Die Tirpitz Legende, 11

1918.
54All technical information taken from: E. Groner, op. cit.,
40. Oberingenieur Techel: in charge of U-boat construction at the
Germaniawerft from 1907 to 1918. His work with the Krupp finn
extended back to 1895. HA Krupp WAXa 4,187. Gennaniawerft
Direktorium 1909: Bauer, HUber, Steinike, Toussaint and Richter.
The last replaced Korvette Capt. Ritter von Mann, later head of
the U-Booteamt and SS/RMA, who was the shipyard's liaison with the
navy. See: F. Krupp A.G. ed., Handbuch (Essen, 1906 and 1909).
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the more sophisticated 5-8 series cost an average of 2.57 million.
was usually the case, Danzig's Loats were substantially cheaper.

As
The

U-2 was 1.5 million, the U-3 and 4 about 300,000 more and the later
9-12 series, 2.2 million.

All of these boats displaced between 3. 13

and 3.55 tons, and the cruising radius, even in the later models,
varied very little.

The U-1 was capable of 1400 sea miles at ten

knots on the surface.

Its successors were capable of 1600 to 1900 sea

miles at between twelve and fourteen knots.

The electric motors of

the U-1 through 4 could propel these boats submerged for 50 to 55
sea miles at 4.5 or 5 knots.

The better electrical systems on the U-5

through 12 increased the submerged radius to 80 sea miles at a
standard 5 knot speed.
At the same time, the RMA initiated work on many U-boat related
projects and facilities.

In 1906, when the fortification of Helgoland

began in earnest, the navy built dock facilities to accommodate ninety
torpedo boats and eighteen Li-boats along with considerable shore
batteries to protect the installation.55 The RMA also purchased more
time for U-boat work at the Center for Shipbuilding and Hydraulics in
Berlin.56 One step that Tirpitz refused to take was the employment of
an independent firm to increase the output of U-boat torpedoes.

He

found the quality and workmanship at the navy's torpedo work station
in Friedricksort far superior to the best private manufacturer,

55w. Hubatsch, Der Admiralstab, 121.
56BA/MA RM3/l004 RMA to Ruchshauptkasse, Berlin 5.28.06.
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Schwartzkopf.

Thus the RMA gave more money to Friedrichsort to

increase its production, and the torpedo work station supplied all of
the navy's torpedoes until the outbreak of the war.57
Germany was far behind its major naval rivals in the number of
Li-boats in service or on order.

In 1904 the international U-boat

situation was su1T111ed up by a British report in the following way:

Britain
France
Germany
Russia
Italy
U.S.A.
Japan

Completed

Under Construction

8

11
13
0
14

26
1*
1
1

2

0
0

8

0

* The U-1 was actually still under construction. 58
All of the major naval powers were beginning to take notice of the
U-boat in varying degrees, save Japan.

However, only the French were

casting the new underwater weap0n in a major strategic role and
adjusting the composition of their fleet accordingly.

In 1906,

French naval experts submitted the following projections of naval
needs through 1919 to the Senate:

34 battleships and 36 cruisers;

109 torpedo boats for defense and 170 more for offensive operations;
and 49 defensive and 82 offensive U-boats.59

57A. Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 1, 38-39.
58BA/MA RM3/3686 11 Fleets (Great Britain and Foreign Countries), 11
London 1904 (official publication).
59BA/MA RM3/1050 Marine Attach~, Paris to SS/RMA, Berlin
4.10.06.
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The French obviously agreed with those in the German navy who
saw value in the strategic doctrines of Galster and Persius.

The

corm1ercial war strategy, for which the U-boat was so well suited, was
an integral part of French naval thought.
in Germany.

The same was not the case

Tirpitz 1 s views were not free from attack, but they

showed few signs of succumbing to those of the U-boat advocates.
Protocol System Revisions, Overruns in Time, Cost, and Weight
The substantial increases in construction between 1905 and 1908
necessitated revision of the Protocol System to streamline inspection
procedures and supervisory methods.

The revision of the publications

governing construction and product quality often caused difficulties
for the yards because some specifications changed while projects were
under way.

Although Weser, the Germaniawerft, and the Imperial Yard

at Danzig voiced their dissatisfaction to the RMA,60 the RMA required
the continued excellence of materials that the revised booklet
guaranteed.

Thus the occasional delay they caused seemed worthwhile.

The General Construction Guidelines were also revised during
these years for the first time since the First Naval Law was passed.
The RMA solicited suggestions from the Imperial Yards, naval
inspectors, and private firms. 61

According to the Construction

Department, it was not changed merely for the sake of change but

60BA/MA RM3/278 Weser, Bremen to RMA, Berlin 1.23.05.
RM3/280 passim.
61Ibid.

KWW:

Suggestions for revision of the ABB, 1908.
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11

The revisions of the construction manuals, weight specifications,

etc., will strive for clarity, lucidity and an ability to exert
control. 11 62
New editions of the Suppliers List appeared in 1905 and 1907.63
Some firms, like Postler Chemical of Dresden, did not appear thanks to
information on illegal business practices supplied by the regional
government. 64 In the case of the Firm of Wilhelm Meyerholz, false
representation was the issue.

It turned out to be an approved company

actually acting as a clearing house for finns not listed in the
Suppliers List.65 This information came to the RMA courtesy of the
Hannover Chamber of Corrmerce.
In many instances, a better product was achieved in each
category of the List by strictly limiting many firms to the areas of
their expertise.66

Purging as many weak finns as possible from each

category enabled contractors an~ the RMA to focus immediately on the
best ones in any given field.

Knowing their suppliers also enabled

RMA officials to pick out new areas in which certain firms might be
useful in the future.

The editing process even addressed the problem

62BA/MA RM3/ll82 BBS, Stettin-Bredow to RMA Construction
Dept., nerlin 2.29.08. RM3/6009 "Return to KI," Berlin 4.28.06.
63BA/MA RM3/2296 1905 Edition of the Suppliers List.
64BA/MA RM3/2299 Postler and Co., Dresden to RMA, Berlin
11 . 0. 08.
65Ibid.

KWW to RMA, Berlin 6.16.08.

66Ibid.

KWK to RMA, Berlin 7.19.09.
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of unfair competition within the List's categories, but the RMA never
found a completely satisfactory solution to that problem.67
The Imperial Yards frequently received a special advantage by
the way the RMA employed the Supplier's List.

Blohm und Voss once

complained about having only one contractor at its disposal,
Siemens-Schuckertwerke, to install the electrical system in the
battlecruiser S.M.S. van der Tann.

Angrily, the Hamburg shipyard

observed that the Imperial Yards could choose from A.E.G., S.S.W.,
Felton and Guilleaueme or any other finn listed in the Suppliers List.
The RMA replied that it restricted Blohm und Voss because with
Siemens-Schuckert doing most of the ship's electrical work the yard
could achieve a uniformity impossible with two or three contractors.
Of course, the RMA also knew that the choice gave the Imperial Ship
yards the opportunity to reduce their overhead.

The latter always had

priority in choosing the best vendor at the cheapest price.68 They
also received first notification of any new addition to the Suppliers
List and early results of product tests.69 As public institutions in
an economic system that supplied every possible freedom to the private
sector, the Imperial Yards needed artificially created advantages to
keep pace.

The RMA obliged, and, coupled with the ongoing expansion

67BA/MA RM3/2296 Construction Dept. report on financial
difficulties confronting Becker and Ulmann, Berlin 8.31 .05. RM3/2297
Carl Stoeckicht A.G., Frankfurt a. M. to RMA, Berlin 2.2.07.
68Jbid.

Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin 9.28.09.

69BA/MA RM3/2296 KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
10.17.05.
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of the facilities of the Imperial Yards, it preserved in these yards
a safety valve against higher prices at the private yards.
Businesses often informed the RMA that its protocol controls
and tests were too restrictive.

Mix and Genest protested that

suppliers to the Imperial Yards were getting preferential treatment,70
and that the time required for the testing of finished products was
too lengthy.

The RMA insisted on the tests and urged the firms to

notify the Purchasing Office earlier regarding a product's impending
completion.71

Given the fact that every product needed to undergo

testing the RMA frequently asked firms to build an extra ten days to
two weeks into their construction schedules to avoid delays and
possible late delivery.72 The larger firms, like Krupp, continued to
complain loudly, but to no avail.73 A memorandum from the Construction
Inspectorate in Hamburg was a bit too effusive in its praise for the
protocol system, but the officer's point was clear.
of cases the system worked well for the RMA. 74

In the majority

One of the most difficult things for the RMA to accomplish was
the precise definition of its role in business affairs.

The leaders

70BA/MA RM3/2076 A. G. Mix und Genest, Berlin-Schonberg to
SS/RMA, Berlin 10.28.16.
71 Ibid.
72BA/MA RM3/7618 Kaiserliche Marine Deutsche Seewarts, Hamburg
to Nautical Section, RMA, Berlin 11.8.06.
73BA/MA RM3/6009 Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA,
Berlin 2.11.08.
74sA/MA RM3/348 BBS, Hamburg to Construction Dept., RMA,
Berl in 2. 11.08.
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of industry involved in shipbuilding found the naval construction
program's promise of substantial profits attractive, but they resisted
any government interference in their affairs.

Emil Kirdorf wrote a

scathing letter to Chancellor van BUlow in 1905 during some labor
trouble in the Ruhr accusing him of not only interference, but
actions less than friendly to industry.75 Most industrialists
expected support and encouragement from the government and a minimum
of actual involvement in private business affairs.

In some instances,

industry and the State were actually partners as both Prussian state
and private coal mines belonged to the Rheinisch-Westfalischen Coal
Syndicate.76 However, the preservation of privacy and the independent
nature of industry's affairs was part of the business leader's expec
tations of government.
Just before his retirement as head of the RMA Construction De
partment in 1907, Vice-Admiral von Eickstedt declared that the RMAcould
never take a neutral stand in business matters directly relating to
naval projects.77 Although the industry often complained bitterly,
Tirpitz and Eickstedt placed the RMA in the role of partner in every
business transaction resulting from contracts granted by the navy.

750. Fricke, "Eine Denkschrift Krupps aus dem Jahre 1912 uber
den Schutz der Arbeitswilligen. 11 Zeitschrift fUr Geschichtswissenschaft,
VI (1957), 1250-53.
76Ibid., 1253.
77BA/MA RM3/6009 Construction Dept. to Legal Section, RMA,
Berlin 10.22.07.
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Rear Admiral Rollmann,78 Eickstedt's successor, also believed that it
was naive to think that industry would place the interests of the navy
first. Rear Admiral von Usedom, the director of the Imperial Yard at
Kiel, asserted in a memo to the Construction Departlllent in 1906 that the
force driving industry in naval construction was anything but
patriotism.

Its first concern was the possible profit in any project,

not whether the best product was built for the RMA.79

Thus, in spite

of frequent complaints from the business community, the RMA's role was
not that of ally or bystander.

Tirpitz and his associates cast the

RMA as an "interested party" in every business transaction with full
authority to interfere if the navy was not properly served.
Ultimately, the RMA administration in Berlin was the arbiter
between all of the scattered branches of the naval construction
program, as it alone had the authority to step in and smooth over any
sort of disagreement among its diverse officers and experts. 80
The RMA's policies all indicated that time was of the essence.
The longer it took to build each ship the greater the risk of con
fronting Britain before Tirpitz felt the fleet was ready.

Both France

and Germany trailed Britain in the amount of time used to construct a
capital ship.

What took the French between fifty and sixty months to

78see Appendix: Rollmann.
79 von Usedom: Captain 9.18.1899 (Rangliste 1904-07); Rear
Admiral 3. 14.05, Director of .KWK; BA/MA RM3/ll76 KWK to Construction
Dept., RMA, Berlin 2.19.06.
80BA/MA RM3/4851 Kommando der Marine Station der Ostee, Kiel
to SS/RMA, Berlin 8.28.07 and 9.21.05.
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accomplish took thirty-six months in Germany and only twenty-four
months in Britain. 81 In his analysis of the French situation, Rollmann
believed that their shipyards had too little money, too complex designs,
and subcontractors who took their time with deliveries.

The French also

suffered from a problem the RMA frequently encountered--personnel
shortages.

Rollmann, the new head of the RMA Construction Department,

knew all of these problems well.

His response was to give the

Construction Inspectorate and the various technical inspectors on each
project greater freedom to deal with daily problems.82
The goal both Rollmann and Tirpitz had in mind was to draw
Germany closer to the construction times of British yards.

In 1906,

the German shipyards were still in the thirty-three to forty-nine month
range for battleships and heavy cruisers.

The year before, the

Devenport yard in Britain built the H.M.S. Montague in thirty-nine
months and the Brown Company finished the H.M.S. Hindustan in thirty
two months.

Both of these represented the maximum times usually

invested in British ships.83 Tirpitz judged that faster construction
would offer economies as well as the obvious political advantage.
Some of the private yards argued that a quicker pace could drive costs

81BA/MA RM3/l05l RMA Construction Dept. Report:
Bauzeit der franzosischen Neubauten, 11 Berlin 6.10.08.

"Lange

82 Ibid.
83BA/MA RM3/6672 RMA Construction Dept. Report:
der Schiffbauzeiten, 11 Berlin 1.24.06.
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up rather than down. 84 The RMA chief was convinced, however, that the
advantage of speed was worth the risk.
Probably the most difficult area in which to conserve time was
artillery and armor.

In an optimistic note, the Weapons Division

presented a 1905 memo on methods the RMA could use to reduce
construction time.

Minor efficiencies could shave off at least two

months, while improvement in material and delivery times and shakedown
procedures might save from thirty-six to twenty-four months and have a
ship in service, complete with the shakedown, before the 33rd month. 85
The officials at the Weapons Division felt that these improvements
were possible by 1907.

However, Krupp was still projecting six to

eight months for guns and armor installation during this period,
pushing these optimistic estimates to at least twenty-seven months,
sometimes thirty-two.

Then the ship still faced a lengthy shakedown

cruise. 86
Krupp and Dillinger often slowed construction schedules by
delivering their armor or guns late.

Dillinger retarded the S.M.S.

Pommern project at Vulcan to such an extent that the latter complained
to the RMA, mentioning the incident in a report to the Kaiser. 87 The

84For example, see:
Berlin 12. 14.05.

BA/MA RM3/499 Shichau, Danzig to SS/RMA

85BA/MA RM3/6672 Weapons Division to Budget Dept., Berlin
12.23.05.
11

86rbid. Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 1.8.06.
Termine fUr Lieferung van Schiffsarmierung . 11

Regarding:

87BA/MA RM3/523 Construction Dept.: "Denkschrift zum Irrmediat
vortrag Uber die Fertigstellung des Linienschiffes Pommern, 11 5.26.04.
RM3/522 Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 11 .3.06.
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Construction Department addressed itself to this problem by ordering
that the yards alter their construction techniques to allow armor
installation to begin earlier in the building process.88 However,
the success of any time saving measure relied on more punctual
delivery by the firms and a greater amount of cooperation between
them.

In the case of the S.M.S. Schlesien, Dillinger managed to

cooperate closely with Schichau.89 The opposite was more usually the
case, as with the Krupp portion of the S.M.S. Schlesien's armor.
Schichau director Ziese told two Reichstag representatives on a
fact-finding tour of the Elbing yard that he would need only twenty
two months to complete a capital ship if Krupp would meet its armor
deadlines.90 Here, the RMA could only apply the few pressures within
its power and hope for a favorable result.
In other areas, the RMA was also hard pressed to keep projects
on schedule.

Firms often pointed to the time wasted while waiting

for quality tests by the Purchasing Office, Construction Inspectorate
or other naval inspectors.

A shortage of Purchasing Office personnel

was one major source of lost time.

Rollmann was pleased with the

88BA/MA RM3/6009 Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin, to the Legal
Section 10.22.07.
89BA/MA RM3/6673 11 Denkschrift uber Verkurzung der Bauzeiten
und Verbilligung der Baukosten bei den Schiffsneubauten nach den
Ausfuhrungen van Schichau, 11 Berlin 12.2.08.
90ibid. Geheime Konmerzienrat Ziese, Elbing to SS/RMA,
Berlin 6.19.08.
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performance of his men, but he badly needed more.91

This problem

reduced Purchasing Office promptness and flawed the Protocol System.92
More frequently, slowdowns in inspection were the result of defective
products which required a series of different probes to discover the
exact nature of the problem and its solution.93 The RMA had sought to
remedy these problems by increasing its requests for technical personnel
and using the Suppliers List to eliminate firms which proved a liability
to the construction program.
Cost and weight overruns continued, but were greatly reduced in
degree.

The amounts of time, extra money, and weight involved were

smaller because of RMA controls.

However, the problem was a long way

from solution.
The last of the Braunschweig and Deutschland Classes were still
giving the RMA difficulty.

In some instances the yard was forced to

absorb extra costs, but this was rare.

The Germaniawerft agreed to pay

an extra 200 marks on a small overrun incurred on the S.M.S. Deutschland,
but that was about as generous as Krupp ever was. 94 On the same ship,
the RMA paid an extra 17,900 marks for alterations to the conmand

9llbid.
92 Ibid.

Rollmann to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.4.08.
Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 3.27.08.

93lbid. Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin 1 .17.08.
RM3/348 BBS, Blohm und Voss-Hamburg to Construction Dept., RMA,
Berlin 2.11.08.
94BA/MA RM3/489 RMA, Berlin to Vulcan, Stettin 2.24.05.
RM3/5ll Construction Dept.: 11 Gutachten zum Sonderbericht des Schiffs
PrUffungs-Kommission betreffend Bekohlungseinrichtungen S.M.S.
Deutschland, 11 1907.
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bridge. 95 Yet the RMA was rejecting certain overrum claims with a
slightly higher degree of regularity.

In the case of the S.M.S.

Preussen, it refused to allow an additional 3,972 marks and 1,400 kg
in clothing, hammocks and living supplies for the crew. 96 However, the
small amounts were still adding up to a disturbingly large total.

The

auxiliary boats placed aboard the S.M.S. Braunschweig, Elsass and
Lothringen in 1905 added an average of 4,447 kg overweight, with 4,594
marks of excess cost per boat. 97
The imperfections found in ships during actual trials at sea
were almost as costly.

Some of these were design problems, like the

aforementioned steering system difficulties with the Braunschweig
Class, which required costly repairs to the steering mechanism, bulk
heads, deckplates and other parts damaged by excessive vibration. 98
Repairs or alterations after shakedown cruises were usually not as
serious as this, but almost always expensive.

Further work on the
Deutschland's command bridge came to almost 27,000 marks. 99 The
S.M.S. Preussen's torpedo tubes required alterations as did the
95 BA/MA RM3/511 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
1 . 19. 07.
96BA/MA RM3/489 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
1. l 0. 05.

97 BA/MA RM3/481 Gennaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA,
Ber1in 2. 1 . 05.
98rbid.

KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 4.6.05.

99BA/MA RM3/510 Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA,
Berlin 7.19.06.
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ventilation system of the Braunschweig. lOO

In some instances the

problems were minor, like a repair job on the same ship's system of
vocal communication pipes, 101 and to be expected in a rapidly
However, this did not make them less troublesome

expanding program.
and expensive.

Only the consistent high quality of the finished

products partially balanced off the financial problems these overruns
created for the RMA.
The Armor Monopoly
Krupp's monopoly in the area of armor and artillery made it
difficult for Rollmann to save time, money, or weight. 102 Essen's
hold on the armor industry was stronger than ever and rendered RMA
protests sterile.

One Krupp overrun on the small guns for the S.M.S.

Pommern totaled 4,200 marks with an extra 2,960 kg over contract
wei ght. 103
In March of 1906 the Construction Department took exception to
Krupp's 2,300 marks price to cover an artillery range finder with
nickel steel armor.

1.2.05.

The alternative, a low nickel content, soft steel

lOOBA/MA RM3/480 Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA, Berlin
RM3/491 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 6.15.05.

101Ibid. S.P.K.~ Kiel to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
9.19.05.
l0 2BA/MA RM3/524 Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 8.21.07.
For international armor price comparisons, see: B. F. Cooling, Grey
Steel . . . , Table 7.
103BA/MA RM3/522 Vulcan, Stettin to SS/RMA, Berlin 10.30.06.
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totaling 1950 marks, was no bargain either. 1o 4 Situations like this
drove the RMA to a constant search for substitutions for Krupp.
As the building program progressed, the RMA persisted in
challenging Krupp armor and artillery prices and continued to seek a
way to lower them.

The source of RMA frustration was the low price of

Krupp products abroad and the ability of the Americans to produce
cheaper steel of similar quality.

Oddly enough it was the latter

which finally forced Krupp to reduce his armor prices further.

When

the American Midvale Company lowered its price to 1,650 marks per ton
in 1903 and the highest price paid in the U.S. was 1,900 marks,
exactly Essen's rate, Krupp had to respond.
breaking into the European market, in Italy.

Midvale was already
The growing, innovative

American armor industry was no longer a distant competitor.

In 1905

the Essen firm dropped its price from 1,900 marks to 1,780 marks per
ton, roughly midway between the low Midvale rate and the higher
American price charged by Bethlehem and Carnegie.105 However, these
events were hardly under the influence of the RMA.

von Eickstedt

gave voice to the Construction Department's helplessness when he
commented that
interest. 11106

11

•••

the Krupp Firm will do everything in its own

l04BA/MA RM3/287 Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 3.28.06.
105sA/MA RM3/11634 Handakten Dahnhardt. "Panzer: Ubersicht
Uber die Panzerpreise in verschiedenen Landern. 11 Prepared 3.3.15.
106sA/MA RM3/2204 Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin to Weapons
Division 3.9.07.
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The financial and technical power available to Krupp was
awesome.

Besides its monopoly of annor and gun supply, the technicians

of the Krupp firm were the only ones capable of properly assembling
and installing heavy guns on naval vessels. 107 Its research facilities
could produce breakthroughs in steel strength and resilience, as in
the case of Siemens-Martin Special Steel. lOB The finn also expended a
great deal of its financial strength by buying up raw materials
deposits abroad, augmenting its domestic resources.

In one case, the

F. F. King Real Estate Co. of Denver, Colorado, offered to sell seven
tracts of land rich in tungsten to the RMA for ten thousand dollars
in gold.

Mr. King informed Admiral Tirpitz that Krupp and an English

syndicate already had extensive holdings in the area. 109 This tungsten
was used to harden Krupp steel for the artillery and annor that repre
sented nearly a third of the cost of every ship the RMA built.110
The navy had neither the resources nor the authority to make such
purchases.

The best it could do in many instances was a personal

appeal to the Krupp directors for more reasonable prices in view of

l 07BA/MA RM3/ll 76 Weapons Division: "Besprechung Uber den
Anschluss der elektrischen Einrichtungen fUr schwere Artillerie der
Neubauten 1906 an ihre Primarstationen, 11 4.28.06.
l08BA/MA RM3/2204 Construction Dept. to Weapons Division,
RMA, Berlin 3.9.07. Reply 3.12.07.
l0 9BA/MA RM3/2206 F. F. King, Real Estate and Investments,
Denver, Colorado to SS/RMA, Berlin 2.13.08.
llOBA/MA RM3/3704 11 Protokoll Uber die Sitzung van 22.
September 1905 betreffend Neukonstruktionen van Linienschiffen und
grossen Kreuzern. 11
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current budget difficulties. 111

This technique rarely brought a

response from Essen.
Krupp's towering position in the industry only prompted naval
officials to join Tirpitz in his efforts to make some progress
against the finn.

Rear Admiral Goetz of the Weapons Division voiced

an appeal very common among Tirpitz s subordinates when he insisted
1

that competition for Krupp, in any form, was absolutely necessary. 112
Goetz dealt with Krupp in nearly every weapons contract and realized
the firm's power better than most.

There was no annor rivalry within

Germany and only Heinrich Ehrhardt s Rheinische Metallwaren- und
1

Maschinenfabriken in DUsseldorf manufactured gun barrels that came
close to Essen standards.113
were more available.

In other areas, alternatives for Krupp

In 1909 the Mulheim firm of Thyssen and Co.

produced this type of steel, and by 1908 had entered the nickel-steel
annor market in a small way. 114 Other finns were engaged in research
on various new types of ship steel, including Phoenix, Duisberger
Eisen und Stahlwerke, and the Friedrichshutte.llS

lllttA Krupp FAH IV C7 Admiral von MUller (RM2) Berlin to Krupp
Director Max Rotger, Berlin 3.21.05.
112 BA/MA RM3/ll76 Weapons Division to Construction Dept.,
RMA, Berlin 1.3.06.
ll3BA/MA RM3/7763 11 Korrmission zur PrUfung von Vertragen Uber
Kriegslieferung 11 10th Session 11.15.17. Brockhaus Enzyklopaidie,
vol. 5 (Wiesbaden, 1968), 267.
ll4BA/MA RM3/600 A.G. Weser, Bremen to SS/RMA, Berlin 8.20.08.
ll5BA/MA RM3/2207 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
3.27.09.
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Inroads that were made against Krupp were due to the firm's few
limitations.

When new contracts kept the Krupp facilities occupied in

the spring of 1908, the Thyssen firm took up the slack on some armor
orders for the deck of the S.M.S. Westfalen.

The facilities at the

Germaniawerft were simultaneously building two battleships, one light
cruiser, two torpedo boats and four Li-boats. ll 6 More firms, such as
the Bismarckhutte and Borsig, were periodically used to fill in for
Krupp as they perfected the techniques required to produce nickel
steel. 117 Some of the private yards were improving the quality of
steel they could produce by 1908.

Nevertheless, Krupp and Dillinger

remained the primary contractors in deck and vertical-superstructure
annor throughout these years.
Electrical Firms and the Turbine Engine
The RMA was having some difficulty monitoring developments and
enforcing controls in the ever changing electrical industry.

As with

the General Construction Guidelines, the Basic Guidelines for
Electrical Systems was, by 1908, already in revised editions.11 8
Although these detailed standards provided a basis for RMA supervision,
there were always the few disturbing surprises not covered in the

ll6sA/MA RM3/544 BBS, Bremen to SS/RMA, Berlin 3.9.08.
117 BA/MA RM3/304 Bergische Stahl-Industrie, Remscheid to
SS/RMA, Berlin 10.1.07. Ibid. BismarckhUtte to SS/RMA, Berlin
11.22.06. Ibid. RMA, Berlin to BismarckhUtte 12.11.06.
118BA/MA RM3/ll84 Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin
7.29.09.
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Guidelines.

In one instance a Krupp complaint to the RMA about two

faulty A.E.G. 60 kw generators slated for use in a 28 cm. gun turret turned
into a classic example of naval frustration with the Essen firm. 119
In the course of ironing out this difficulty, the RMA discovered that
Krupp was nearly finished developing an economical 25 kw system for
28 and 30.5 cm. turrets. 120 The RMA first stumbled on the new break
through in an article in the Journal of the American Society of Naval
Engineers.

Krupp protested that the system was not yet completed and

denied inspiring the publication.121

This did not quell the justified

outburst of anger from both the Construction Department and Weapon's
Division.

They found it hard to believe that Krupp had no knowledge

of the 1906 article, especially when it discussed the possible use of
the new system in the 30.5 cm. turrets of the U.S.S. Louisiana.1 22
There was little that could be done to the Krupp Firm in retaliation,
so the RMA officials issued their reprimand and the matter died.
Not all experiences among the electrical finns were as
frustrating.

The case of switches for the various ship control panels

ll 9For example:
Prtifung," May 1905.

BA/MA RM3/ll74 11 Allgemeine Beivertung und

l20BA/MA RM3/ll80 Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 8.17.07.
Construction Dept. to A.E.G., Berlin 8.23.07.

RMA

121BA/MA RM3/ll78 Telegram to RMA from Krupp, Essen 8. 11.02.
Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 8.16.06. SS/RMA, Berlin to Krupp, Essen
11 .25.06. Weapons Division to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 11.13.06.
122BA/MA RM3/ll77 Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin to Krupp,
Essen 7. 14.06. Weapons Division to Construction Dept., Berlin 6.29.06.
Construction Dept. to Weapons Division, Berlin 7. 12.06.
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and back-up systems is an illustration.

The RMA was not satisfied with

the automatic switches Siemens-Schuckert produced; nor was the A.E.G.
model entirely trustworthy. 123 The product of Voigt and Haeffner Firm
was, however, exceptionally reliable.

Thus, the RMA dealt extensively

with this firm with the whole-hearted approval of the Imperial Yard at
Wilhelmshaven and other shipyards. 124 Siemens-Schuckert and A.E.G.
were not struck from the Suppliers List, only encouraged to bring
their products up to standard.

Hence, competition was maintained and

quality assured.
In yet another instance, the RMA confronted a mixed situation.
By 1904 it feared that Siemens and Halske would soon monopolize the
manufacture and installation of wireless telegraphy systems.

Soon

thereafter the RMA asked Wireless Telegraphy Ltd. to provide Siemens
and Halske with competition.

Here they quickly discovered the limits

of a company smaller and less diverse than Siemens.

Whereas the latter

was able to produce most of the required parts for a wireless, the
newer and smaller company was plagued by a host of subcontractors and
less than successful research and development efforts.
Wireless Telegraphy Ltd. tried to limit these headaches by
abandoning the standard electrical transformers made by S.S.W. for a
model of its own.

This new transformer was riddled with technical

l23BA/MA RM3/ll80 A.E.G., Berlin to Construction Dept., Berlin
9.11 .07. RM3/1178 KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 8.4.06.
124BA/MA RM3/1184 KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
7.28.09.
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problems, forcing the company to relinquish the effort and return to
an RMA approved vendor, Felton-Guilleaume. 125 Usedom of the Kiel
Imperial Shipyard even welcomed the cost and weight overrun caused by
the new Felton transformers when they enabled him to get his ships
back on schedule. 126 The transformers were not an isolated case.
Similar annoying technical difficulties beset the design and
construction of the wireless rooms aboard many ships.127
The RMA, however, was not willing to suffer a Siemens and
Halske monopoly, or even a hint of one, if there was an avenue of
escape.

As far as Tirpitz and the Construction Department were

concerned, a duplicate of the armor-artillery stalemate was out of
the question.

In the electrical industry, there were many firms and

plenty of competition.
challenge the old.

New organizations were always moving in to

For the RMA, it was a case of the existing

situation presenting a greater threat than the risk of going to
someone new.
The RMA was also interested in further encouraging turbine
development within Germany.

For this reason, it turned down an offer

from the 11 Turbina 11 to sell licenses to the Imperial Yards for turbine

125BA/MA RM3/1101 Letters to SS/RMA, Berlin from the major
shipyards April, May, June 1905. Ibid. Gesellschaft fUr Drahtlose
Telegraphie m.b.H., Berlin to Construction Dept., Berlin 4.4.05.
Ibid. Berlin 10.26.05.
126Ibid.

KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 2.5.07.

127BA/MA RM3/ll02 KWK to Construction Dept., Berlin 3.3.09.
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construction.128 The deal would have cost the RMA 300,000 marks for a
fifteen year period.

Eickstedt, like Tirpitz, preferred to keep

turbine work in the private sphere to avoid tying the navy to one
turbine, when some Gennan companies were exploring other systems.
Furthennore, von Eickstedt felt that the company 1 s German branch was not
giving the RMA its best effort, because the performance of German
vessels powered by Parsons did not measure up to current British test
results. ~Jhen he said as much to the directors of 11 Turbina, 11 they
categorically denied national favoritism and the latter accused the
RMA of suspicion, excessively rigid rules and denying the company
access to information vital to its work.

While the RMA's distrust

was a bit too open and perhaps excessive, von Eickstedt had a reason for
some of his doubts; 129 The tests on the light cruiser S.M.S. Lubeck
were up to standard.

However, why could the S.M.S. Hamburg, the

fonner 1 s sister ship, accelerate and stop faster with ordinary engines
in identical trial runs?

The Daily Telegraph captured the RMA s
1

attitude exactly when it quoted Eickstedt s November 1906 speech
1

before the Society for the Study of Shipbuilding:

11

The German

Admiralty was not convinced that the Parson 1 s system was the best,
and they would be glad to consider any system which claimed to have
eliminated the drawbacks at present apparent. 11130

128BA/MA RM3/2112,2113 passim 1906-1907.
129Ibid. , 9. 26. 06 .
130rbid. Press clipping from the Daily Telegraph, 11.23.06,
sent to the RMA by the Foreign Office.
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The "drawbacks" were less the engines I imperfections as the
possibility of never having a truly domestic alternative.

The

acceleration and stopping problems were worth solving, given the vast
increase in speed and the reduced space required by the turbine.

The

RMA was clearly dissatisfied with Parsons, and MUller of the Naval
Cabinet reported to the State Secretary that Kaiser Wilhelm had
approached Krupp with this problem while visiting Villa HUgel.

Gustav

Krupp indicated that his finn was deeply involved with the development
of the Zoelly System and might approach Emil Rathenau about A.E.G.
aid.131

In fact, Krupp belonged to a syndicate bent on using the

Zoelly System to challenge Parsons.

Other participants included

Escher Wyss and Co., M.A.N. and the North Gennan Machine and Armature
Co. of Bremen. 132 This syndicate ended up competing rather than
cooperating with A.E.G.

Rathenau had already signed a contract with

the Curtis Marine Turbine Co. of West Virginia and felt certain this
system would outstrip the Zoelly. 133 Vulcan allied itself with A.E.G.
to use their Curtis machine in capital ships. 134 Later, this
combination led to an A.E.G.-Curtis engine for the Vulcan built

131Ibid.
Berlin 9.22.06.

Notiz zum Immediatvortrag 11 (signed by v. Eickstedt),
Admiral von Muller to Tirpitz, Berlin 10.16.06.

11

l32Ibid. Gennaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA, Berlin
10.20.06. RM3/ll76 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 5.7.07.
S.S.W., Berlin to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.4.06. Reply 4. 10.06.
133BA/MA RM3/2112 A.E.G. Turbinenfabrik, Berlin to SS/RMA,
Berlin 9. 17.06.
l34Ibid. Vulcan, Stettin-Bredow to SS/RMA, Berlin 5.29.06.
Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin to Vulcan, Stettin 6. 14.06.
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battleship S.M.S. Friedrich der Grosse, a part of the Kaiser Class
begun in 1910.

Two other private yards comnitted themselves to

turbine deals as well.

A. G. Weser decided to pump research time and
money into a system developed by retired propulsion engineer Schulz. 135
Both Schichau and the Bergmann Co., a division of Electrical Industries,
Ltd., produced their own engines.

A Schichau model was put in the

dreadnought S.M.S. Konig Albert and a Bergmann system powered the
S.M.S. Markgraf (1911) of the Konig Class.
Nevertheless, the ships mentioned here and other pre-war
capital ships driven by German turbines were in the minority.

Parsons

supplied most of the engines that the RMA eventually purchased,
including those in the battle cruiser von der Tann and in the Moltke
and Sachsen Classes.

German industry started late in this field and

lacked an early focus on one or two alternatives to Parsons.

Later

attempts by Schichau to develop its own turbine were unsatisfactory.
In spite of technical problems, especially with the smaller
turbines used in conjunction with on-board electrical generators,1 36
the RMA kept encouraging the efforts of the electrical firms.

The

process of development was slow but successes with the Parsons• system
in large German transatlan~ic conmercial ships showed the great
promise of this style of propulsion.

The HAPAG liner 11 Kaiser 11 was

tested at the Imperial Yard at Kiel as a favor to the navy from

135Ibid.

A.G. Weser, Bremen to SS/RMA, Berlin 11 .3.06.

136 BA/MA RM3/1174 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
2.3.05. RM3/1173 KWK to Construction Dept., Berlin 1.14.05.
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Director Ballin.

These tests and the trial results of the 30,000 ton

British liner 11 Carmania, 11 built by John Brown and Co., showed that the
turbine was perfect for capital ships.137
SuITTllary
The 1905 to 1908 period was the most intensive of the entire
building program to date.

Both the Nassau and Helgoland Classes of

battleships were laid down, shared by six different shipyards.

The

Imperial Yard in Wilhelmshaven,with the cheapest construction costs
of any yard, was given the S.M.S. Nassau and Ostfriesland.

A.G.

Weser, in Bremen, received the S.M.S. Westfalen and Thuringen and the
S.M.S. Rheinland went to Vulcan.

The S.M.S. Posen and Oldenburg went

to the Germaniawerft and Schichau, respectively.

All of these ships

were dreadnoughts, ranged in cost between 37 and 47 million marks and
were in service by 1912.

The Imperial Yard at Kiel and Blohm und Voss

began building the heavy cruisers S.M.S. Blucher and van der Tann in
1907 and 1908.

The Imperial Yard at Kiel produced the Blucher for 28.5

million marks, but the van der Tann cost somewhat more. The first of
the larger ships to employ a Parsons turbine, the van der Tann, cost
36.5 million marks.
The pace of construction in the smaller classes was no less
hectic than for the battleships and heavy cruisers.

The Imperial Yard

at Kiel was kept busy with the light cruisers S.M.S. Ktlnigsberg and
137 BA/MA RM3/2533 Central Division, RMA, Berlin to S.P.K.,
Kiel 4.7.06. RM3/2111 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 4.25.06.
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NUrnberg, and Danzig was given the Stuttgart and the Emden.

The

S.M.S. Nautilus, Albatross, Stettin, Dresden and Kolberg went to
Weser, Vulcan, Blohm und Voss and Schichau, respectively.
varied in weight and cost between 3 and 8 million marks.

These ships
The number

of torpedo boats were sharply increased, and the RMA drew more yards
into their construction.

Out of thirty-four boats begun between 1905

and 1908, Schichau only received sixteen, whereas before the Elbing
yard had dominated in this area, Vulcan and Germaniawerft shared the
remaining contracts at prices ranging from 1.4 to 1 .8 million marks
per boat. 138
The years between 1905 and 1908 were characterized by continuity
rather than change.

Tirpitz 1 s basic faith in his theories regarding

the composition and use of the fleet was reinforced by the sheer
momentum of public and industrial support.
Secretary stepped up his program.

Thus assured, the State

He increased construction and

achieved a four ship building tempo by means of supplementary legisla
tion in 1906 and 1908.

This tovk immediate concrete form in eight new

dreadnought battleships.
These most recent successes in the Reichstag also enabled the
RMA to deepen its involvement with the U-boat despite Tirpitz 1 s
reluctance.

He was a battleship advocate and the U-boat had no

place in the age of Mahan.

The RMA 1 s escalation of the number of

U-boats on order was intended to quell internal criticism and to keep

138For all technical information regarding these ships, see:
E. Groner, op. cit., 20-35.
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pace with international naval technology.

Before 1914, the U-boat

was, for Tirpitz, only a small vessel with a role to perform secondary
to that of the capital ship.
The State Secretary did not respond kindly to criticism of his
policies.

Vice-Admiral (ret.) Galster's 1907 pamphlet entitled ''Which

Type of Naval Armament Does Germany Need?" started a battle with the
RMA that lasted for five years. 139 Galster's defense of the "klein
krieg" or commercial war strategy, with emphasis on the U-boat,
brought RMA harrassment in many forms.

Intense adverse publicity and

investigations of the Admiral-turned publicist by the Berlin police
are only two examples. 140
Lothar Persius, far more relentless than Galster, added
criticisms of Tirpitz's ever rising budget demands to the list of his
objections to the Admiral's administration of naval construction.
Persius was interested in slightly reducing Germany's naval budget to
avoid a direct confrontation with Britain.

As compensation he

suggested encouraging a naval buildup by Austria-Hungary which would
strengthen the alliance as a whole vis-a-vis the Triple Entente. 141
He received the same treatment Galster did, and was even threatened
with arrest by the Berlin police on a few occasions. 142

139BA/MA RM3/9757 Boy-Ed (News Bureau-RMA) to SS/RMA, Berlin
10. 4. 07. "Welche Seekri egsrustung braucht Deutschl and" (Berl in, 1907).
140BA/MA RM3/9753 Berlin Police President to RMA News Bureau,
Berlin 11.5.09.
14lrbid.

Clipping from the Times 4.16.09 (RMA News Bureau).

142Ibid., passim.
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Continuity extended itself also to the choice of a successor
for Eickstedt as the retiring head of the Construction Department.
Rear Admiral Rollmann was described by a colleague as a "distinguished,
11143 He was an
somewhat professorial, splendid character.
excellent administrator, ran the Department according to Tirpitz's
directives, and provided reliable leadership until the outbreak of the
war in 1914.
The RMA's primary problems did not change.

The Krupp-Dillinger

alliance remained a frustration and both firms collected profits from
artificially inflated domestic prices.

The RMA handled cost and weight

overruns, often a direct result of steel products, more effectively
during this period.

However, time and money were still being wasted,

while ships carried additional weight that strained engines and burned
extra fuel.
Tirpitz also found himself adjusting his policies toward the
shipyards to the advantage of the Imperial Yards.

In order to keep

these open as an effective safety valve against high prices at the
private yards, they received additional benefits to help them keep
costs down.

The German economy gave extraordinary freedom to the

private business to expand, combine, monopolize and profit.

The RMA

needed the Imperial Yard strong to preserve both a financial advantage
and a delicate balance with the private yards.

143BA/MA N316.61 Nachlass Weichold:
Admiral (ret.) von Mantey (1938)."

"Aufzeichungen . . .
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Lastly, Tirpitz 1 s policy regarding research and development
rebounded to the benefit of the Parsons Company.

While a handful of

German companies scrambled to displace 11 Turbina 1 s 11 edge in the turbine
business, the RMA remained dependent on the British based firm as the
only proven vendor in the market.

The A.E.G.-Curtis, Schichau and

Bergmann systems represented the earliest of the reliable German
versions.

If the RMA had involved itself in this matter sooner, by

focusing industrial efforts and conducting research of its own, a
domestic alternative would have appeared earlier.

CHAPTER V
THE MONEY RUNS OUT:

1909-1912

Never before in the short history of his construction program
had Tirpitz experienced sharper contrasts in success and failure than
he did now.

In his eternal struggle with the Krupp-Dillinger armor

monopoly he finally discovered a way to change Essen's price policies.
By employing a triple threat Tirpitz drastically lowered the armor
prices that plagued him since 1897.

First, he used the European

ambitions of the American Midvale Company to provide Krupp with a true
competitor that Essen could not consume or lure into collusion.
Tirpitz used RMA contracts and government supports to create in Fritz
Thyssen the possibility of a homegrown alternative to Krupp and
Dillinger.

Finally, he orchestrated a fierce and well-timed attack on

Krupp and Dillinger in the Reichstag by Graf van Oppersdorf.

The

result was a drastic drop in armor prices and more cooperation from
Krupp than Tirpitz ever expected to receive.
However, Tirpitz s good fortune ended with the inroads made
1

against the armor monopoly.

The SPD election victory in 1912 gave

hope to the trade unions in the shipbuilding industry and support to
those who believed the navy was an expensive luxury.

Chancellor van

Bethmann-Hollweg was dismayed by the fleet's negative effect on
Germany's international position.

Then the Treasury Office told the

Reichstag to choose between increased appropriations for either the
army or the navy.

The Reich's financial situation would not allow
210
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additional spending in both areas.

On top of this a scandal broke in

the press in 1909 revealing that certain private vendors had
defrauded the Imperial Shipyard at Kiel.

The Protocol System failed

to detect the crime and the RMA received a great deal of adverse
publicity.

The State Secretary could not overcome the growing

feeling among the Reich leadership that the nation's financial
resources were better spent on the army as a tested source of national
security.

Thus Tirpitz's building tempo was drastically reduced and

the navy once again took a back seat to the army in budget appropria
tions.
Political Background
As 1912 approached, military and political thought regarding
the fleet became more confused than ever.

The only one who, as usual,

seemed sure that there was value in continuing past policy was Tirpitz.
The new naval attache in London, Erich MUller, was urging some sort of
naval holiday with Britain.

He witnessed, at close range, the

determination of the British government not to allow the German
challenge to progress further.

Dahnhardt, chief of Tirpitz's Budget

Department, rejected the possibility of victory based on the Risk
Theory.

Rather, he felt Germany would find it difficult to wage an

adequate defensive war against the Royal Navy. 1 Confusing the conflict
further, Capel le of the .Administrative Department tended to agree with
Tirpitz.

see:

Naively, he believed that Britain would have to seek an

lBA/MA RM3/11639 Handakten Dahnhardt, passim.
Memo on the Risk Theory, 1912.

In particular,
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agreement with Germany at the expense of France because of the threat
presented by the High Seas Fleet.
asserted, "not England.

"We hold the trump cards, 11 he

All we need do is wait patiently until our

present naval act (1912) has been fulfilled. 11 2
The Kaiser was wavering between full-fledged support for
Tirpitz and the fear of a confrontation with England.

His Secretary

of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral von MUller, cautiously argued against
precipitating a war, but did not want to pay a price in terms of naval
hardware for a stable agreement with the British.

Neither did he

fully agree with Tirpitz's building program.3 Relying exclusively on
capital ships seemed risky, but he did not come forth with any viable
alternatives. 4 In all of this only two characters were consistent:
Lothar Persius, in his scathing public critiques of Tirpitz,5 and
Tirpitz in his relentless efforts to fulfill his policies.
From the State Secretary's point of view, the fleet could
easily destroy Britain's hope of maintaining a 2:1 battleship ratio
during this period.6

In order to keep a tenuous peace, he advised the

Kaiser against any type of offensive that would oblige the British to

2G. Ritter, Staatskunst, vol. 2, 232-36.
3J. Rohl, 11 von MUller and the Approach of War, 1911-1914, 11
HJ, 12 (1969), 670 and 688-89.
4Ibid., 654.
5BA/MA RM3/9753 RMA News Bureau, Berlin to the Jahrbuch fur
deutsche Armee und Marine, Berlin 5. 1.09.
6w. Hubatsch, "Der Kulminationspunkt der deutschen Marine
politik im Jahre 1912, 11 HZ, 172 (Oct. 1953), 296.
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react. 7 These same goals prompted him to take a hard line in conversa
tions with the Kaiser and Lord Haldane in February of 1912.

The Kaiser

was angered by Tirpitz's refusal to enter into some sort of rapproche
ment during the Haldane Mission, but the Admiral stood his ground.
The price he refused to pay for an understanding with the British was
a marked reduction in the construction plans outlined in the 1912
Supplementary Naval Law.

Later he felt vindicated in his resistance,

when a discussion between Albert Ballin and Churchill, as First Sea
Lord, offered no hope of British neutrality in the event of German
involvement in a war on the continent. 8 Tirpitz still believed that
he could bring the fleet to a point where Germany could challenge
Britain without precipitating war along the way.

The political

reality, since about 1904, was that Britain had discarded her splendid
isolation and developed a new determination to counter Tirpitz 1 s goals.
Indeed, by 1909 the British government appeared moderate in
its response to the German fleet by comparison with the public and
press.

Naval Intelligence in Britain had carefully monitored German

raw materials imports and the capability of the shipbuilding industry
as a whole.

The Admiralty felt that the German yards had reached a

capacity equal to Britain's, erasing an advantage that had provided
the Royal Navy with a one or two year lead in ship construction.

7p. Kennedy, "German Naval Operations Plans Against
England, 1896-1914," English Historical Review, 89 (No. 550,
1974), 75.

8w. Hubatsch, "Der Kulminationspunkt, 312, 17.
11
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According to historian Arthur Marder, the British drew the 11 most
alarming conclusion" that the Germans would have seventeen dread
noughts to their twenty-one by the spring of 1912.9 London began to
believe that it would be hard pressed to maintain a 5:4 ratio in
dreadnoughts with Germany.
It was this situation and the reaction of the press that
produced the British Naval Scare of 1909.

At the height of this

public outburst, the liberal Asquith government presented its 19091910 Naval Budget to the Corranons.

It proposed four new dreadnoughts

immediately and four more the next year on proof of their necessity.
Although the official naval sources in Britain felt a total of six
ships would restore a favorable balance, Conservative MPs and their
allies in the press demanded all eight immediately.

Eventually the

latter position passed the House.10
Actually neither nation fully appreciated the position of the
other.

The Gennans wanted the assurance of British neutrality in a

European war if Germany were attacked.

In effect, this would damage

the foundation of the Triple Entente system.

In return the British

were arguing for a real reduction, not a slowdown, in the Gennan
construction program for 1909-1912.

11

The British never appreciated

that the French entente was for Germany a potential threat to their
safety, but no more did the Germans ever realize that in a world of

9A. J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal
Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1914, vol. l (London, 1961), 153.
l0Ibid., 160-170 passim.

215
armament races, Realpolitik and imperialistic rivalries, naval
supremacy was vital to Britain's safety. 11 11
The 1909 scare obliged the British government and navy to
respond over and above the pledge of eight new battleships.

The

Dominions were asked to help, and New Zealand and Australia both
promised to contribute a battleship to the Royal Navy.
offered two if the need appeared great enough.

The latter

Anti-German feeling

reached a new high in Britain, and all MP's save a few radical
Liberals saw limiting naval arms as politically suicidal.

The

British abandoned the 2:1 standard and began to solicit the support of
growing American naval power.

The political ramifications of the

1909 Scare also contributed to Admiral Fisher's retirement as First
Sea Lord in January of 1910.
The British overestimated both the capability of the Gennan
shipyards and the time it would take to place new dreadnoughts in
service.

However, they did not exaggerate Tirpitz's determination.

Haldane was confronted with that first hand in 1912, and it soured his
originally optimistic assessment of a possible understanding with the
Germans. 12
The breakdown in Anglo-German relations dismayed the Kaiser.
On 8 December 1912, he had a meeting with Tirpitz, van MUller and
van Moltke in which he expressed his fears for the future and felt
obliged to take some steps to prepare for war.
11 Ibid., 177.
12rbid., 179-205 passim.
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loyalty to its Entente allies and the failure of the Haldane Mission,
Wilhelm found himself bombarded by conflicting opinions from his
military advisors.

Moltke advised action as soon as possible, for

this would give the army an advantage.

Tirpitz argued for a delay

of up to a year and a half to ready the fleet and continue construc
tion.

For the moment, Tirpitz seemed to have won, for Wilhelm was

concerned that the Li-boats and their base in Helgoland were not
ready.

He was still talking in terms of offensive naval operations

rather than an irrmediate land war. 13
It was characteristic of Wilhelm not to invite any civilian
advisers to these discussions.
with Tirpitz or Moltke.

Few of his political leaders agreed

In 1909 BUlow 1 s government fell and Theobald

van Bethmann-Hollweg became chancellor.

He did not support further

drastic increases for the navy and instantly clashed with Tirpitz.
The new chancellor perceived the contradictions of government policy
regarding the navy and had to endure endless infighting and differ
ences of opinion.

Both Prince Metternich and his successor as

ambassador in London, Kilhlmann, urged that an offensive role for the
navy was counterproductive and risked destroying a potentially
profitable friendship with Britain. 14 Bethmann agreed, adding that
11

the policy of working for English friendship while demanding new

l3J. Rohl,

11

von MUller, 11 661.

14w. Hubatsch, "Der Kulminationspunkt, 11 319-22. BA/MA
RM3/6674 van KUhlmann, London to Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin 10.22.13.
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ships from the Reichstag is a fiasco. 1115 At one point he asserted
that the heavily naval slant of Reich policy both made enemies
needlessly and neglected the army, which was Germany's prime military
force. 16 Tirpitz defended his position against the new chancellor so
fiercely that at one point the latter's friend and advisor Kurt
Riezler was convinced the Admiral wanted the chancellorship for
himself: 11 However he can't do it, because no one will trust him. 11 17
Nevertheless, before the war Tirpitz's position was strong enough to
force a stalemate with the chancellor.
In spite of questions raised by the effect of fleet expansion
on relations with Great Britain, Tirpitz pushed continuation of the
three battleship per year tempo in the Reichstag.

His assurances of

success were having less effect than before because of a number of
new influences.18 The increasing number of SPD representatives
crested with their 1912 election victory, making them the largest
party in the Reichstag.
Tirpitz.

The left-wing of the SPD totally opposed

Moderates, like Vogtherr, pushed for the coexistence with

Britain that the naval program, in its pure fonn, made impossible. 19

15K. Jarausch, The Eni matic Chancellor: Bethmann-Hollwe
and the Hubris of Imperial Germany New Haven, 1972 , 94-95.
l6Ibid., 96.
17K. Riezler, op. cit., 187-188.
l 8w. Hubatsch,

11

Der Kulmi nationspunkt, 11 301-303.

l 9BA/MA RM3/5997 pt. 1. Speech by SPD Reichstag Representative
Vogtherr in the Naval Budget Debate, 123 session 3.1.13.
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The SPD as a whole constantly attacked the anns manufacturers and
the industrial combinations that were reaping huge profits from
Reichstag appropriations.20 Between 1898 and 1911, according to the
RMA s publication Nauticus, the Reichstag pumped 1.31 billion marks
1

into the naval shipbuilding industry.

Over half of the figure went

to ship construction and another third to the cost of armor and heavy
guns.21

Even the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal required alterations in order

to accommodate the new, larger dreadnoughts.22 These financial and
political factors, combined with the opposition of Bethmann and many
within the navy itself, placed the future of the building program in
doubt two years before the First World War.
During November, 1909 a scandal broke in the Gennan press that
further endangered the plans of the RMA.

The Finn of Frankenthal,

among others, was discovered defrauding the Imperial Shipyard at
Kiel.

The directors of the Imperial Yard were paying transport costs

that were never earned, accepting old steel sold for new and bronze in
a case that called for brass.

The final bill, spread over an

indefinite period of time, totalled in the millions, and newspapers
of every political persuasion aimed their editorial columns at
Tirpitz and the RMA administration.23 Der Tag predicted a severe

20Ibid. Speech by Neske (SPD) in the Reichstag Naval Budget
Debate, l~session 3.3.13.
21Nauticus, 1912, 297-98.
22c.-A. Gemzell, op. cit., 81.
23BA/MA RM3/4742 1909 press clippings, passim.
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political backlash that Tirpitz would have to weather.

Die Post

reported that the Reichstag waited for an explanation while Tirpitz
hid behind a wall of technological jargon, a smokescreen to reduce
public perception of the navy's problems.

Even though the courts

convicted the businessmen involved of fraud and meted out stiff jail
sentences, the public outcry refused to die down.

The socialist

Vossische Zeitung suggested that there was more to the problem than
the conviction of felons:

11

Mr. Tirpitz must answer for faults and

mistakes. 11 24
The State Secretary was interpellated as a minister of the
Bethmann-Hollweg government before the Reichstag in December.
Tirpitz defended the RMA administration in the German parliament by
saying that the matter was already resolved.

While the civilian

defendants were enduring their trial the navy was cleaning house at
Kiel.

Unfortunately, the Reichstag co11111ittee of inquiry was in no

mood for what they perceived as a naval cover-up.

After one session

in the Reichstag the Vossische Zeitung reported that Tirpitz wanted to
pass the affair off and accept it as experience, when it seemed
evident that wholesale internal reform was in order.25 The liberal
Freisinnige Zeitung joined in the call for naval reform measures.
It supported the suggestions made by the Reichstag progressive,
Dr. Leonhart, that more civilian technical and business people

24BA/MA RM3/4743 Vossische Zeitung clipping 12.7.09.
25Jbid.
12.7.09.

Der Tag 12.7.09.

Die Post and Vossische Zeitung
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belonged in the administration of the naval construction program.
The State Secretary did not altogether oppose some reform measures.
As the Vossische Zeitung of 7 December reported after Tirpitz's hour
long defense of nava 1 measures taken during the crisis:

11

Mr. von

Tirpitz made assurances that he has swept with an iron broom:
ordered all kinds of reforms and placed others within view. 11 26

he has
He was

not, however, willing to relinquish naval control over the Imperial
Shipyards.
mind.

This was what many of the Reichstag representatives had in

Civilian penetration of the construction program administration

would greatly increase public influence in a heretofore purely military
sphere.

Indeed, on the seventh of December, Dr. Leonhart called for

Tirpitz's removal and a complete reform of the naval hierarchy.27
The 1909 Kiel Scandal revealed much more than the need for
reform within certain parts of the RMA administration and Protocol
System. It showed just how precarious Tirpitz's political base in the
Reichstag had become.

The conservatives were curiously quiet in all of

this, and the intensity of the barrage fired by the radical liberals
and the socialists was unprecedented.

Tirpitz, indeed, managed to

weather the storm, but the odds seemed against him in the long run.
His Reichstag opponents were seeking his recall and his naval associates
were questioning his definition of the navy's needs.

Even Bulow, whose

imperial policies were partially based on German naval might, parted
company with the State Secretary over the long range consequences of

26Ibid., Vossische Zeitung 12.7.09.
27Ibid.
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German naval growth without some sort of understanding with
Britain.28 With BUlow s successor, Bethmann-Hollweg, these disagree
1

ments became permanent.

The public and official reaction to the Kiel

Scandal was symptomatic of a political climate increasingly unfavor
able to Tirpitz s vision of the naval construction program.
1

Research and Development and the U-Boat
The RMA continued its research and development efforts, now
only with a greater eye toward economy.

The General Naval Department

received a memo from the Naval Attach~ on London who suggested that
many existing ship designs were a waste of RMA funds.
sentiment which the RMA could readily appreciate.

He expressed a

Li-boats, torpedo

boats and destroyers were easy and relatively cheap to build, but their
capability was limited.

All big-gun battleships were still the answer.

However, now speed, reduced size and maximum fire power should be the
goal of naval architecture.

In the process, the RMA administrators

could build ships better prepared for war, but at a lower cost. 29
The modest RMA research and development effort still relied a
great deal on the facilities of private companies.

Discussions

regarding turret designs always included Krupp, for the facilities at
the Gussstahlfabrik were the only ones capable of executing any plans

28w. Hubatsch, Die Tir~itz Ara: Studien zUr deutschen
Marinepolitik, 1890-1918 (Ber in, 1955), Chapter 4.
29BA/MA RM3/3707 Marine Attache, London to SS/RMA, Berlin
10.30. 13.
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° Krupp's facilities included a metals

the firm and RMA decided upon. 3

research laboratory as early as 1863, and one for materials testing
since 1895.

Between 1907 and 1909 two million marks were invested in

yet another, more comprehensive facility in Essen. 31

With these

assets the company was able to do studies on ship design for the RMA,
concentrating on battleships of reduced size and weight.

One such

research effort completed in 1911 lasted nearly four years and cost
the RMA 33,075 marks. 32 The North German Lloyd and HAPAG continued to
aid the RMA's efforts.

HAPAG was engaged in work on an improved water

cooling system for capital ship turbines in 1911.

The North German

Lloyd worked with the Deutsche Seewarte on highly sophisticated
navigation techniques and compass testing.33
In 1910, the RMA expanded the Naval Research Center at
Marienfelde, complete with an experimental "stream" to test new ship
designs. 34 Such growth intensified the RMA search for technical
personnel to staff the center.

In one case the navy promised a

30BA/MA RMJ/3694-95 passim.
31BA/MA RM3/2101 "Bericht Uber die 12. Hauptversammlung des
Deutschen Verbandes ftlr die Materialprufung der Technik, 11 1911.
32HA Krupp WA VII f 1479 "Kosten fUr Ausarbeitung des
Projekts No. 283. Schnelle Linienschiffsstudie," 1911.
33BA/MA RM3/1482 Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin
l 2• 2. 11 . RM3 /7 61 9 pas s i m.
34BA/MA RM3/1013 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 4.27.10.
BA/MA RM3/1011 F. H. Schmidt, Altona to Rechnungsrat Dopking, Berlin
4.23.09 passim.
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skilled mechanic and fitter a good salary with a yearly raise
f

schedule, in addition to paying for his family s transport and his
1

first month s rent.35
1

The navy's modest research and development

efforts were feeling the pressure of financial limits.

Paying its

employees was as hard as finding them, and the situation would
worsen before long, because this area was not among Tirpitz s
1

budgetary priorities.
One of the Admiral 1 s priorities was discussed in a Reichstag
session in early 1909.

The legislators asked him to verify state

ments by the British press that German construction time was now
shorter than that achieved by the Royal Navy.

The press stories

placed German construction time at between 26 and 30 months for
capital ships.

Although he probably would have enjoyed asserting

that this was true, he could not.

Without the time allotted for the

shakedown cruise, private yards were taking 36 months and the
Imperial Yards 40 on an average.36

Reports on this same topic reached

the Kaiser through the Naval Cabinet.

His marginal notes to an

article from the British publication Shipping World showed a great
deal of frustration and impatience:

11

24 months against 34

months in Germany, sometimes 36-40! 11 After visiting Weser in March
1910 and seeing the same ship under construction that was there
during a visit the year before, Wilhelm added to the above notes:

3SBA/MA RM3/1013 KWK to SS/RMA, Berlin 4.30.10.
36BA/MA RM3/6674 Tirpitz s statements in the Reichstag
3.29.09.
1
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"It should have been launched in 9 months'. 1137

Tirpitz would have

agreed with the Emperor's remarks on the Naval Cabinet's annual
report on the international naval situation in 1909:
slow!

A light cruiser takes 39 months!

"We build too

No English ship of the line

takes that long, and 20 months longer than an English heavy cruiser of
the same type!

Unheard of'. 11 38 Unfortunately, the Kaiser I s outrage

did Tirpitz little good at the shipyards.

Late deliveries, defective

parts, late inspections and other now well known causes kept these
construction times at the existing levels until the demands of war
forced a change.39
The submarine program was still just getting under way.

The

U-boat was accepted as a useful naval weapon but its exact strategic
and tactical place was still very much under discussion.

A memo from

the Technical Department's Breusing in 1909 was very optimistic.

He

felt that the U-boat was ready for mine laying and harbor defense.
Then he suggested that offensive operations were not far off.
Experimentation along these lines was worth eliminating some battle
ships from the program to find more money.

He believed that "we
should build more U-boats and fewer capital ships. 11 40

37BA/MA RM2/190 The Shipping World, no. 875, 3.9. 10.
38BA/MA RM2/189 11 Rundschau in allen Marinen: JahresY1bersicht
11
1909, Marine Rundschau 1910.
39BA/MA RM3/280 Verein Deutscher Schiffswerften to SS/RMA,
Berlin 7.28.09. RM3/582 Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin to KWW
3.16.11.
40BA/MA RM3/4915 11 Vorgehen in Ubootsbau, 11 Berlin 11.30.09.
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Tirpitz did not agree, but he was interested in deploying the
new boats to best advantage.

Most of the boats were at the Imperial

Yard at Wilhelmshaven, awaiting the completion of their pens on
Helgoland.41

Eventually, he envisioned three stations for a force of

thirty-six boats.

Twelve would operate within a thirty sea mile

radius of Helgoland, with about five sea miles between each boat.
Another dozen would soon go to the Kiel Bight.

Of these, four were

in the belts area, four in the harbor approaches and the rest in
reserve.

Tirpitz saved the last dozen for offensive action in the

case of a North Sea blockade of Germany by the British.42 Clearly,
he was still wary of the U-boat 1 s offensive capability.

The entire

force was slated for defense, or desperate action in the event the
Imperial Navy lost the decisive battle which still lay at the core
of naval strategy.
Although most submarine work met with considerable success, the
RMA 1 s U-boat work was not without tragedies.

In 1911, the U-3 was

unable to surface after submerged tests in Kiel.

When a floating crane

pulled the boat up by the bow, twenty-nine men escaped through the
torpedo tubes, after twenty-five hours under water.

The rest of the

crew, including the captain, were later found asphyxiated in other
compartments when the boat was completely raised.

Tragic lessons like

41BA/MA RMS/1948 RMA to Chief of the Admiralty Staff, Berlin
1.5.10.
42E. Rossler, op. cit., 49.
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this one prompted standardized safety measures, more salvaging equip
ment and further research into on-board ventilation systems.43
The RMA's U-boat testing and construction was not as insular as
private efforts.

Krupp did most of this work as Germaniawerft could

build boats employing subcontractors only for propulsion systems and
some electrical work.

Other private firms such as Weser were working

on new submarine designs by 1912.44 Unlike Krupp, the RMA had
extensive dealings with subcontractors in nearly every phase of U-boat
construction.

For instance, the firm of Julius Pintsch A.B. (Berlin

Furstenwalde) supplied most of the hull sections for the U-boats
built at the Imperial Yard at Danzig.45

Initial problems also

plagued the diesel engines desisned to propel the U-boats on the
surface, much to the State Secretary's annoyance. 46 Nevertheless,
three major firms quickly perfected machines that served Germany's
U-boat ann through 1918, viz. Korting, Daimler and M.A.N.

Later,

Krupp frequently provided its own engine, and Fiat of Turin was used
once and then abandoned.47

43Ibid., 40.
44A. Ti rpitz, op. cit., vo 1. 2, 581-582. BA/MA RM3/ 4915 11 Denk
schri ft zum Inmediatvortrag, betreffend Entwicklung des U-Bootswesens, 11
Berl in 9. l O. 09.
45BA/MA RM3/2209 KWD to Construction Department, RMA, Berlin
1.5.10.
46BA/MA RM5/1948 SS/RMA, Berlin to Commander of the Baltic
Naval Station, Kiel 6.1 .13.
47A. Tirpitz, op. cit., 571-72.

E. Rossler, op. cit., 33.
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By 1912, U-boat construction was settling into a routine similar
to that of the capital ships by 1904-1905.

Germaniawerft forecasted

a construction time of at least eighteen months per boat, depending on
the number of vessels in any given contract.

It was capable of

delivering up to four boats in twenty-four months, working on them
simultaneously.48 Two RMA departments governed similar work on
location at the Imperial Shipyard in Danzig.

Matters pertaining to

electrical systems, propulsion and weaponry were left to the yard's
Technical Bureau.

The U-boat inspectorate directed the submarine

service, the submarine school, and research.49

By 1908 the RMA had

published the guidelines for U-roat construction in a special edition
of the General Construction Guidelines.SO Though the operation at the
Germaniawerft was more self-contained than that at Danzig, they were
obliged to employ those vendors listed in the Suppliers List and abide
by all the requirements of the protocol system.
U-boat construction was an expensive proposition.

It increased

the RMA 1 s dependence on the Imperial Yard at Danzig because Krupp's
boats were the only alternative.

The Germaniawerft prices were already

bringing complaints from the RMA by 1909.51

However, it was less

48BA/MA RMS/1948 SS/RMA, Berlin to the Chief of the Admiralty
Staff, Berlin 1.30. 12.
49E. Rossler, op. cit., 51.
50BA/MA RM3/ll83 KWD to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 3.17.09.
51E. RHssler, op. cit., 27.
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Krupp's propensity to overcharge than the sheer high cost of modern
technology that was contributing to rising prices.

On Krupp's early

models the Essen firm managed very small profits compared with its
capital ship work.

It also lost about four million marks in its

protracted efforts to perfect a U-boat diesel engine to render the firm
independent of M.A.N. or Korting. 52 The percentage of the total cost
for vessels spent on new technical components and the salaries of
special personnel was nearly as high for U-boats as for the Kaiser
Class battleships.

The S.M.S. Prinzregent Luitpold cost the RMA

nearly thirteen million marks, ~.59% of which went for highly technical
equipment and related personnel.

The U-23 through 26 collectively ran

up a bill for 5.95 million marks, and their 3.66% high technology
expenditure was huge, relative to the size of the project. 53
The Annor Monopoly
By this time RMA relations with the Krupp Finn had assumed a
character of coexistence based on profits and naval necessities.
Krupp prices, occasional production errors, and frequent late deliveries
were always frustrating to Tirpitz and his associates.54 The

52HA Krupp WA VII f 1113 passim.
53HA Krupp WA VII f 1479 See:

Bau No. 177/180 and Bau No. 167.

54BA/MA See, for example: RM3/1118 ABA, DUsseldorf to
Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 6.30. 12. RM3/547 Weser, Bremen to
SS/RMA, Berlin 7.9.09. RM3/550 Weser, Bremen to SS/RMA, Berlin
1.3.10. RM3/308 Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA, Berlin
4.18.11.
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Krupp-Dillinger combine still dominated the annor plate industry,55
although their prices on other steel products often differed.

It

was no consolation to the RMA when Essen and Dillingen occasionally
parted company on rivet prices and their charges for particular parts
custom built with nickel stee1.56

In addition, artillery was still

the sole province of Krupp, and the bills increased as the caliber
and number of guns required by the dreadnoughts grew.

The first

installment paid to Essen in 1911 for the S.M.S. Kaiserin's guns,
for example, came to over 7.9 million marks, a full 17% of the total
cost for the battleship.57 The RMA did not have enough coercive
power to force a reduction in Krupp's prices, primarily due to
Essen's monopoly in the field of gun production.
By 1909, however, other new developments gave the RMA its best
opportunity against the Krupp-Dillinger armor plate alliance.
Earlier, international competition from the American Midvale Company
had helped drive Krupp prices down to 1,780 marks per ton.

In 1906

fierce competition with U.S. Steel and Bethlehem in the United States
had produced a record low price of 1,450 marks for Midvale armor.58

55BA/MA RM3/3694 "Protokoll Uber die Sitzung am 30.3.11 Anwesend
Vetreter van A, K, Wand B. Betreffend: Grossen Kreuzer K, 11 Berl in
5.5.11.

56BA/MA RM3/580 Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 9.25.09.
Dillinger Huttenwerke, Dillingen/Saar to SS/RMA, Berlin 10.2.09.
57BA/MA RM3/289 11 Zusammenstell ung der im Rechnungsjahre 1911
entstanden Kosten der artelleristischen Armierung fur Schiffsneubauten, 11
Weapons Division, RMA, Berlin.
58BA/MA RM3/ll634 Handakten Dahnhardt 11 Ubersicht Uber die
Panzerpreisen in verschiedenen Landern, 11 3.3.15.
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Taking advantage of the international pressure placed on Krupp by this
new price, the RMA had asked Midvale, in November 1906, to provide the
Imperial Navy with samples of its armor for tests.

The same month the

RMA offered its support to Fritz Thyssen if he would consider entering
the armor market against Krupp-rillinger.59
The momentary pressure provided by Midvale gave the RMA the
opportunity to use Thyssen, the best of the smaller arms producing
firms, to explore any vulnerable points in the armor monopoly.
Tirpitz was anxious to cut into the monopoly's power, especially when
Schichau asserted that the RMA could build 20% to 25% cheaper if
British firms were supplying the armor and artillery.60 Discussions
with the Mulheim firm began in 1906 and continued well into the next
year.
Although events in the U.S. allowed the price of armor to
bounce back to 1,750 marks in late 1906, the RMA maintained its
interest in the Midvale product.
Krupp complained that it was hard to equal the prices produced
by intense American competition.

By this time, however, the Krupp

Dillinger price was also down to 1,750 marks.

As the talks with

Thyssen continued, Krupp and Dillinger enacted two further

59rbid., "Entwicklung der Panzerpreise," Budget Dept., RMA
Berlin 19~
60w. Boelcke, op. cit., 206.
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reductions, to 1,680 marks in May of 1907 and then to 1,630 marks in
June.

Krupp and Dillinger offered to keep their armor at this low

level only if the RMA agreed to a long term contract extending to
1915.

By August of 1907 the price was down to 1,600 marks, and Krupp

then agreed not to object to any competition the navy might promote.
The two dominant firms were sure that they could produce armor at
least 5% cheaper than any competitor. 61 At last the RMA was making
progress.
The negotiations with Thyssen soured in June 1907 because the
firm was unsure whether it should risk competing in the world of
Midvale and Krupp.

However, in 1909 it was drawn back into discussions

with the RMA at the request of Reichstag member Graf von Oppersdorff.
During the Budget Conmission hearings over the Krupp-Dillinger armor
contracts, 0ppersdorff launched a political attack against the
monopoly.

He appealed to Thyssen and corresponded with the American

Secretary of the Navy regarding Washington 1 s policy toward armor
producers.

He then drew the Ehrhardt artillery firm into the talks

with the navy as wel1.62
In a twenty page memorandum to Tirpitz, 0ppersdorff criticized
past RMA policies, the dangers of monopoly, and presented some

6lsA/MA RM3/ll634 Handakten Dahnhardt: see footnote 42. For
Krupp's reaction to the Thyssen-Midvale threats, see: RM3/11712 Krupp,
Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 12. 16.09. And RM3/ll635 Handakten Dahnhardt
pp. 26-39.
62sA/MA RM3/ll638 Handakten Dahnhardt.
volume.

See pp. 178-94 in this
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possible solutions to the problem.

In his opinion there were a variety

of possible alternatives to the difficulty posed by Krupp and
Dillinger.

The RMA could lengthen the duration of its contracts past

the usual three years simply to coax new firms into the field.
Otherwise it could actively provide competition either by supporting a
state owned armor factory or giving every possible advantage to a
third firm.

He believed that it was vital to avoid leaving Krupp and

Dillinger with full responsibility for Germany's annor, that the
Reichstag coffers had limits and that, in case of war, both Essen
and Dillingen were too close to the French border for comfort.63
In April of 1909, the RMA once again entered discussions with
Wallmann, Thyssen 1 s technical representative, but the negotiations
faltered over the substantial guarantees demanded by Thyssen to make
his risk worthwhile.

By January 1910, Thyssen explained that it

wanted at least one-third of all navy armor contracts for the next
ten years.

The finn would provide the RMA with a low price that could

exert further pressure on the Krupp-Dillinger monopoly until 1915.
Thereafter, Thyssen would feel free to charge the same price as the
alliance did.

If the navy decided to participate in the creation of

a state armor factory, the provisions of this agreement would stand
unchanged.

Arguing that this risky venture could ruin the firm,

Thyssen refused to assume any responsibility for changes in material

63Ibid., 16-26. BA/MA RM3/ll635 11 Verhandlung mit Thyssen Uber
Aufnahme ~Panzerplatten-Herstellung, 11 Construction Department,
RMA, Berlin 1913.
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and labor costs that might eventua11y increase the price of the
finished product. 64
The circumstances created by possible American competition,
debates in the Reichstag, and talks with Thyssen drove the Krupp
Dillinger price down to 1,550 marks per ton by early 1909. 65

None

theless, Tirpitz faced accusations in the Reichstag during February
of 1910 that the navy was not doing enough to lower armor prices.66
Indeed in June of 1911 the Center Party representative, Erzberger,
joined 0ppersdorff in encouraging Thyssen to enter the armor field
against the monopoly. 67 The political pressure on the RMA to employ
an alternative armor source was as great as ever.

Ironically,

Krupp's lower price and Thyssen 1 s extensive guarantee demands made
Tirpitz less willing to pursue an alternative than ever before.
During these proceedings, a number of RMA department chiefs
expressed their views on the alternatives open to the navy.
Rollmann (Construction Department) believed that since the Krupp
Dillinger prices were already down to a fairly low level, the navy
should continue to deal with these two firms.

A state factory would

not produce better or cheaper armor and might take as much as ten

64sA/MA RM3/11635 Handakten Dahnhardt:

see footnote 63.

65sA/MA RM3/11634 Handakten Dahnhardt:

see footnote 58.

66sA/MA RM3/11635 Handakten Dahnhardt Reichstag Verhandlungen,
24, Sitzung, Korrmission fur den Reichshaushalts-Etat, 12, Legislatur
Periode II, session 1909/1910.
67sA/MA RM3/11639 Handakten Dahnhardt, M. Erzberger, Berlin to
Thyssen, Mulheim, June 19 .
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years to reach a point where it could adequately compete with
Krupp. 68 Rollmann had doubts about Thyssen's capacity to function as
an alternative

11

third finn. 11

trative Department).

These were shared by Capelle (Adminis

The current Krupp price was good, the alliance

could deliver immediately, and Thyssen 1 s contract demands far
exceeded those ever suggested by Krupp or Dillinger.

Capelle also

agreed that a state factory was far too expensive to consider, and
there was no guarantee that it could ever outproduce or undersell a
private annor company.

Besides Krupp had already agreed to keep his

prices down even if a state-owned factory became a future reality.
No such guarantee came from Mulheim.

Capelle stressed that Essen and

Dillinger were willing to come to tenns early with the RMA on a long
range contract under more favorable conditions than ever before.
advised the State Secretary to stay with the alliance. 69

He

Dahnhardt (Budget Department) agreed completely with his two
colleagues.

He quickly discarded any suggestion from the political

arena that the RMA did not truly desire competition for Krupp and
Dillinger.

Nonetheless, the RMA's current alternatives to the armor

alliance did not impress him at all.

A state annor factory was a risk

that would not justify the navy's investment.

Another Graf von

Oppersdorff suggestion was the possibility of a compromise between a

68BA/MA RM3/11712 RMA Construction Dept.: a) "Konkurrenz
gegen Krupp," 1909; b) "Panzerlieferungsfrage Krupp-Thyssen, 11 Berlin
2.1.10 (Rollmann). See also: "Resume."
69BA/MA RM3/11711 EI 182/10 1910.
1 .26. 10.

Capelle to SS/RMA, Berlin
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Staatswerke and a private effort.

In effect, he proposed a partnership

in which the state would partially finance a privately directed effort.
Dahnhardt strongly advised against this as well because it would have
all the disadvantages plaguing military-industrial relations with no
guaranteed advantages.

The military could never exert the control in a

mixed enterprise that was the primary reason for wanting a public one.
Besides, said Dahnhardt, "This theory has never been realized in
practice, there are Staatswerke, but absolutely no mixed enterprises. 11 70
The new lower prices, the stability of the Krupp-Dillinger alliance,
and the reliability of their products now appealed to him far more
than any alternative.
That the RMA enjoyed lower annor prices during the 1908-1912
period was more a product of foreign competition than their own efforts.
The price war in the United States and Midvale 1 s penetration of the
foreign market forced Krupp to respond.

Tirpitz openly explored the

possibility of using Midvale products to challenge Krupp's position at
home.

Although the State Secretary could never pennanently depend upon

foreign sources for armor, he kept up RMA contacts with U.S. Steel,
Bethlehem and Midvale through 1913.7 1 The long-term negotiations with
Thyssen and the serious consideration given to Graf van 0ppersdorff's
suggestions showed that the RMA was never content to endure the annor
monopoly if there was a viable alternative.

70BA/MA RM3/ll635 EI 182/10 1910.
7lsA/MA RM3/11634 See footnote 59.

236

The renewed negotiations with the RMA and the energetic support
of Oppersdorff convinced Thyssen that it was in a strong bargaining
position.

Furthennore, Oppersdorff and his Reichstag associates

probably felt vindicated in their antimonopoly efforts by the drastic
reduction of Krupp-Dillinger prices between 1900 and 1909.

If the

alliance could reduce their price to 1,600 marks per ton and still turn
a handsome profit, why was this not done long ago?
decline even further?

Could prices not

The spectre of possible Thyssen success and

continued Reichstag assaults on armor prices pushed a worried Krupp to
stabilize the situation by suggesting a long-tenn contract with the
RMA at 1,550 marks for battleship armor.
Unfortunately for Thyssen, the guarantees it demanded destroyed
its chances of capturing a portion of Krupp 1 s armor profits.

While on

the one hand, it was true that the venture under discussion was a great
risk for Thyssen, on the other hand, the alliance's prices were down
sharply and their contract proposals were far more appealing.

The

unanimous approval of these proposals by Rollmann, Capelle and Dahnhardt
leaves little doubt that this was the predominant feeling within the
RMA.

The result was a long-term agreement with Krupp and Dillinger

which lasted until the outbreak of war in 1914.

In the final reckoning,

it was effective handling of political and economic forces both inside
and outside the navy that eventually produced lower armor prices.
The Protocol System, Labor, and Overruns in Cost and Weight
Not every test and inspection in the protocol system went
smoothly.

By 1909, the RMA Purchasing Office was experiencing severe
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personnel shortages.

The existing Purchasing Office inspectors were

too few and could not work quickly enough to keep construction on
schedule.

In one instance, the Bismarckhutte waited nearly three

months for purchasing tests required for its steel by RMA protocol.72
These cases prompted many naval officials to push for more personnel
in spite of budget restrictions.

von Goecke of the Imperial Yard at

Wilhelmshaven argued that if the Prussian railroad alone could have
ninety-six inspectors the navy could manage to increase its own.7 3
Some naval suppliers resorted to independent engineers or testing
firms to perform tests approved by the Purchasing Office.

The Zeiss

Co. did this in 1913 in order to have cables approved for a U-boat
periscope system.74 However, mcst firms were reluctant to employ this
alternative.

If the Purchasing Office did the job, the firm only paid

for the tests and not the personal expenses of the naval officials.
Hiring a private testing agency meant accepting all of the additional
costs.

Furthermore, this practice, although not forbidden, was not

encouraged by the RMA.
In an effort to resolve these difficulties, the Construction
Department proposed that independent suppliers should transport their
products to the private and Imperial Yards part of the time, where

72BA/MA RM3/2043 Baumeister Grundt, Danzig to SS/RMA, Berlin
10.2.09. Correspondence between the BBA in Danzig and Wilhelmshaven
and the Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 5.11.09.
73Ibid.

ABA, DUsseldorf to KWW 3.10.10.

74sA/MA RM3/2044 Firma Carl Zeiss, Jena to Kaiserliche
Inspektion des Torpedowesens, Kiel 12.23.13.
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shipyard personnel could assume some of the tasks usually reserved for
the Purchasing Office.

This idea was under debate at the RMA for at

least two years, between 1910 and 1912.

However, the Imperial Yards

and some chief inspectors strongly opposed this solution as counter
productive.

They argued that the additional transport costs involved

in sending defective equipment back to the factories made this solution
far more expensive than asking for increased personnel appropriations.75
This remained a nagging problem well into the war years, primarily
because Tirpitz would not reduce his construction spending to allow
for an increased personnel budget.7 6 By 1912 most purchase tests
were still performed at the factory.77
This decision was common to other navies as well.

The

Austrians limited purchasing tests to the production site and then
allowed delivery and installation under naval supervision at the
shipyard.

They demanded the very same type of guarantees required by

the RMA and left their Construction Inspectorate in ultimate control
of construction site decisions.78 Vienna managed to avoid delays at
the end of a ship's construction period by convincing its yards that

75Ibid. KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 2.3. 12. BBS,
Hamburg (Blohm und Voss) to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 6. 15.12.
BA/MA RM3/2043 KWD to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 8.22.10.
76BA/MA RM3/2044 Telegrams:

RMA to KWD, KWW, KWK 8.29-30.13.

77Ibid. Beaufsichtigung der Panzerplattenfabrikation, Essen
to SS/RMA, Berlin 7.29.12.
78BA/MA RM3/1063 Prasidialkanzeli des K.u.K. Kriegsminister
iums, Marinesektion, Vienna to German Naval Attache, Vienna
10.3.13.

l
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it was wise to increase the number of naval technical personnel on
board at the time of launching and shakedown.

This would guarantee

quick acceptance of the product by the navy and a much shorter, more
efficient trial period.

While the RMA was having a great deal of

trouble carrying out this same measure, the Austrians cut their shake
down time to less than three weeks.79 The RMA constantly ran into
debates with industry over who would pay the costs for the on-board
personnel during these trial runs.

The time period involved remained

a month or more.BO Then the vessel still had to face final approval
by the Ship Testing Commission.Bl
The RMA frequently found itself once again defining the
boundaries of responsibility an~ spending for industry.

The private

yards often argued that the navy should pay much of the cost for tests
on machines, boilers and other apparati.

The RMA retorted that the

well of construction funds was not bottomless.

It would bear the cost

of docking and maintenance, some research projects, and a percentage of
the work on the submerged parts of the ship, but not standard product
testing.B2 As was the case with adhering to the Suppliers List and

79Ibid. Naval Attach~ in Vienna to SS/RMA, Berlin: "Probe
fahrten inder Osterreichisch-ungarischen Marine, 11 9.22.11.
BOBA/MA RM3/6013 Germaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden to SS/RMA, Berlin
10.9. 12. Schichau, Elbing to SS/RMA, Berlin 11.6. 12. Vulcan, Hamburg
to SS/RMA, Berlin 11.4.12.
81BA/MA RM3/6198-6202 passim, 1909-1918.
S2BA/MA RM3/6011 KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
1.24.11.
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obtaining permission to employ some patents, the individual firms were
completely responsible for providing the navy with well constructed
and tested products.83

If a finn encountered difficulties, as it might

over a patent, it could count on RMA assistance.84

However, the

responsibilities here ultimately lay with industry.
In its search for suppliers or information about firms applying
for a place on the Suppliers List, the RMA became closely associated
with scores of local Handelskammern or Chambers of Conmerce.

It was

standard procedure for the RMA to check out every firm that desired to
work for the navy 85 and much of this information came from the Chambers.
In 1910, the Hamburg Chamber of Conmerce revealed that the Henry P.
Newman Co. sold some corkboard ship insulation that was not produced
in Germany.

The RMA later assured itself that the material it bought

from Newman was manufactured in Gennany.86 Nonetheless, information
like this assured some Chambers of a great deal of influence at the
Konigin Augusta Strasse.

Others would merely supply details on a

firm 1 s financial stability and fixed capital.

The Frankfurt a. M.

Chamber gave the RMA facts on the Gunmiwerke Frankfurt A.G. that

83BA/MA RM3/363 Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to Geheim Oberbaurat
Burkner, Hamburg 9.13.13. RM3/381 Werkvertrag: Ersatz KurfUrst
Friedrich Wilhelm (Grosser KurfUrst, Ktinig Class) 1911.
84BA/MA RM3/lll9 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
5. 31 . 13.
85BA/MA RM3/2208 "Besichtigung Uber die Firma 1 WUrttembergische
Eisenwerke GmbH', Feuerbach-Stuttgart, 11 1909. RM3/2300 KWW to
Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 9.9.09.
86BA/MA RM3/2256 Henry P. Newman, Hamburg to RMA, Berlin
8.20.10. HK, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.10.10.

241
revealed the firm's capital and distribution of shares, as well as
information on its dividends and founders.87
It was the function of a Chamber of Commerce to promote the
fortunes of business in its locality.

By reporting accurately on

the best and the very worst of firms, 88 many trusted Chambers were
able to sponsor small firms in their ambitions to work for the navy.
These Chambers of Co1T111erce actually assumed the role of minor pressure
or lobbying groups for companies which otherwise might have had a
difficult time obtaining naval consideration.

In January of 1910 the

DUsseldorf Chamber appealed to the RMA to avoid going abroad for an
insulation material called 11 polypyrit. 11

The navy was investigating

the product manufactured by the R. G. van Kokeritz Company in New York
City, but the Chamber made an excellent argument for staying at home
by proposing a capable DUsseldorf firm as a viable domestic
alternative. 89
In other circumstances, Chambers of Commerce acted on behalf
of groups of small firms with as few as fifty workers each or often
banded together with other chambers to introduce a single firm to
navy work.

In one instance the Plauen and Zittau Chambers joined to

sponsor the bid of the Otto BUttner finn in Bautzen for a place on the

87Ibid. HK, Frankfurt a. M. to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.30.10.
Dresden to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.1. 10.
88Ibid.

HK, Hannover to SS/RMA, Berlin 3.23.10 .

89sA/MA RM3/2255 HK, DUsseldorf to RMA, Berlin 1.3.10.

HK,
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Suppliers List. 90 These small towns tried to conmand the attention of
the RMA, but more characteristic of this facet of RMA relations with
industry were letters from Berlin, Hannover, Dresden and Hamburg.
This was a symbiotic relationship which provided influence for the
smaller businesses in the highest circles and vastly expanded the
number of firms from which the RMA could choose.
Tirpitz also had to enforce greater security measures, primarily
due to complaints from some of the private yards.

The RMA was already

very security conscious when it came to the foreign contracts under
construction at some private yards.

The yards had to give the navy

any infonnation it required on these vessels.91

However, RMA

procedures did not take into account possible security problems with
the foreign workers employed at the private yards.

Both Schichau and

Vulcan complained about less than stringent security measures taken
against foreigners working for Blohm und Voss in Hamburg.
accusations were possibly a by-product of competition.

These

Nonetheless,

the RMA rewrote its paragraph in the General Construction Guidelines
Manual in 1913 to avoid any further danger, real or imaginary, posed
by non-Germans working on naval projects.92 At the same time it
tightened security on the exchange of private or patented technical

90BA/MA RM3/2209 HK fUr den Kreis Siegen to SS/RMA, Berlin
3.30.10. RM3/2256 HK, Plauen to SS/RMA, Berlin 5.3. 10.
91BA/MA RM3/6010 RMA, Berlin to Gennaniawerft, Kiel-Gaarden
1.27.09; Blohm und Voss, Hamburg 2.6.09; Schichau, Danzig 1.25.09.
92BA/MA RM3/284 Vulcan, Hamburg 7.3.13; Blohm und Voss,
Hamburg 7.12. 13; to RMA, Berlin.
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systems and methods employed by certain private yards.

It seems that

RMA engineers and inspectors were too freely disseminating information
that private yards often wished to keep to themselves.93
As the RMA prepared for the 1912 Naval Budget, it gave more
consideration to expanding the Imperial Yards and lending greater
financial support to the services they performed for the RMA.

By this

time construction was only one facet of the work at the Imperial
Shipyards.

They were the fleet repair bases, dock facilities, centers

for training technical personnel, and competition for the private
yards.

They assisted in research and the accounting and disbursal of

construction funds.94 Every yard and subcontractor was required to
give the Imperial Yards at least thirty days' notice with regard to
cost, weight and design changes so the quarterly financial reports to
Berlin were accurate.95 Thus, the RMA knew whether the construction
funds for a particular project were adequate or overdrawn and just
how much was due each vendor.
for its own projects.

No Imperial Yard did the cost accounting

Rather, one of its sister yards would then

play the role of naval auditor.96

93BA/MA RM3/281 Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to RMA, Berlin 6.28.10.
94BA/MA RM3/ll713 Handakten Capelle, 11 Notizen fur Seine
Exzellenz den Herrn Staatssekretar zu den Beschuldigungen im Prozess
Heinrich Frankenthal. Betr: Schlendrian in der Marineverwaltung. 11
Part 2, 11 Werftorganization, 11 11.12.09.
95BA/MA RM3/6089 KWK to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 4.22.11.
11 Aufstellung der Ausgabekontrollen, Berucksichtigung von GeldUber
weisung.11
96BA/MA RM3/6121 KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 8.22.12.
Ausgabekontrolle fUr das 1. Vierteljahr 1912. RM3/6119 KWW to
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Only in the spring and summer of every year was the fleet
together, ready for exercises.

At other times it was paraded, in

stages, through the Imperial Yards for most of its repairs. 97

In

1912 Wilhelmshaven could dock forty ships of various sizes and types
and the Kiel yard provided thirty-two more places.

However, given

the size and continuous growth of the fleet, these two primary
Imperial Yards needed even better facilities.

Sixteen million marks

were added to the budget proposals of May, 1912 to enlargen both
Wilhelmshaven and Kiel for capital ship and U-boat work.98
A further frustration plaguing Tirpitz was the rising cost of
construction.

The RMA was finding it more and more difficult to build

at cost in the Imperial Shipyards and keep expenditures within
reasonable limits.

The rising price of materials and labor, long

construction schedules, the ambitions of private finns for maximum
profits and lengthy repair work in the Imperial Yards all contributed
to Tirpitz's financial dilerruna.99

Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 11.10.11. RM3/609l KWK: "Viertel
jarliche Ausgabekontrolle den Fonds fUr den Neubau des Linienschiffes
"Ostfriesland" fUr das IV Vierteljahr 1911. 11
97BA/MA RM3/2021 Jahresausbildungsplan der Flotte, 1910.
98BA/MA RM3/36ll "Denkschrift betreffend den wei teren Ausbau
der Werften auf Grund der Flottengesetznovelle 1912," Berlin 5.7.12.
99BA/MA RM3/ll599 "Denkschrift Uber die Notwendigkeit der
Beibehaltung der Deckungsgemeinschaften bei den Schiffbauund
Armierungsfond," 1911.
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In his efforts to cut cost, Tirpitz did have some assets.

RMA

accounting procedures were generally accurate, and more companies were
forced to absorb excess costs than ever before.100

In the fall of

1911, the navy tightened up on its transport expenses.

The RMA

lowered its transport costs by reducing the weight of the heavy metal
containers for the bulk delivery of rivets.101

It also insisted that

reluctant firms assume any transport costs from factory to shipyard as
stipulated in their contracts.102
Sometimes a technological breakthrough helped the chronic
budget problems.

Schichau and Blohm und Voss initially deemed a new

system for reducing the number of steel ribs supporting a ship's hull
too risky and expensive.

When Vulcan tested the design change in a

1909 prototype nothing was further from the truth.

It promised to

markedly reduce the weight of light cruisers at .an initial expense
which was only one-quarter of that predicted.103
Unfortunately, the sheer number of overruns still outweighed
these small successes.

Revisions of a battleship's rudder system at

the Imperial Yard in Wilhelmshaven in 1911 amounted to over 1,600

lOOsA/MA RM3/539 Krupp, Essen to SS/RMA, Berlin 6.18.10.
RM3/14GO BBS, Blohm und Voss, Hamburg to SS/RMA, Berlin 12.2.13.
lOlBA/MA RM3/308 Reports to RMA by: Inspektion des Torpedo
wesens, Kiel 10.24.11; KWW 11.11.11; KWD 11.24.11; KWK 11.30.11.
l02BA/MA RM3/548 Inspektion des Torpedowesen, Kiel to Ohlrich
(representative A.G. Weser), Friedrichsort 4.19.09.
l03BA/MA RM3/361 Vulcan, Stettin to RMA, Berlin 3.13.09.
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marks, including labor costs.104

The regularity of these cases

continued unabated into the war years.
An article in the 1912 edition of the naval annual, Nauticus,
extolled the advantages of the fleet construction program for the
workers.

One dreadnought type battleship supplied work and pay for

seven thousand men for about two years.

The navy estimated that this

total would include about 1,500 administrators of various sorts and
5,500 workers. 105 These shipyard workers were glad, no doubt, to have
a job, but their satisfaction stopped there.

The socialists in the

Reichstag complained that wage rates were hardly keeping pace with the
profits reaped by the private yQrds or the pressure placed upon the
worker by the navy's construction schedule.
The socialists were comparing the cost of living in the north
German shipbuilding centers with the worker's take home pay and
publicizing the obvious plight of their constituents.

During a

session of the Reichstag Budget Corrmission, representative Brandes
(SPD, Halberstadt) asserted that at Kiel and Elbing a worker could
expect only between 32 and 40 pf per hour.

If he worked a fifteen

hour day for six days every week, he would take home a maximum of 36
marks.

After investing 1.62 marks in government social welfare

programs and about 3.29 marks each week for rent, he had a mere 31.09
for his family's food, clothing and other needs.106

Brandes

l04BA/MA RM3/583 KWW to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin 8.11 .11.
105Nauticus, 1912, 296.
l06BA/MA RM3/5996 pt. 2.
session 5.15.12.

Reichstag Budget Commission, 63.

247
sarcastically wondered why workers were left with about thirty marks
each week, when estimated Krupp profits from navy contracts in 1911
alone were 28 million marks.107
Brandes' information was accurate.
the average wage was 37.6 pf per hour.
were even worse off.

At Schichau 1 s Elbing yard

The company's Danzig workers

Forty-seven percent of a work force of approxi

mately 6,000 were earning between 20 and 30 pf.

Only 5% reached the

top range of 40 to 50 pf, with the rest hovering at various levels in
between.108 With the exception of the slightly higher wage levels
common in Hamburg, these figures were typical of six top private
yards not much better at the Imperial Yards.

A master ship's mechanic

working for the RMA in 1909 could expect about 49 pf per hour at the
outset with the possibility of raises to over 50 pf. l09 However, in
most skilled categories naval wages were stable at between 40 and 53
pf whereas private industry sometimes offered up to 58 pf for an
experienced machine or ship builder.110 Most workers never achieved
the highest wage levels because the majority were only slightly
skilled or completely unskilled labor.
In spite of these problems, strikes were infrequent and
ineffective.

They were small, isolated and sporadic, and were

l07Ibid.
l08Ibid.
109BA/MA RM3/1011 KWD to Construction Dept., RMA, Berlin
8.20.09.
llOBA/MA RM3/5997 pt. 1. Speech by representative Brandes
(SPD). Reichstag Verhandlung 124. session 3.3.13.
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perceived more as a loss of valuable time rather than a real threat to
the industry or RMA.

In the Fall of 1910, the Howaldtswerke in Kiel

experienced a strike that delayed its construction schedule for weeks.
This event presented a real problem for Howaldt only when the RMA
insisted upon the original completion date for the ships involved.

It

was not considered an important independent action by the workers.111
The same was the case when Vulcan noted difficulties with its workers
on the Ersatz Friedrich Wilhelm in August of 1911. 112 The Schichau
werft's low wages also prompted a work action in 1911 lasting twenty
weeks.

The workers gained nothing and an SPD Reichstag member angrily

noted that the yard's profits amounted to 800 marks per worker in that
year. 113 A strike against Krupp in Kiel during Christmas week, 1912,
met with the same result.

The 5,000 men that walked out at the

Germaniawerft had nothing to show for their trouble.

The Krupp

directors lamented the slowdown and railed against the SPD and the
socialist press in Schleswig-Holstein for inspiring the workers.114
As far as Gustav Krupp was concerned the government was failing to
protect the rights of those who were willing to work.

By now many

industrialists used this traditional argument to isolate strikers and
then precipitate government action against them.

The head of the Krupp

lllBA/MA RM3/368 Howaldtswerke, Kiel to RMA., Berlin 1.5.12.
11 2BA/MA RM3/379 Telegrarr,:
8.10.11.
ll3BA/MA RM3/5996 pt. 2.

Vulcan, Stettin to RMA, Berlin
See footnote 106.

114HA Krupp FAH IV C90 Direktorium to Krupp van Bohlen und
Halbach, Essen 12.21.12.
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family even turned this point of view into an official memo which he
presented to the Bethmann-Hollweg government during the strikes in the
Ruhr in early 1912.ll5
Although the Hamburg harbor workers struck three times between
1897 and 1914, the shipyard workers did not manage any unified,
effective effort during this period.116 Labor unrest became more
intense after 1910 as the naval construction program reached its
maturity.

Nonetheless, strikes had a relatively small number of

participants and were regularly limited to a single yard.

In the

shipbuilding industry, union activities were still primitive and the
power of organized labor did not extend to every yard.

~Jages,

especially for unskilled workers or those with a minimum of experience,
remained low.

However, the increasing power of the SPD could at least

guarantee that workers' complaints would quickly find political
expression.
The Money Runs Out:

The 1912 Supplementary Naval Law

Tirpitz probably faced the greatest challenge of his career in
the debate over the 1912 Supplementary Naval Law.

The technical and

strategic demands posed by his consistent fleet goals were staggering

1150. Fricke, "Eine Denkschrift Krupps aus dem Jahre 1912 Uber
den Schutz der Arbeitswilligen, 11 Zeitschrift fUr Geschichtswissenschaft
VI (1957), 1245-48.
ll6These 11 hafenarbeiter 11 strikes took place in 1896/97, 1910
and 1913/14. See: E. Bohm, Uberseehandel . . . passim.
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in financial terms.11?

Outside the navy he was under attack by both

the Reichstag and the Imperial Treasury Office.
was second nature to Tirpitz by now.
matter.

Managing the former

The Treasury was quite another

In the State Secretary of the Treasury Office, Tirpitz met

his match, at least in determination.

Peter-Christian Witt has

characterized the relationship between Wermuth of the Treasury and
Tirpitz as an 11 extremely bitter, small scale war. 11 118 The head of
the Treasury saw the 1912 Novelle as symptomatic of a general
11

egotistical department-policy 11 that characterized both the army and

the navy . 11 9
Supported by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, Wermuth was bent on
redrawing the budget priorities of the Reich in 1912.
broader fiscal foundation for the country.

He wanted a

This included resurrecting

the old tax question that plagued the Reichstag throughout the years
of naval development.

Without a modern tax law, most of the programs

desired by the armed forces would depend upon traditional sources of
revenue, augmented by increased taxes on consumer products.120

In the

military sphere, he agreed with the chancellor that Germany's true
power lay with the army.

The best possible public investment in

defense should reflect this fact.

Ever since the outset of Tirpitz 1 s

117BA/MA RM3/ll599 11 Denkschrift Uber die Notwendigkeit der
Beibehaltung der Deckungsgemeindschaften bei den Schiffbauund
Armierungfonds, 11 1910, p. 5.
11 8p • -C . ~Ji t t , op . c i t . , 261- 62.
ll9Ibid., 341-43.
l20Ibid., 341-43; 375.
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construction program the navy's rate of growth far outstripped that
of the army.

In spite of a budget three to five times larger, the

army's war readiness suffered from the vast increase in funds piped
into naval hardware.

The navy's rate of growth in the short period

since Wermuth took office in 1909 was alone more than twice that of
the army. 121
The Secretary of the Treasury Office used traditional political
and social forces to oppose Tirpitz's 1912 proposals.
succeeded in passing more equitable tax laws.

He never

However, the assets he

had in this confrontation were the conservatives' antipathy to an
inheritance tax and their traditional ties to the army, coupled with
the political clout he and Bethmann could muster.

These were the

forces Tirpitz faced in 1912.122
The State Secretary clung to his theories of strategy and fleet
composition with a dogged determination.

He used RMA inspired reports

from the London Naval Attache to convince Wilhelm that the British
were expecting a further German naval buildup and were grudgingly
resigned to it. 123 He argued that in spite of what the British might
say publicly, they would not place their navy above every other
consideration and go into a building frenzy.

Thus he defended and

promoted his current fleet composition, his reliance upon the capital
ship, and the distribution of the fleet in the Baltic and North

121Ibid., 206.
l22Ibid., 343.
123G. Ritter, Staatskunst, vol. 2, 233-36.
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Seas. 124 However, he was worried for some time before the debate over
the naval supplement about tighter financial conditions within the
Reich.

Privately, he expressed doubts to his RMA colleagues about the

possibility of pushing much further beyond the 1911 spending levels.
Inflation, the colossal cost of the newer dreadnoughts, and the high
price of technology were drying up his reserves and making success in
the Reichstag less certain than ever before.125
In the debates over the 1912 Supplementary Naval Law in the
Budget Commission hearings and then in the regular sessions of the
Reichstag, Tirpitz pounded away at his old themes.

Britain was the

enemy and Germany could achieve at least a 2:3 ratio in capital ships
in the near future.

He told the Reichstag that British vows to out

build Germany at any cost were efforts at inflarrmatory propaganda
designed to intimidate rather than express reality.126 Actually,
the members of the Reichstag seemed less concerned with British points
of view than they were with the Reich s financial condition.
1

The

challenges Tirpitz faced in the Reichstag touched on high prices,
efficiency of the Imperial Yards, monopoly, and cases of cheaper
124BA/MA RM3/ll639 Handakten Dahnhardt, Capelle memo to Budget
Dept., RMA, Berlin 1911.
125v. Berghahn, Coming of War . . . 99.
126HA Krupp FAH IV E64 Krupp to Ehrensberger, Berlin 1.19.10.
BA/MA RM3/ll594 11 Begrundung der Novelle in der Budgetkommission, 11
Administrative Dept., RMA, Berlin 1912. One such example was
W. Churchill 1 s speech in the Commons on 22 July 1912.
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shipbuilding abroad. 127 The Reichstag representatives were taking a
greater interest in shipyard fact-finding tours.
the show-tours of the 1898-1900 period.

These were no longer

More often than not a repre

sentative of every political point of view participated.

Thus, they

were now criticizing the RMA budget proposals from a much more informed
and concerned position. 128 After the heated naval supplement debates
the Reichstag established an Annaments Committee to look at the
financial aspects of military anns purchases more closely. 129
The 1912 naval supplement passed the Reichstag on 14 June, but
for the first time in fourteen years the event was a setback for the
State Secretary.
his ends.

On the surface it seemed that Tirpitz had achieved

There was an increase in construction funds and the active

fleet was to receive a third squadron.

However, the reserves in home

waters were tapped to form the third squadron.

All of the battleships

and cruisers of the active fleet and one quarter of those in reserve
were now kept pennanently in commission.

This increased the active

fleet by four battleships, four heavy and four light cruisers.

The

reserve fleet flagship was also activated and new funds completed the

127BA/MA RM3/5996 pt. 2. 63. session, Reichstag Verhandlungen
5.15. 12. 33. und 34. Sitzung, Reichstag, 13. Legislatur-Periode,
1. session 1912. Korrmission fUr den Reichshaushalts Etat.
128BA/MA RM3/ll69l "Nachweisung der Teilnehmer an einer
Reichstagsinformationsreise im Juni, 11 1913.
l 29Ibi d.
Ber1in 7. 13. 13.

Handakten van Gohren, "Betrifft:
(Dahnhardt to Tirpitz, Berlin).

RUstungsausschuss, 11
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third squadron by providing for three more battleships and two light
cruisers.l 30
Personnel had always taken a back seat to Tirpitz's instruction
program.

As historian Gerhard Ritter explained:

"Clearly, the rate

of construction had far outstripped the facilities for procuring
trained personnel, especially officers. 11131 In 1912, however, in
response to requests by the Chief of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral van
Holtzendorff, a greater amount of money was diverted to the acquisition
and training of personnel to man the fleet.

Support for this measure

also came from some of Tirpitz's associates in the RMA.

Rollmann of

the Construction Department had increased personnel spending as far
back as 1909.132
Although the addition of the reserves to the active fleet
momentarily obscured it, Tirpitz's precious building rate was markedly
reduced.

From 1908 through 1911 the State Secretary built at a tempo

of four capital ships per year, three battleships and a heavy cruiser.
Now, reduced resources allowed only one of each type for the 1912
budget year, and the Supplementary Naval Law funds only increased this

130Hurd &Castle, op. cit., 337-39. BA/MA RM3/11637 Handakten
Dahnhardt, Scheme of Fleet Composition and Development from 1898 to
1912.
131G. Ritter, Staatskunst, vol. 2, 237-38.
132BA/MA RM3/2500 Rollmann's personnel requests were often
drastically reduced. The 1910 Budget is one example. See the above
volume passim.
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by one battleship in 1913. 133

(Table 5)

The days of rapid growth

and plentiful funds were at an end.
Summary
A variety of forces acted on the naval construction program
during the 1909-12 period.

On the one hand, Tirpitz did not

thoroughly appreciate political and military realities like the
British unwillingness to allow the German challenge to go unanswered.
He chose to play down the British threat when it called for a real
reduction in German shipbuilding because this did not further his
goals or satisfy his imperative to complete the fleet required by the
Risk Theory.

By this time, however, his vanity and the public and

industrial momentum gained by fleet expansion were pushing the navy
toward the very confrontation the State Secretary repeatedly said he
wished to avoid.
On the other hand, Tirpitz fully appreciated the opportunity
presented by American competition in the steel industry.

He very

effectively used this situation to force the Krupp-Dillinger alliance
into the concessions the RMA had sought since 1897.

Tirpitz had lost

none of his ability to recognize a line of activity that could further
his aims, like the triple pressures he placed on Krupp-Dillinger by
using Midvale, Thyssen and Prince van Oppersdorff.
Domestic forces exerted enough pressure to hand Tirpitz his
first legislative defeat in fourteen years.

The reduced construction

133BA/MA RM3/6673-6674 Annual Reports of the Shipbuilding
Commission 1906-1915.
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TABLE 5
CAPITAL SHIPS BUILT BY THE RMA
IN THE 1909-18 PERIOD*

Capital Ship

Company

Year

Battleships
Kaiser
Friedrich der Grosse
Kaiserin
Konig Albert
Prinzregent Luitpold
K"oni g
Grosser Kurf"urst
Markgraf
Kronprinz
Bayern
Baden
WUrttemburg
Sachsen

KWK
Vulcan
Howaldtswerke
Schichau
Germaniawerft
KWW
Vulcan
Weser
Gennaniawerft
Howaldtswerke
Schichau
Vulcan
Germaniawerft

1909-12
1910-12
1910-13
1910-13
1911-13
1911-14
1911-14
1911-14
1912-14
1914-16
1913-16
19141914-

Blohm und Voss
Blohm und Voss
Blohm und Voss
Bl ohm und Voss
Schichau
KWW
Blohm und Voss
Schi chau
Blohm und Voss
KWW
Vulcan
Germaniawerft
Blohm und Voss

1909-11
1909-12
1911-13
1912-14
1912-15
1913-17
1914191519151915191619161916-

Heavy Cruisers
Moltke
Goeben
Seydlitz
Derffl i nger
Lutzow
Hindenberg
Mackensen
Graf Spee
Prinz Eitel Friedrich
FUrst Bismarck
Ersatz Yorck
Ersatz Gneisenau
Ersatz Scharnhorst
Light Cruisers
28 ships, eight of which were never completed.
*Statistics taken from E. Groner, Die Deutsche Kriegsschiffe,
1815-1945 (Munich, 1966), vol. 1.
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funds and slower building tempo indicated that Tirpitz 1 s construction
program had reached its zenith.

The decisive factors were Bethmann,

Wermuth, and the vulnerability of the navy to public and political
attack exhibited by the Kiel scandal.

These proved too much even for

the State Secretary's political talents.
a bit more frequent.

Even strikes were becoming

The SPD's election victory in 1912 assured

that they would have a great political and economic effect in the
future.
Save for the pressures that finally gave the RMA relief from
oppressive armor prices, every other instance pointed to the
difficulty of attaining Tirpitz's ideal.

Political and diplomatic

realities in Gennany's relations with Britain had begun to change
as far back as 1902, and Bethmann-Hollweg's opposition to Tirpitz
reflected this change.

The burden of ship construction was becoming

unbearable for the Reich's narr0w financial foundation, thus
Wennuth s attitude.
1

In 1912, the government's decision to increase

anny spending at the expense of the navy revealed a necessary
recognition of political and military reality.

The anny was a proven

commodity, needed in a time of stress and instability.

The navy was

still a binding social force domestically, but now it was also an
expensive burden and a source of some domestic and international
strife.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The key to naval-industrial relations in Gennany between 1897
and 1912 is Admiral Tirpitz.

He was a man of inmense detennination,

political talent, and personal ambition.

Unfortunately for Gennany,

he also possessed the blindness of a dogmatist.

Paul Kennedy has

shown that the Admiral's relentless efforts to build a fleet to rival
Great Britain contributed to Germany's political and military isola
tion from most of the world's great powers. 1 His dogmatism was also
reflected in his insensitivity to the Reich's difficult financial
condition.

This is affirmed by Peter-Christian Witt's work.2

Indeed,

as Volker Berghahn has revealed, Tirpitz s defense of the Risk Theory
1

tended to obscure almost every facet of the changing political scene
during this period. 3 His actions indicate an inclination toward what
is often called "tunnel vision."

Spurred on by the support of the

Kaiser and heavy industry, Tirpitz came to look upon his theories as
Gennany's only means for achieving world power status.

Tirpitz

perceived officers, publicists, and politicians as friends or enemies
by the degree of support or opposition they rendered.

He acknowledged

lPaul Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914
(London, 1980).
2P.-C. Witt, Die Finanzpolitik des deutschen Reiches von 1903
bis 1913 (Historischen Studien 415 . LUbeck, 1970).

3v.

Berghahn, Der Tirpitz Plan . . . (DUsseldorf, 1970).
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or ignored events affecting the navy depending on how they might
further his goals.
Some of the baser aspects of Tirpitz's behavior revealed them
selves in his treatment of opponents.

The RMA chief drove von Maltzahn,

Galster and Persius into professional obscurity.

Later, when the Ad

miral's power began to falter, Galster reemerged as the theoretical
mentor of Tirpitz's strategic opponents.

Only Lothar Persius struck

back at Tirpitz with an equal ferocity both in and out of the service.
In 1918 he took particular relish in a final published condemnation of
Tirpitz 1 s composition of the fleet and his strategic ideas.
After the success of the 1898 and 1900 Fleet Laws, Tirpitz's per
sonal inclinations were reinforced by other factors.
tainly one of the single most influential forces.

Industry was cer

This was not because

Tirpitz commanded respect, but simply for the huge profits his political
administrative talents produced. Various other popular groups also kept up
the pressure.

Historian Wilhelm Deist I s analysis of the enthusiastic re

sponse of the Naval League and other organizations to the RMA 1 s fleet propa
ganda clearly indicates the kind of independent momentum developed by these
civilian groups.4 As the political climate inGermanyandabroadchanged,
these popular forces prompted the State Secretary to remain unbending.
For the navy and industry the most pressing problem was rapid
expansion and having to keep up with Tirpitz's plans.
inherent in a rapid pace soon became evident.

The liabilities

Too little money was

invested in personnel to man the fleet during construction and in
4wilhelm Deist, Flatten olitik und Flatten ro a anda: Das
Nachrichtenburo des Reichmarineamts, 1897-1914 Stuttgart, 1976 .
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service.

The difficulties of the Purchasing Office in completing

its technical examinations of purchased materials on schedule were
one manifestation of this problem.

Handicaps of this sort expanded

like a chain reaction causing lost construction time, increasing the
cost of a ship and often delaying the installation of turbines, armor
and guns.

It was increasingly characteristic of a diverse program

on a tight schedule that one problem frequently caused a multitude
of others.
The most effective weapon Tirpitz had in his efforts to reach
his goals in the fleet construction program was the Protocol System.
This was the labyrinth of rules and regulations that governed the
RMA s relationship with industry.
1

As State Secretary of the RMA,

Tirpitz broadened and perfected this system, using as his groundwork
the General Construction Guidelines and the other various regulations
that obliged most of the naval armaments industry to play by the
RMA 1 s rules.

The Protocol System was not a unique or ingenious

system of infallible controls that assured RMA dominance over the
armaments industry.

Rather, the RMA was able to assert itself in its

relations with industry through the Protocol System by means of
superior administration and management.
The Protocol System gave the RMA many advantages in its deal
ings with the industry.

The most obvious example of this is the

Suppliers List, which helped the RMA enforce its wishes with
industry.

Through its own inspectors and with help from Chambers of

Commerce, the RMA developed a profile of every company that applied
for naval work.

It then had the opportunity to test all of the
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materials and products for use at the shipyards, withholding approval
until the standards were met.
The Suppliers List did have its flaws.

The RMA could have

shown more care in assembling the finns in each category in order to
avoid creating unfair competition.

More careful definition of

Suppliers List categories and a clear indication of affiliate
relationships would have placed the private yards in a position to
select a qualified subcontractor at a better price.

This would have

reduced direct supervision by the RMA and perhaps prompted fewer
accusations of unwarranted interference from industry.

Yet, overall,

the Suppliers List was an effective tool in an efficient system of
restraints upon industry.
In the supervision of th~ construction program Tirpitz allowed
von Eickstedt and Rollman a great deal of freedom to pick their own
people and employ their own style.

The latter were very capable

administrators and effectively employed the Protocol System to
achieve Tirpitz's ends.

This freedom also extended to those who

actually supervised the shipbuilding at the yards.

The Construction

Inspector attached to each project was able to make most decisions
with a bare minimum of contact with Berlin.

All business corres

pondence with the Konigin Augusta Strasse regarding a given project
had to go via the Inspector for his canmentary.

This way the RMA

was better able to evaluate the performance of the firms, the
Inspectorate and relations with industry in general.
Another valuable facet of the Protocol System was the part
played by the Imperial Yards.

These yards effectively supplied the
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RMA with an alternative when bids from the private yards were far
too high.

They were, of course, the ones to set the example for

private industry when van Stosch first called for a completely home
based shipbuilding industry.

The Imperial Yards fulfilled a variety

of functions for Tirpitz as the navy's pace of growth quickened and
the RMA had a real need for alternatives to private industry.
Although it was not exploited to the full, the U-boat research at
the Danzig Imperial Yard gave the RMA a great deal of technical
expertise.

It also supplied an alternative to Krupp when Tirpitz

reluctantly decided to build submarines.

Thus, the RMA was never

placed at the same disadvantage with respect to U-boats as it was
with the turbine engine.

However, the Danzig Yard was not allowed to

advance its U-boat work as far and as fast as the Germaniawerft.
It remained Tirpitz's policy throughout this period to leave the
development of major technical innovation entirely in the hands of
private enterprise.
The Imperial Shipyard at Kiel was also used as a torpedo
manufacturing center.

This area was, of course, the State Secretary's

professional specialty and his estimate of the torpedoes produced at
Friedrichsort, adjacent to the Imperial Yard at Kiel, was very high.
Tirpitz kept this naval monopoly intact until 1914, and expanded
Kiel's extensive research and testing facilities.

Furthennore, the

Imperial Yards were collectively entrusted with the difficult task
of disbursing construction funds to the private yards as each stage
of a project was completed.
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Tirpitz obviously sought to keep as much of the building
program within the precincts of the RMA as possible.

The Protocol

System and the various parts the Imperial Yards played in it allowed
him to limit his dependence on private industry.

He then sought to

keep the Reich's political and financial forces at arm's length.
The less naval influence wielded by the Reichstag, Chancellor and
Treasury Office, the better the State Secretary liked it.
however, this effort was thwarted.

By 1909,

Tirpitz found it too difficult

to handle both the Wermuth's and Bethmann-Hollweg's determination to
moderate the navy's negative impact on the Reich's domestic and
foreign policies.
A source of frustration that neither the Protocol System nor
the Imperial Yards were ever able to resolve fully was overruns in
cost and weight.

They were a disagreeable, unavoidable part of

building sophisticated weaponry.

Every design revision, every price

change and every small production delay resulted in cost or weight
increases.

This was the kind of added expense that the RMA could

accept and minimize but never fully solve.
Additional sources of extra costs lay in the area of transport
and labor.

There was a constant contest between the RMA and its

suppliers over who was responsible for transport costs from the
factory to the shipyard.

In most cases the RMA coerced the suppliers

into arranging transport and paying the cost.

In the area of labor,

both the RMA and industry were undisturbed by any major shipbuilders'
strikes through 1912.

The socialist and independent labor unions

were as yet unable to force any dramatic changes in hours, pay or
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conditions.

While the situation was different at many of the Ruhr

mines and foundries, the wages paid to the shipyard workers rose
only slightly.

Nonetheless, the frequency of isolated work actions

began to increase between 1910 and 1912.

With the political success

of the SPD in 1912 the future of union influence at the shipyards
looked promising.
The RMA 1 s relative success in keeping the upper hand in its
relationship with vendors found its exception in the Krupp-Dillinger
alliance.

In the spring of 1900, Tirpitz's major clash with Fritz

Krupp over armor prices forced the latter to play his trump card,
i.e., his close relationship with the Kaiser.

The incident did

nothing to enhance the RMA 1 s relationship with Essen.

Indeed,

Capelle and other RMA leaders were afraid to bring up the subject of
armor prices lest the scene be replayed.

Obviously, Tirpitz himself

avoided another confrontation until favorable external forces changed
his mind.
Only Krupp and Dillinger were able to produce the nickel steel
armor in the quality and quantity that the navy needed.

Although

intra-industry competition among steel suppliers was often rigorous,
there was never any chance to use this against the armor alliance.
Not only did the industry usually manage to present a united front
to the navy in business matters, but also it seemed dangerous to
attack Krupp-Dillinger.

The RMA always had a chance of doing slight

damage to the alliance, but to what end?

Tirpitz needed the armor,

there was no alternative, and the threat of realiation was too
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great.

A production slowdown at Essen would have presented the

building program with a major setback.

Besides, Krupp owned the

Germaniawerft and monopolized ship artillery production.

To attack

Essen without some expectation of dramatic success would merely
invite disaster.
with Krupp.

Tirpitz knew this, and it colored his relationship

Eickstedt and his successor, Rollmann, also counseled

against attacks on Krupp or Dillinger.
Krupp operated as the most powerful and independent of all
navy contractors.

The RMA had ~o control over the firm's tendency to

consume its competitors.

The annexation of Gruson in Magdeburg gave

Krupp its preeminent position in armor production.

The firm's

attempted takeover of Vulcan in Stettin-Bredow was one of its few
failures.

However, in this case it was more the strength of the

Vulcan leadership than aid from the RMA that made the difference.
By 1906 Vulcan 1 s expansion into its new Hamburg facility assured it
of a greater number of capital ship contracts from the RMA.

This

guaranteed continuity for its workers and greater profits and
stability for the firm as a whole.
Krupp's efforts to enter into alliances met with mixed results.
As Krupp's successful alliance with Dillinger in armor plate showed,
the great advantage of this procedure was to assure complete control
in a particular market.

Dillinger had to enter this union, because

in the long run Krupp might have driven the company out of the armor
business with lower prices or annexed it.

From Essen's perspective

either of these options could cause a price war redounding to the
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benefit of the navy and army and squandering possible profits.

The

further possibility of the armed services supporting Dillinger as an
effective opponent also loomed large.

Thus, from Fritz Krupp's point

of view, the alliance assured a monopoly and kept Dillinger from
becoming an effective competitor in the future.
Krupp's failure to draw the American Lake Company into such an
alliance was a portent of things to come.

The Holland type U-boats

which the Lake Company sold in Europe were as good or better than the
Germaniawerft products.

Furthennore, many American finns were not

inclined toward Krupp's comfortable alliance proposals if a chance of
out competing Essen was still a real possibility.

It was Krupp's

inability to extend its alliance and combination practices to the
international scene that later gave the RMA its first real chance to
reduce annor prices.
The activities of the American Midvale Company in Europe and its
amazingly low annor price of 1,450 marks per ton in 1906 provided a
source of competition the alliance could not control.
beyond Essen's reach.

Midvale was

Tirpitz skillfully combined early overtures to

Midvale, serious RMA-Thyssen negotiations with the opportune attacks
on the alliance by 0ppersdorff later in 1909, to pressure Krupp into
lower prices.

Thyssen also became a real threat simply because the

Reichstag and RMA could give it advantages that would endanger the
hold the alliance possessed over the annor market.

At the very

least, Krupp perceived this combination as a threat, and that was
exactly what Tirpitz needed.

Domestic Gennan armor prices dropped
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more in the period between 1906 and 1910 than in the entire history
of naval expansion to that time.

Thus, the armor contract signed

with Krupp-Dillinger in 1910 at 1,550 marks per ton was initially
made possible by competitive forces outside of Germany.

Tirpitz's

ability to perceive the advantage allowed the RMA to exploit it to
the fullest.
Tirpitz was unable to exploit the possible advantage of the
LI-boat because he did not consider the LI-boat a necessary part of the
construction program.

Thus he had little interest in the vessel save

for keeping abreast of the technology.

Even this concern represented

less a concession to the LI-boat's future possibilities, than a
partial surrender to pressures from German government officials to
keep abreast of naval development.

The construction of LI-boats by

the RMA between 1906 and 1912 was Tirpitz's reaction to a successive
series of stimuli provided by a number of individuals and pressure
groups.

The Foreign Office provided the RMA with many reports on

the progress made by France and the United States with regard to
the U-boat.

Both countries were making an effort to find a

place for this new technology in their respective naval strategies.
The State Secretary's colleagues in the navy and many of those in
the Reichstag frequently wondered why the RMA was not fully exploiting
the possibilities of the U-boat.

Tirpitz felt he had to respond to

foreign pressures and knew the importance of naval and Reichstag
support for his construction program.

Therefore, he involved the RMA

in LI-boat development just enough to satisfy most critics and
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preserve the progress of his ambitions for the High Seas Fleet . When
it came to the U-boat, Tirpitz's dogmatism was at its worst.

To him

the U-boat was never anything but a defensive weapon and a minor
auxiliary to the battleship.

The ideas in Service Memo IX left no

room for the offensive strategy the U-boat represented .

Tirpitz felt

that extensive development of the weapon only detracted from the
major goal of the construction program, building capital ships.
One result of this situation was the strong position of the
Germaniawerft in 1904 when Tirpitz grudgingly allowed U-boats to
become part of the Imperial Navy.
manufacturer available.

Krupp was the only private

On the positive side, the Germaniawerft 1 s

extensive research and development facilities showed the diversifica
tion of Gennan industry and its ability to adapt.

The negative side

was the possibility of a Krupp U-boat monopoly, only narrowly
averted by the Danzig Imperial Yard's modest advances in the field.
On the whole, U-boat production was a lost opportunity for most of
the German shipbuilding industry before 1904 and remained so until
A.G. Weser first expanded into the area in 1914.
The RMA's experience with the U-boat illustrated the advent
of expensive high technology weipons.

The capital ships became

increasingly sophisticated with the dreadnought, and the U-boats added
to the cost of technical innovation.

Approximately 4% of the cost

of a dreadnought went into revolutionary technology or recent
innovation.

The estimate of between 3% and 4% for the much smaller

U-boats made them as expensive in this respect as a ship many times
their size.

In spite of the mastery of such advanced technology
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exhibited by German industry, Tirpitz 1 s strategic dogmas prevented
them from pursuing U-boat development on a larger scale.

Thus, his

faith in battleship strategy created a flaw in his policy regarding
research and development.
Tirpitz 1 s research and development policies also provided a
handicap to the RMA's electrical needs.

The major advantage for the

navy in the electrical industry was the intense competition, the
high demand for products and resulting ability of smaller finns to
survive.

There was plenty of profit available both inside and out

of naval work, and a real opportunity for the newer companies to
compete.

In the case of the turbine, however, this became a disad

vantage.

It was exactly the opposite of the RMA's problem with the

annor alliance.

Tirpitz insisted that research and development was

the province of the private sector, yet his need for turbines to
power his ships might have motivated him to guide the private firms
in their efforts to rival Parsons.

German shipbuilding and

electrical firms diluted their efforts to produce a truly domestic
turbine by experimenting with a number of different types in various
business syndicates and alliances.

As a result the building program

reached its peak in 1912 without a German turbine to compete with
the Parsons' System.
By employing the options open to him, especially through the
Protocol System and Suppliers List, Tirpitz could have reduced much
of this wasted effort.

By limiting RMA vendors to the Parsons'

System at the outset, and encouraging research and development to

270

develop variations and improvements, the results might have been much
better.

Certainly, he was not above this sort of interference in

business affairs.

Greater RMA involvement might have focused the

powers of industry to a higher degree.

In this case, Tirpitz's

policy of removing the RMA from any major technological innovation
until it was perfected encouraged too much competition.

Parsons'

early prominence should have quickly given way to a German variation.
Instead the British company dominated this type of propulsion via
its Gennan subsidiary.
The final questions regarding the RMA's relationship with the
shipbuilding industry are twofold.

First, did the navy achieve its

goals within the strict boundaries defined by Tirpitz? Second, an
evaluation of Tirpitz is necessary.

Was he an asset or a liability

to RMA-industrial relations in the long run?
Within the limits stipulated by Tirpitz, the RMA was very
successful in purchasing quality naval hardware and keeping the upper
hand in its relations with industry.

The RMA was dealing with a

multitude of diverse vendors and shipyards which the Protocol System
managed to coordinate and tame with a few notable exceptions.

Of

these even the power of the Krupp-Dillinger alliance was moderated
with some success in spite of a degree of dependence upon outside
forces.

Furthermore, there is little question that the ships built

by Tirpitz performed well in war.

Indeed, the British were surprised

by the high degree of quality they confronted at Jutland, only two
months after Tirpitz resigned as State Secretary in 1916.
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The building program was a boon to German business.

Tirpitz's

well defined ambitions brought the shipbuilding industry to a greater
stage of maturity, more quickly than van Stosch would have thought
possible.

The diversity of the skills required and the technological

expertise needed to create the High Seas Fleet benefitted Krupp and
Siemens, M.A.N., Korting and many smaller concerns.
Throughout the construction program Tirpitz's outstanding
political and administrative abilities shone forth.

He took an

extremely primitive navy and gave it purpose and direction.

The

Reichstag committed itself to Tirpitz's ambitions for the navy less
than two years after it spurned Hollmann's meager requests.

Tirpitz

also managed to mobilize the industrial strength needed to fulfill
his expansion program.

At the same time he preserved an advantage

for the navy in its relations with industry.

In particular, the

Admiral's accomplishments between 1897 and 1902 were nothing less
than phenomenal.
However, there is still another perspective.

Tirpitz's

theories of naval warfare placed strict limits on what the navy could
build.

The construction prograffi was the opening shot of the decisive

battle he was determined to have with the British.

Unfortunately, he

believed that he could defeat Great Britain at its own game.

Instead

of focusing on the vulnerability of Britain's geographic position and
the weak points of the Royal Navy, he advocated a head-on confrontation
between capital ships.

The British, given their naval traditions and

head start in sheer numbers, naturally relied on their battleship
strength.

Germany possessed neither the numbers nor such honored
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traditions but it had the industrial potential.

If Tirpitz had

worked for a Handelskrieg strategy as hard as he did for his Risk
Theory, the danger to Great Britain would have been far greater.
The Li-boat might have penetrated the Imperial Navy sooner and in
greater numbers, as it did in France.

The building program designed

to fulfill such a strategy would have equally benefitted industry.

A

large force of fast cruisers, and hundreds of smaller craft including
the Li-boat, also promised industrial challenges and profits.
On the one hand, Tirpitz showed an amazing ability to adapt
politically and to sense an advantage that would further his goals.
These talents he used effectively in the Reichstag and among the
industrialists and manufacturers who contracted to build the fleet.
On the other hand, his dogmas prevented him from transferring this
adaptability into the areas of strategy and technological innovation.
Thus the RMA had difficulty with the turbine and the substantial
advantages of the Li-boat were by and large lost to the navy and
industry until 1914.
With Tirpitz, the fleet construction program satisfied both the
RMA and industry.

Without his dogmatic views the fleet might have

played a greater role in the war.

It was the ultimate contradiction

_ to have the State Secretary of the RMA dictating strategy to the
ACllliral Staff.

However, that is exactly what his decisions on fleet

composition did, and without the agreement of those whose job it was
to direct the navy in wartime.

As an administrator and politician,

Tirpitz was necessary for the success of the 1898-1912 naval expansion
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program.

As a strategist he proved a liability, playing into his

chosen enemy's strength and reducing the options open to the Admiral
Staff.
The Kaiser was the only arbiter between the Admiral Staff and
the RMA.

Rather than solve the problem by encouraging collaboration

between them or subordinating one authority to the other, Wilhelm
supplied no direction at all.

Therefore, Tirpitz efficiently created

a fleet of his own design, paying little attention to the needs of the
Admiral Staff.

This situation accurately reflects the chaotic

political and social system of which Tirpitz and Wilhelm were only
one part.
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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
These biographical sketches are intended as a supplement to
the footnotes and an aid to the reader. Source: Ran~liste der
kaiserlichen deutschen Marine, 1890-1918; Eherenrangl1ste der
kaiserlichen deutschen Marine, 1914-1918.
Admiral Behncke (8.13. 1866- 1.4.1937): entered the navy on April 4,
1883 and by 1911 had accumulated 14 years and 2 months of sea
duty.
Promotions and positions:
Captain: 9.12.08 Admiralty Staff Dept. Head.
Rear Admiral 7.14. 14 Official representative of the
Admiralty Staff 1914-1915.
Vice Admiral 11.25. 16 Same as above until January 1916;
then in charge of the 3rd Battle Squadron to Sept. 1918.
Admiral Capelle: Entered the German Navy on April 18, 1872.
He spent a total of 13 years working at sea.
Promotions and positions:
Captain: 10.8.00 Dir. of the Administrative Dept., RMA
(to 1906)
Rear Admiral 7.7.06 Same as above (to 1909)
Vice Admiral 9.5.09 Same as above (to 1913)
Admiral 1913 Same as above until 1914; Asst. State Secretary
of the RMA until 1916.
17 March 1916 He succeeded Tirpitz as State Secretary of
the RMA.
Admiral Dahnhardt: Was born on October 27, 1863 and entered the
service in April of 1879. He was a Lt. Captain under Pohl in
the Central Div. of the RMA until 1902 when he became first
adjutant to Diedrichs, Chief of the Admiralty Staff.
Promotions and positions:
Captain 1905 Dir., Budget Div. of Capelle's Administrative
Dept.
Rear Admiral 1910 Same position
Vice Admiral 3.31. 14 Dir., Budget Dept. of the RMA
Retired: 1. 15.16
Admiral von Eickstedt: Took over as head of the Construction Dept.
of the RMA as of November 10, 1899 (Captain)
Promotions and positions:
Rear Admiral 3.11.02 Same as above until his retirement in 1906
Vice Admiral 1.27.06.
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Admiral Galster: Was one of Tirpitz's strongest and best known
critics. He advocated the integration of the U-boat into
German naval strategy.
Promotions and positions:
Rear Admiral 9.13.01
Vice Admiral 3.14.05
1904 Dir. of the Ship Artillery Inspectorate at the Imperial
Shipyard in Wilhelmshaven.
Retired: 1907
Admiral von Heeringen: Entered the service in 1872 (4.18) and rose
to the rank of Captain by 1900, when he corrmanded the S.M.S.
v!orth.
Promotions and positions:
Rear Admiral 7.7.06 Comnander of the Scout Cruiser Squadron
Admiral l .27.13 Chief of the North Sea Naval Station
Retired: 1914.
Admiral Heusner:
Admiralty
was given
RMA.
Retired:

Entered the navy on 18 June 1857 and served in the
and as Director of the Naval Department. In 1889 he
the newly created position of State Secretary of the
1891.

Admiral Hollmann: Was Tirpitz's immediate predecessor as State
Secretary of the RMA. He took over that position in 1891.
Promotions and positions:
Captain: 2.15.1881 Corrmander of the First Sailor Division.
Rear Admiral 8.14.1888 Chief of the Instruction Squadron.
Vice Admiral 11. 18.90.
Admiral von Holtzendorf: Entered the service on April 11, 1869.
As of 1902 he had almost twenty years of service at sea.
Promotions and positions:
Captain 6.30.97 Dir. of the Imperial Yard at Danzig
Rear Admiral 1.27.04 Attached to the Dir. of the Baltic Sea
Naval Station.
Vice Adniral 4.27.07 Chief of the First Squadron.
Admiral 1.27.10 Chief of the High Seas Fleet
Retired: 1913.
Admiral Freiherr van Maltzahn: (1849-1930) Began his career in 1866.
He was Chief of the Baltic Naval Station and participated in
tactical experiments on maneuvers under Dahnhardt, Koester,
and Thompson.
Positions:
Commander, S.M.S. WUrttemberg, 1893-1895.
Commander, School Ship 11 Stosch, 11 1898.
Transferred to the Naval Academy, 1899.
He was a strategic opponent of Tirpitz.
Retired: l 903.
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Admiral von M°uller: (1854-1940) Entered the service in May of 1871
and spent some time as a Lt. Commander in Tirpitz's Torpedo
arm in 1879. Early in his career he was assigned to the German
Embassy in Stockholm as Naval Attache.
Promotions and positions:
1891 Commander, canon boat Iltis (China).
1897-1898 Personal Adjutant to Prince Heinrich (the Kaiser's
brother) in China; Chief of Staff to the Cruiser Squadron.
1898-1900 Commander, S.M.S. Deutschland.
1900 Captain, assigned to the Naval Cabinet.
1902-1904 Commander, S.M.S. Wettin
1907 Replaced von Senden-Bfbran as Chief of the Naval Cabinet.
1910 Admiral.
Captain Persius: Was Tirpitz's most relentless opponent and a U-boat
advocate. Professionally isolated and hounded by Tirpitz, his
career ended prematurely. He entered the service on April 16,
1883 and was promoted to Corvette-Captain by 1903.
Admiral Rollmann: Replaced von Eickstedt as head of the RMA Construc
tion Dept. in 1907. He held that position until the opening
of the World War in 1914.
Positions and promotions:
Corvette-Captain 1906 Second Adjutant under Capt. Engel,
Dir. of the Shipyard Div., RMA
Rear Admiral 4.27.07 Dir. RMA Construction Dept.
Vice Admiral 1 .27. 10 Same as above.
Admiral Tirpitz: (1849-1930) Director of the RMA and architect of the
German naval buildup between 1897 and 1912.
Promotions and positions:
Cadet 1865.
Naval Academy years 1874-1876
Rear ACJJ1iral 1895
Vice Admiral 1899
1896-1897 Commander, East Asian Cruiser Squadron
January 1897 State Secretary of the RMA
1901 knighted
Replaced by Capelle as State Secretary in March of 1916.
Admiral von Usedom: Was Director of the Imperial Shipyard at Kiel and
its Technical Institute. He entered the service in May of 1871
and put in 17 years and 9 months at sea.
Promotions and positions:
Captain 9.18.1899 Adjutant to the Kaiser and commander of
the Imperial Yacht, S.M.S. Hohenzollern.
Rear Admiral 3.14.05 Dir. of the Imperial Shipyard, Kiel.
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Admiral Wegener: Had an impact on strategic thinking by virtue of his
experience with command at sea. He challenged Tirpitz by
writing a service memo against the Risk Theory.
Promotions and positions:
Entered the service 1894
1897-1899 Far East Cruiser Squadron
1905-1907 Academy
1907-1908 Second Battle Squadron
1908-1909 First Battle Squadron (under van Holtzendorf)
1909-1910 Scout Forces
Staff Officer with the Scout Forces under Bachmann, 1911-1912;
under Lans and Eckermann 1913-1917.
Frigate Captain 4.26.17
Captain 1.21.20 (Reichsmarine)
11
Rear Admiral 3.1 .23
Retired: Vice Admiral 9.30.26

APPENDIX B
STRUCTURE OF THE RMA PROTOCOL SYSTEM
KWS - reports on inventory acquisition
T - funds disbursement control (Neubaufonds)
! - operation cost accounting
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